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MONOPOLIZATION OF COMPUTER PERIPHERAL
EQUIPMENT: Telex Corp. v. International Business
Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975)
By CHRISTOPHER NORGAARD*
INTRODUCTION
Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp. I repre-
sents the first major decision in a series of antitrust actions which
have been lodged in recent years against the International Busi-
ness Machines Corporation (IBM) by both IBM's competitors
and the Justice Department.' Prior to reversal by the Tenth Cir-
cuit, Telex had obtained one of the largest damage awards in the
history of American litigation.' The trial court judge, A. Sherman
Christensen,' found that IBM's success had generally been due to
its skill, industry, and foresight, and, specifically, that IBM had
set the standard of quality in the industry for products and serv-
ices.5 But because IBM was also found to have a high percentage
* Associate, Grant, McHendrie, Haines and Crouse, Denver, Colorado; A.B., 1970,
Stanford University; J.D., 1973, Georgetown University.
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 8 (1975), rev'g 367 F.
Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
2 Telex's numerous compatriots who have similarly beseiged IBM with suits alleging
monopolization of the "peripheral equipment" part of the electronic data processing
(EDP) industry have had their actions consolidated for trial in the Northern District of
California and assigned to Judge Ray McNichols for pretrial proceedings. Discovery is
continuing and trial has tentatively been set for late 1976 and early 1977. The consolidated
action is entitled In re IBM Antitrust Cases, MDL No. 163 (N.D. Cal., filed April 11,
1975). To date, one case, Marshall Industries v. IBM, has been settled and dismissed. See
note 8 infra. The Justice Department's action, United States v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ.
200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 11, 1974), is now in trial before Judge Edelstein. The Justice
Department is seeking to break IBM into smaller units on the basis of alleged monopoliza-
tion of mainframes as well as peripheral products.
The district court awarded plaintiff Telex $259.5 million in treble damages and $1.2
million in legal fees. 367 F. Supp. at 363-64.
Judge Christensen, Senior Judge for the District Court of Utah, was assigned spe-
cially to the Telex case. For the procedural background, see Id. at 267-69.
5 Id. at 306.
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of the relevant market as defined by the district court, IBM's
introduction of products at lower prices, in ways which were
stated to be lawful absent such a market share, was deemed
violative of the antitrust laws to the extent that a competitor
(Telex) was injured.' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reversed the antitrust decision. The appellate
court, however, believed itself so constrained by the market share
test that it went off in search of a new and larger market (of which
IBM's percentage share was relatively low), finding one only by
introducing a new and logically unwarranted concept of supply
substitutability.7
The Telex case was settled prior to a decision by the United
States Supreme Court on whether to grant certiorari.' Each side
dismissed its claims with prejudice, although certain injunctive
provisions of the Tenth Circuit's decree relative to Telex's misap-
propriation of IBM trade secrets remain in effect. Claims based
on activities outside of the United States, which had been ex-
cluded from the case by stipulation of the parties, will not be
pursued. The settlement makes the Tenth Circuit's decision all
the more important; moreover, it is likely that the Supreme Court
will at some time render a decision on the facts of Telex in either
the Justice Department action or the other consolidated cases.'
This article suggests that courts should relax the market
share test in favor of a more comprehensive industry analysis
' Although the court does not make a general finding on this point, it is supported
by the court's specific findings in its separate discussions of each challenged act. See, e.g.,
id. at 294, 296-97, 299, 301, 306, 342, 345, 346, 347.
7 510 F.2d at 897, 917. Supply substitutability and reasonable interchangeability are
two terms which describe the same concept. The former term is used throughout this
article and in the district court's opinion; the Tenth Circuit uses the latter term.
The court of appeals affirmed judgment in favor of IBM on its counterclaim for
misappropriation of trade secrets, but reduced the compensatory damages to $17.5 million
while affirming the $1 million punitive damages award.
Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6, 1975, at 6. Telex stated in documents filed with the
SEC that it would be unable to pay the $18.5 million IBM counterclaim damages awarded
by the Tenth Circuit. IBM has also settled a peripheral products action brought by
Marshall Industries, which has since sold its electronic data processing operations to
Mohawk Data Sciences for a cash payment of $800,000. Marshall had sought $36 million
in actual damages. The other plaintiffs have generally stated that they intend to press
ahead notwithstanding the Telex and Marshall settlements, which they view as motivated
by the special financial conditions of the settling plaintiffs. Id., Sept. 30, 1975, at 16. See
also note 2 supra.
' See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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when monopolization is alleged, with the focus on what should be
the ultimate issue in any monopolization case: Has the defendant
demonstrated the power to control prices or exclude competition?
The Supreme Court has pointed the way with its recent treat-
ment of merger cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 0 In
United States v. General Dynamics" the Supreme Court rejected
the talisman of market share in favor of a detailed examination
of industry trends and economics.
Indeed, it may be seriously wondered whether monopoly
power resulting from single firm growth is even possible in the
absence of governmental intervention or capital curtailment and
absent conduct independently violative of the antitrust laws.
Moreover, any possible detriment resulting from short-term mo-
nopoly position should be outweighed by the benefits of a relaxed
monopolization policy in shaking up complacent, oligopolistic
major manufacturing industries.
I. NATURE OF THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
A. Electronic Data Processing Systems 2
An EDP system has two general parts: A central processing
unit (CPU or mainframe) which controls the system and performs
logical operations such as additions, subtractions, and compari-
sons; and peripheral equipment consisting of input devices, out-
put devices, and storage devices. 3 The CPU and peripheral
equipment are controlled by a sequence of instructions which tells
the system how to perform a given function. This sequence of
instructions is known as "software"; the CPU and peripheral
equipment are known as "hardware." Peripheral equipment is a
necessary and important equipment group which now accounts
for 50 to 75 percent of a new system's price. Peripheral equipment
includes a number of different devices performing varied func-
tions.
The first function is storage of information for processing.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
415 U.S. 486 (1974).
2 This discussion is based largely on the district court's findings of fact, nos. 24-34.
See 367 F. Supp. at 273-75. See also Briefs for Appellant and Appellee.
11 Peripheral devices, however, can also perform control functions. Moreover, peri-
pherals such as tape and disk drives have their own controllers.
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Storage devices include magnetic disk spindles, magnetic tape
drives, and memories. Tapes and disks are somewhat analogous
to conventional recording tapes and phonograph records respec-
tively. Disk drives are faster and more expensive than tape drives.
Memories are even faster and more expensive than disks. In addi-
tion to peripheral memories, all CPU's have a minimum memory
capacity of their own, and increasingly larger memories are being
integrated into CPU's. Data is transmitted to the processor and
returned in processed form through memories. Disks and tapes
are a more permanent storage media from which data can be
transferred to memories for processing.
Two additional peripheral equipment functions are input
and output. Input is the conversion of data from language or
numbers to electronic signals for processing; output is the conver-
sion of electronic signals back to printed or typed language for
display on paper or a television-like screen. Output devices can
also be used to perform further mechanical functions, including
the operation of other computer systems. Some examples of
input-output peripheral equipment are teletype machines, type-
writer terminals, card punches, punch card readers, and readers
of characters on checks or merchandise. Both tapes and disks can
also perform input and output functions.
A peripheral device is said to be "plug compatible" with
other components of a system when it can be "plugged" into that
system without modification. Peripherals designed for one system
can be used in another system only if the manufacturer changes
the "interface" attachment between the peripheral device and
the other system components. Such interface modifications con-
stitute a very small part of a peripheral device's manufacturing
cost. I4
Computer equipment is classified by generations (first, sec-
ond, third, or fourth generation) according to the technology used
in producing the equipment. A higher numbered generation in-
corporates significant technological advances, usually resulting in
an improved price/performance ratio over the generation preced-
ing it. First generation equipment was initially produced in 1952,
" For example, the total engineering cost required for Telex to modify its first tape
drive for use in the IBM System 360 was $42,000. See 367 F. Supp. at 270.
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and equipment of the succeeding generations appeared in 1958,
1964, and 1970.'1
B. The Computer Industry'6
As of 1972, 96 companies manufactured and marketed all
components required for a complete EDP system and were thus
considered systems manufacturers. About seven of these are con-
sidered principal manufacturers; they include IBM, which was
found by the district court to have 35 to 45 percent of the systems
market, Sperry Rand Univac, Honeywell, Control Data, Bur-
roughs, National Cash Register, and Digital Equipment Corpora-
tion. 7
In addition, a large number of generally smaller companies
manufacture and market only peripheral equipment for use in
systems manufactured by others. IBM systems customers are the
chief market for peripherals made by others because IBM, as the
industry leader, has the largest number of installed systems. The
manufacture by others of peripherals plug compatible with IBM
systems received its primary boost by the widespread success of
IBM's third generation System 360, first marketed in 1964. In
1966 Telex and other manufacturers began marketing peripheral
equipment which was "plug compatible" with the System 360.
IBM's plug compatible manufacturer (PCM) competitors
market copies of IBM peripherals. The PCM's wait until IBM has
brought a system to market and then duplicate the peripheral
devices through reverse engineering. IBM's lead time over Telex,
i.e., the time required for Telex to study, duplicate, and market
its own plug compatible copy, has generally been at least 11/2 to
" Brief for Appellant at 17. IBM's fourth generation equipment is the System 370,
which includes the Merlin (3330) disk and the Aspen (3420) tape. In 1972, a new field
effect transistor memory was introduced with the new Models 158 and 168 of the System
370 CPU. The System 370 components will be referred to as fourth generation products,
although, as discussed below, it is not clear that they offer sufficiently improved
price/performance characteristics to constitute a new or separate market for purposes of
assessing liability for monopolization. See text accompanying notes 100-05 infra.
1' This discussion is based largely on the district court's findings of fact, nos. 17-23.
See 367 F. Supp. at 271-73. See also Briefs for Appellant and Appellee.
11 General Electric, RCA, and, very recently, Xerox have left the industry. Sperry
Rand Univac and Honeywell, respectively, have taken over the RCA and General Electric
operations. Honeywell has signed a letter of intent to service installed Xerox computers
and is negotiating for the purchase of Xerox's manufacturing operations. Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 9, 1975, at 7.
1976
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2 years, absent illegal appropriation of IBM trade secrets.'" IBM's
total costs are accordingly higher than those of its peripheral
competitors, although its manufacturing costs alone appear to be
10 to 15 percent less than those of Telex. Of course, if its manufac-
turing costs were not less than those of Telex, IBM would presum-
ably have strong incentive not to manufacture its own peripherals
but simply to engage Telex as a supplier. Many "Telex" branded
peripheral components are manufactured by other suppliers for
final assembly and marketing by Telex.' 9
A user can change its installed peripherals either by replac-
ing only the peripherals on a box-for-box basis, or by converting
to an entirely different system. While most users can replace on
a box-for-box basis with relative ease, the same is not true for
converting to a different system. Systems purchasers and lessees
are typically large and increasingly sophisticated institutions.
They include government agencies, universities, and business
corporations. A great deal of customwork must go into the design
and installation of each system for its particular use. Precise
configuration and selection of equipment must be made, based
upon the customer's needs, space, and financial limitations, and
the customer's data must be appropriately programmed and its
personnel trained. Because of the reprogramming which is re-
quired in addition to reinstallation and retraining, there is a sig-
nificant conversion-cost barrier encountered by a user seeking to
replace its present system with another. Apparently, there are no
statistics indicative of the height of this barrier, but some indus-
try personnel have estimated that a systems manufacturer or
marketer has perhaps a 20 to 25 percent chance, at best, of sur-
mounting the barrier to obtain customer conversion to a system
which otherwise offers price/performance advantages over the
customer's existing system.20
'" Such misappropriation was found to have occurred in connection with the Telex
copies of IBM's fourth generation tapes and disk drives. A table in the district court
decision shows a comparison of the IBM product introduction dates with those of equiva-
lent Telex introductions. 367 F. Supp. at 292.
" Telex disk drives are purchased from Information Storage Systems, a Sperry Rand
subsidiary. The basic mechanism for Telex printers is purchased from Control Data. The
basic parts of the Telex memories have been purchased from various suppliers.
21 Various computer industry personnel were contacted with regard to background
information important to an understanding of antitrust principles in the EDP industry
but not discussed in the briefs or court opinions.
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Price/performance considerations of the product itself, how-
ever, are dominant when a customer considers a PCM offer to
replace one or more peripherals with PCM products. Moreover,
it appears to be fairly common for such price/performance consid-
erations to induce a new system customer to substitute PCM
equipment directly at the time of the system purchase. Telex
itself has purchased IBM CPU's and offered them to new custom-
ers in conjunction with Telex peripherals.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO CONTROVERSY
A. IBM's Responses to Its Declining Peripheral Product Market
Share During the 1969-1972 Period
The years 1969 and 1970 saw substantial erosion of IBM's
market share of System 360 compatible disk drives in favor of
Telex and other PCM's who were marketing such products at
prices substantially below those of IBM. The IBM 2314 series disk
drive and controller was the disk component of the System 360.1
Telex shipments of its 5314 disk drive and controller, equivalent
to the IBM 2314 series, began in April 1970, and by December
1970 the PCM's had replaced at least 5.3 percent of the 2314-type
disk drives attached to IBM systems.
IBM's first response to the market erosion problem studied
by a task force created in February 197022 was the 2319A disk
drive for Model 145 of IBM's new System 370.3 The 2319A an-
nouncement was made on September 23, 1970, and its stated
purpose was to provide a smaller and cheaper disk drive alterna-
tive for the 370/145 CPU than the fourth generation Merlin 3330
disk drive. To produce the 2319A, IBM began with a 2314 series
four-spindle disk drive and removed one of the spindles, reducing
storage capacity by one-fourth. The control function, which had
been performed by an independent controller on the 2314 series
" The 2314 disk drive was available in three basic configurations: The 2312, contain-
ing one disk-drive spindle; the 2318, containing two spindles; and the 2313, containing four
spindles.
22 IBM designated peripherals as a "Key Corporate Strategic Issue" in February 1970.
One month later a task force was formed, headed by H. E. Cooley, Vice President of IBM's
Systems Development Division. On July 31, 1970, the Cooley task force reported to IBM's
management review committee. 367 F. Supp. at 293.
" For a discussion of IBM's marketing of the 2319A disk drive, see the district court's
findings of fact, 367 F. Supp. at 293-94, and the court of appeals' opinion, 510 F.2d at 900-
02.
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models, was split into two parts, with one part placed inside the
2319A box itself and the other moved into the 370/145 CPU. The
2319A was priced substantially below both the 2314 series unit,
which was still available for use with the 370/145, and the PCM
equivalents. Its monthly rental was $1,550, compared with a total
monthly rental of $2,875 for the comparable 2314 series unit. 4 Its
rental was also a minimum of $300 below Telex's monthly rental
for its equivalent product. The 2319A's price was not below pro-
duction costs and was projected to produce a profit margin in
excess of 20 percent on expected sales volume.
A second peripheral task force was formed by IBM in Octo-
ber 1970. ' The new task force analyzed IBM's PCM competitors
in some depth, including their manufacturing costs and cash flow
relating to 2314 series products. Its report concluded that Telex
was a viable competitor in a number of respects, but that its
manufacturing costs were 10 to 15 percent above those of IBM.
The report, after finding that Telex and Memorex were IBM's two
chief PCM competitors, undertook to forecast the effect on them
of various 2314 price cuts. IBM believed that Memorex and Telex
would respond to 2314 price cuts with reductions of their own, but
that such reductions would have a very serious impact on their
profits and revenues.
IBM announced the 2319B disk drive on December 14, 1970.
It could be used with all System 360 CPU's. The 2319B had the
same storage capacity as the 2319A, but, unlike the 2319A, con-
trol logic was not moved to the CPU. The monthly rental price
for the new unit was more than $1,000 below that of its 2314 series
equivalent, $270 below the monthly rental of Telex's 2319B equiv-
alent, and $235 below the average PCM rental for such a product.
In addition, IBM's extra use charges, which Telex did not have
and which IBM knew to be a source of customer irritation and
expense, were eliminated on the 2319A, 2319B, and fourth genera-
tion 3330 disk drives. As the district court noted, the 2319B an-
nouncement was "purely a price cut" which did not purport to
increase performance over the 2314 series disk subsystems. 6
" 367 F. Supp. at 293.




The 2319 pricing actions did not reverse the decline of IBM's
market share. The PCM's, including Telex, made responsive
price cuts to levels substantially below those of IBM. They had
the additional advantage of "complete modularity," i.e., their
disks were available in a greater variety of storage capacities so
that they were able to "sell between" IBM's 2319 configurations.
Also, Telex was able to meet the IBM price reduction, because it
negotiated a 28 percent price reduction from its 2314-type sup-
plier, Information Storage Systems. Between November 1970 and
December 31, 1972, Telex shipped 1,074 more 2314-type disk
drives and 191 more 2314-type disk controllers than it had pre-
dicted. By December 1972, the PCM share of 2314/2319-type disk
equipment was 21.6 percent, and the PCM share of all disk drives
installed on IBM CPU's was 17.5 percent.
B. IBM's Fixed-Term Leasing Plan
In the first quarter of 1971, Mr. Whitcomb of IBM prepared
another study of PCM's which was presented to the president of
IBM and to IBM's management review committee. 7 It estimated
that by 1976 IBM would lose 19 percent of the plug compatible
tape market and 28.7 percent of the disk market, including 48
percent of the fourth generation 3330 disk installations. The
study recognized that defending against the PCM's was difficult
due to their pricing and performance advantages and recom-
mended frequent improvements in technology, as well as pricing
actions, to exploit IBM's new product lead time. It also recom-
mended the consideration of long-term leases. It raised a warn-
ing flag of possible substantial erosion in printers and memories;
in 1970, IBM had begun to suspect that Telex would soon offer
a memory device. A task force, known informally within the IBM
organization as the "Blue Ribbon Task Force," was formed to
develop a new peripheral strategy. On May 6, 1971, the task force
recommended drastic tape and disk price cuts ranging from 15 to
50 percent. Instead of accepting this recommendation, the man-
agement review committee, apparently on the wishes of IBM
President Frank T. Cary, suggested a long-term leasing approach.
The fixed-term leasing plan (FTP) was formulated, and upon
approval by the management review committee on May 25, 1971,
17 Id. at 297-98. See also 510 F.2d at 904.
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was announced to the public 2 days later." The task force antici-
pated that FTP would reduce revenue by more than $75 million
in 1971 and 1972, but believed that it would produce a profit in
the long run due to reduced market shares for PCM's and less
churning of equipment.
FTP covered disks, tapes, and printers. It provided for a 15
percent reduction in purchase price. For lease customers, it pro-
vided an alternative to the current 30-day rental contract with
discounts of 8 percent on a 1-year lease and 16 percent on a 2-
year lease. Additional use charges were also eliminated for all
products covered by the plan. The total effective monthly rental
reduction on the 2-year plan was 31 percent on disks and 20
percent on tapes. The reduction on printers was in the 30-35
percent range. The cuts put prices of products covered by the
plan "in some instances" below those of the PCM's. Nevertheless,
Telex and the other PCM's managed to respond by generally
lowering their prices below those of IBM. Telex prices were lower
than those of IBM at all times within the 1968-72 period, except
on "four isolated occasions," and Telex's prices were generally
somewhat higher than those of the other PCM's. 9
IBM imposed termination penalties of 5 times the monthly
rental charge in the event of termination of a 2-year lease during
its first year, and 21/2 times the monthly rental charge for termi-
nation of a 2-year lease during its second year or for termination
of a 1-year lease. The plan was completely optional, i.e., custom-
ers could still purchase the peripheral equipment outright or lease
it under the normal 30-day rental arrangement. 0
FTP was not motivated only by the failure of the 2319 pricing
367 F. Supp. at 298.
Id. at 299. The district court found that:
Telex's prices were generally higher than the prices of other plug compatible
manufacturers. In addition, Telex and the other plug compatible manufac-
turers generally reduced below list the prices they actually charged through
various forms of price concessions.
Id.
Id Id. The Extended Term Plan, announced in March 1972, was a variation of FTP
and was found by the district court to have no substantially different economic impact or
consequence in this case. In March 1973 IBM announced a term-lease plan which offered
a 4-year lease on System 370 virtual storage processors. FTP, Extended Term Plan, and
the 4-year term lease were all alternatives to the normal 30-day lease-and-purchase op-
tions. Id. at 300.
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actions to stop the rapid erosion of IBM's disk and tape market
shares. Because IBM, unlike its plug compatible competitors,
had employed no long-term lease of any kind prior to FTP, it had
suffered substantial returns of its equipment during the 1970-71
inflationary/recessionary period. This ill fortune had not been
shared by the PCM's or by IBM's systems competitors, who gen-
erally leased their equipment for 1, 2, or more years.' In 1970
IBM's sales force had achieved only 50 percent of its objective,
and in 1971 IBM experienced the "worst sales record year" 2 in
its history, as gross income growth was sluggish and earnings
flattened out.3
The effect of FTP was found to be a successful suppression
of further PCM growth in the disk, tape, and printer markets.
The basis of this finding was that between June 1971 and Decem-
ber 1972 the PCM share of the disk market did not exceed 17.5
percent, and the PCM share of the tape market did not exceed
15 percent. This is not to say, however, that the PCM tape and
disk drive market shares did not increase somewhat after June
1971. The PCM share of all plug compatible disk drives increased
from 14.5 percent in June 1971 to 17.5 percent in December 1972.
The PCM 2314/2319 disk drive share increased from 14.7 percent
in June 1971 to 21.6 percent in December 1972. The PCM share
of the total tape market during the same period increased only
from 13.7 percent to 14.9 percent. This retarded growth rate was
apparently due chiefly to IBM's success with its fourth generation
Aspen 3420 tape drive, which was announced in November 1970
and first shipped in September 1971. The PCM share of third
generation tapes increased during the same period from 13.7 per-
cent to 21.6 percent.
Nevertheless, the fixed-term plan was in many respects a
success for IBM. By July 22, 1971, 40 percent of those who were
already IBM disk, tape, and printer customers had signed up
with FTP. IBM records showed that 90 percent of its new fourth
generation 3330 disk and 3420 tape products were being installed
under FTP. Immediately following FTP, and notwithstanding
" Id. at 297.
32 Id.
33 Annual Report for the Year Ended December 31, 1974, International Business
Machines Corp., Jan. 28, 1975, at 28-29.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
competitive price reductions by Telex and three other PCM's,
IBM estimated that the order rate of the PCM's had been cut by
50 percent. By the end of 1971, 6 months after the introduction
of FTP, IBM estimated a 62 percent decrease in monthly PCM
sales of tape products. The same analysis estimated that in the
41/2 months subsequent to the FTP announcement, PCM
monthly disk sales were off 48 percent from their rate during the
first 5 months of 1971.
The district court emphasized an IBM document which had
attempted to forecast FTP effects on PCM's. This document had
predicted that the PCM's would offer long-term leases similar to
those of IBM but with base rentals initially 10 percent below
those of IBM and declining 5 percent per year. The forecast
noted, however, that in the disk area the initial PCM installa-
tions would be conversions from the third generation 2314 series
rather than replacements of fourth generation 3330's, because the
3330 was a new product not yet copied by the PCM's and was
being widely installed under FTP. IBM estimated that by the
time the 3330 leases approached maturity, it would be able to
introduce more new products to hold its market share. IBM also
predicted that FTP would further encourage customers to move
from the 2314 series to the 3330 series disk products.
C. IBM's Pricing of CPU's and Memories
IBM documents indicated that some IBM executives had
believed that once FTP was announced it would have to be ap-
plied across the board and could not be confined to peripherals. 4
In late June 1971, however, IBM rejected any extension of FTP
to CPU's and memories on the grounds that such an extension
would "prematurely erode the FTP concept to the entire product
line, and, in addition, would be ineffective unless accompanied
by some degree of pricing action. '3 5 In July 1971 CPU prices were
raised, with the increase ranging from 4 to 8 percent.3 1 IBM's
position was that the increase simply reflected higher costs during
the 1970-71 period, as shown by Federal Price Commission ap-
" See 367 F. Supp. at 300.
I /d.
" On March 30, 1971, the Data Processing Group had recommended to IBM's man-
agement review committee that CPU prices be raised. Id.
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proval of the increase. On August 5, 1971, Mr. Powell of IBM
wrote that the net effect of FTP in conjunction with the July 1971
CPU and memory price increase would "probably be a wash inso-
far as business volumes are concerned. . . .The net effect of the
FTP and price changes will not significantly increase [the cus-
tomers'] total cost and no system decreases were forecast."37
On August 2, 1972, IBM announced its new 370/158 and
370/168 CPU's. The 158 CPU monthly rental was $30,700, com-
pared to $20,600 for a 370/155 CPU. The monthly rental for the
168 CPU was $48,600, as opposed to $36,400 for a 370/165 CPU.
The 158 and 168 offered improved performance, but the district
court found that the price increase outweighed the performance
increase. At the same time, IBM also announced a new auxiliary
memory to be used with the 158 and 168, at a price of $5,200 per
megabyte per month," which was substantially below IBM's
prior memory prices. On the basis of IBM's studies and memo-
randa, the trial court concluded that: (1) The 1971 price hikes on
CPU's and memories had been specifically planned to offset reve-
nue reductions resulting from the 2319 and FTP programs; and
(2) the 1972 CPU prices on the 158 and 168 CPU's had been
planned in conjunction with low prices on the memories to be
used with the CPU's to bar entry of memory competitors.
The memory utilized with the older 370/155 and 370/165
CPU's, announced in June 1970, was a magnetic core memory,
which because of its relatively large size, was contained in boxes
independent of the CPU. Telex had announced its competing
memory, the 6360, in November 1971, and had begun customer
shipments in November 1972. Although the record apparently
did not contain market share information for memories in the
same detail as for disks and tapes, the charts and testimony of
IBM's Mr. Bonham showed, and the district court found, that
in 1970 IBM had received 99.6 percent of all revenues from
memory products attached to IBM CPU's. It should be noted,
however, that the 1970 measurement was prior to Telex's entry
into the plug compatible memory market. It appears that there
was virtually no PCM competition for memories plug compatible
37 Id.
3' A "byte" is one character of data, often shorter than a word and made up of several
"bits." A "megabyte" is one million characters of data.
1976
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with IBM's third generation System 360, and none whatsoever by
Telex.
In 1970 IBM internal documents had forecast that by 1976
PCM's might sell up to 23 percent of the memories installed with
IBM's fourth generation System 370. IBM's forecast had also
indicated that PCM's could become viable competitors by offer-
ing memories at $6,000 per megabyte per month if that price were
under IBM's price. Meanwhile, work was progressing on replace-
ment of the magnetic core technology, on which IBM's forecast
had been based, with field effect transistor, semi-conductor cir-
cuitry. The new technology allowed production of much smaller
memories at much lower cost. Indeed, IBM has stated that the
new memory was 40 times smaller than the old magnetic core and
cost less than one-half as much to make. 9 The new memory price
of $5,200 per megabyte per month compared with a $12,000
monthly rental for the core memory. Nevertheless, Telex an-
nounced a competing memory for the 158 and 168 models in
March 1973, and Control Data, Itel, Ampex, and Intel also an-
nounced competing memories at prices substantially below those
of IBM." '
D. The District Court's Market Share Statistics
Market share figures with regard to peripherals are "not
readily available from published sources, nor can they be extrapo-
lated or inferred from census data dealing with peripheral prod-
ucts in general . . . ."I' The court accordingly relied on the testi-
mony and charts of Mr. Bonham of IBM, as well as other charts
based on IBM internal documents. The disk and tape percentage
market shares shown on the charts are summarized in Table 1.
510 F.2d at 907.
367 F. Supp. at 304. IBM had considered raising the "minimum" memory con-
tained within its System 370/145, 155, 165, and 195 CPU's to reduce the additional mem-
ory capacity required and thus shield more memory capacity from PCM competition.
Apparently these proposals were not carried into effect. Id. at 304-05. The district court
found no evidence that IBM had reduced its prices below cost and found further that all
of the acts challenged by Telex had been calculated to produce profit margins of at least
20 percent on the volume expected to be sold. Id. at 306. The court also found that IBM
was the quality leader for products and services in the EDP industry and that its success
was due "in substantial measure to its skill, industry and foresight." Id.







12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
IBM: IBM owned 65.8 62.2 59.0 47.9 32.4
IBM: User owned 10.3 10.6 12.0 16.6 24.1
IBM: Leasing company owned 13.7 13.5 13.9 17.5 21.9
PCM 10.2 13.7 15.1 18.0 21.6
Fourth Generation
12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
IBM: IBM owned 0.0 0.0 95.7 92.6 87.4
IBM: User owned 0.0 100.0 4.0 2.3 3.7
IBM: Leasing company owned 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
PCM 0.0 0.0 0.3 5.0 8.7
(PCM shipments did not begin until November 1971).
Combined Third and Fourth Generation
12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
"IBM" 89.8 86.3 86.0 86.1 85.1
PCM 10.2 13.7 14.0 13.9 14.9
DISK SPINDLES
Third Generation
12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
IBM: IBM owned 62.0 54.8 53.1 49.0 45.0
IBM: User owned 14.8 15.1 15.5 16.8 19.1
IBM: Leasing company owned 16.4 15.6 15.1 15.2 15.3
PCM 6.8 14.5 16.3 19.0 20.6
," This table is from the district court opinion. Id. at 288-90. The percentages given
for combined third and fourth generation tapes and disks were calculated from the court's
figures. The Bonham charts apparently contained information on peripheral product reve-
nues which generally did not go beyond 1970. The other charts were those primarily relied
on by the district court and measured market shares for disks and tapes, but not other
products, at five 6-month intervals: December 1970, June 1971, December 1971, June
1972, and December 1972. The court classified as "IBM" tapes and disks not only those
still owned by IBM and leased to users, but also those owned by users and leasing compa-
nies. The court stated that the "PCM" tapes and disks also included both sold and leased
PCM products, but the PCM statistics, unlike those relating to IBM products, do not
indicate how many PCM products were sold and how many were leased. IBM, however,




12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
IBM: IBM owned 0.0 0.0 86.1 90.6 90.5
IBM: User owned 0.0 100.0 13.4 8.6 7.6
IBM: Leasing company owned 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.8 1.2
PCM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7
(PCM shipments did not begin until October 1972).
Combined Third and Fourth Generation
12/70 6/71 12/71 6/72 12/72
"IBM" 93.2 85.5 84.2 82.7 82.5
PCM 6.8 14.5 15.8 17.3 17.5
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION
The district court rejected IBM's contention that the rele-
vant market consists of the entire EDP industry or, in the alterna-
tive, peripheral products compatible with all systems. It held,
instead, that the relevant market consists of peripherals plug
compatible with IBM systems and that submarkets exist for plug
compatible tapes, disks, memories, and printers, together with
their respective controllers and communication controllers. 3 The
court did not analyze the submarkets in further detail because
IBM's share of each submarket was held sufficient to raise an
inference of monopoly power and because IBM's predatory acts,
as well as documents evidencing general predatory intent, ap-
plied to all of the submarkets except communication controllers.
The court awarded damages to Telex of $259.5 million after tre-
bling, plus $1.2 million in attorney's fees and costs.44
The trial court recognized the general rule that monopoliza-
tion in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act45 involves two
elements:
(1) The possession of monopoly power in the relevant market or
submarket and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power with intent to monopolize, which intent need not be evi-
denced by predatory practices but which is not to be gathered
merely from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen or historic accident."6
367 F. Supp. at 282.
' See note 3 supra.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
367 F. Supp. at 335.
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The court also defined monopoly power, in accordance with lead-
ing Supreme Court cases, as "the power to control prices or to
unreasonably restrict competition." 7 The relevant market within
which such power must be found is both a geographic market and
a product market. In Telex the geographic market was the United
States, with international aspects having been excluded by stipu-
lation of the parties. The test for whether two products compete
in the same product market is whether they are "reasonably in-
terchangeable by consumers for the same purposes."" The prime
determinant of "reasonable interchangeability" has in turn been
cross-elasticity of demand: If a slight rise in the price of one
product will cause a substantial number of users to buy another
product, the two products can be said to be competing in the
same market.
The district court and, apparently, the parties themselves,
however, did not make any statistical analysis of cross-elasticity
of demand in the computer industry. Indeed, the court only fleet-
ingly mentioned the concept. 9 The court was instead impressed
by IBM actions which, on the basis of the documents explaining
or appearing to explain them, were aimed primarily at the PCM's
following their rather spectacular initial success in installing
equipment on IBM systems. The court also stated that the only
physical or functional competition for peripheral equipment on a
"box-for-box" basis, without changing CPU's, was between IBM
and the PCM's, and that:
IBM's Systems competitors were not directly affected by IBM's
pricing and product actions for peripherals and made no competitive
price responses to IBM's 2319A and B and Fixed Term Plan (FTP)
price reductions for its peripheral products. After FTP, IBM's Sys-
tems competitors were not mentioned in any of IBM's FTP tracking
documents as having cut or reduced their price for any of their
products. Time sharing companies, service bureaus, and data cen-
ters, were not directly affected by IBM's price and product actions
for peripherals, and after 2319A and B and FTP made little if any
competitive pricing responses to IBM's peripheral price reductions."
Not completely unwilling to recognize the effect of other sys-
7 Id. at 336.
" United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
" See, e.g., 367 F. Supp. at 282.
I" Id. at 281.
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tems manufacturers on IBM's peripheral product actions, the
court found that:
It cannot be gainsaid that indirectly at least and to some degree the
peripheral products attached to non-IBM systems necessarily com-
pete with and constrain IBM's power with respect to peripherals
attached to IBM systems. The quality and price/performance of the
peripherals attached to a system are a substantial factor in a cus-
tomer's choice between competing systems, and if for example IBM
failed to improve the price/performance of its peripherals, customers
might choose systems (including peripherals) of other systems man-
ufacturers. For example, the IBM Merlin (3330) disk drive was be-
lieved by IBM to be a critical factor to the competitive
price/performance of the 370 systems 135, 145, 155, 158, 165 and 168.
The 3330 was therefore announced in June of 1970 at a
price/performance designed to make IBM more competitive with
both systems manufacturers and peripheral equipment manufactur-
ers. . . .Peripheral pricing and product announcements of one sys-
tems supplier influence subsequent peripheral pricing and product
announcements of other systems suppliers, although it may be diffi-
cult to identify any given competitive price cut or product improve-
ment as a reaction to a single competitive act.'
The court engaged in something more of a cross-elasticity
analysis with regard to its submarket definitions. While noting a
degree of possible cross-elasticity among, for example, various
kinds of storage devices, the court stated that:
The reality of this situation appears to be that despite some theoret-
ical interchangeability, a rise in the price of one storage device will
cause a substantial number of customers to turn to similar devices
less expensive rather than to use fewer of such devices and more of
other types of devices.52
The court believed that the particular applications and objectives
of each customer's system imposed sufficiently stringent require-
ments to justify the court's submarket definitions.
The court adopted the view of United States v. Grinnell
Corp. 53 that there is "no reason to differentiate" between a "line"
of commerce under section 7 of the Clayton Act 4 and a "part" of
commerce under section 2 of the Sherman Act.55 It rejected, how-
Id. at 277-78.
Id. at 283.
5 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
367 F. Supp. at 366.
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ever, IBM's heavy reliance on the theory of "supply substituta-
bility." IBM argued that the relative ease with which systems
manufacturers, or peripheral equipment manufacturers market-
ing peripherals for non-IBM systems, could change interfaces on
their existing products so as to enable them to be marketed for
use with IBM systems, was sufficient to place such manufacturers
in the same relevant market as IBM and those marketing peri-
pheral equipment for use with IBM systems. The court noted that
the cases cited by IBM for this proposition had arisen in a merger
context under section 7 of the Clayton Act and involved the po-
tential competition doctrine, by which a merger between a com-
petitor within the market and a potential competitor on the edge
of it may be held to be illegal.,
On the basis of the market share data summarized above, 7
the district court concluded that IBM's extremely high share of
the relevant market and submarkets compelled a finding of mo-
nopoly power. After examining each of IBM's acts, the court con-
cluded that all of them involved price reductions which were
"predatory" because they were taken by one having predominant
market shares without justification in the form of lower costs and
with a view toward "suppression" of the PCM's and the inroads
they had made. Specifically, the court found that the 2319A disk
drive offered no significant performance increase over the 2314
series equivalent and carried a price reduction which was not
justified on the basis of reduced manufacturing costs, despite
IBM's contention that the lower price could be explained by reuse
of 2314 units which had been returned by customers who had
switched to PCM products.5" The court held that the price cut
had been camouflaged in the form of a new product so that IBM
could avoid reducing rental prices on all of its installed 2314 series
subsystems, which reduction would have cut approximately $120
million from IBM's annual revenue stream of $514 million on its
installed disk drives. 9 A similar view was taken of the 2319B disk
56 Id.
' See table accompanying note 42 supra.
See 367 F. Supp. at 294.
The camouflage characterization of the 2319A is somewhat difficult to accept. The
large sophisticated customers in the computer industry would presumably have had no
trouble seeing through the camouflage. Those who were 370/145 users would, therefore,
have switched to the 2319A (IBM had no long-term, discounted leases in effect at this
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drive. The court concluded that the price cuts had been designed
by IBM to contain its plug compatible competitors and maintain
dominant control of the disk submarket. The district court found
that, although IBM studies had indicated that FTP would lower
IBM's costs through a decrease in the churning of leased equip-
ment, the primary intent and effect of the plan was "suppression"
of the PCM's and maintenance of monopoly power.6 0
The court found that the 1971 CPU price increase had been
designed to offset reductions in revenue resulting from FTP and
that the 1972 pricing of the new 370/158 and 168 CPU's had had
a similar purpose of offsetting low memory prices. Although the
new CPU's possessed performance improvements and required
additional costs in their design and manufacture, these costs and
improvements were found to have been more than compensated
for by the new price. The court found that, in conjunction with
the 1972 CPU pricing, the price of the field effect transistor mem-
ory used with the 158 and 168 had been deliberately set at a level
below that which IBM knew PCM's would have to charge in order
to enter the market and thus constituted an illegal entry barrier.6
time) or would have bargained for reductions on the 2314 series, with the option of moving
to PCM products when responsive PCM price cuts had been made. IBM may have pro-
tected its revenue by confining the 2319A disk announcement to the 370/145 CPU, but in
so doing it was refraining from tactics deemed predatory by the district court. In any
event, IBM extended 2319 availability to all third generation systems 3 months later and
then made substantial price reductions on all or almost all disk products 8 months later
through its FTP.
367 F. Supp. at 297.
' The district court rejected Telex's arguments that the placing of a minimum mem-
ory within the 370/158 and 168 CPU's was an illegal tie-in under section 3 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). Although IBM had considered raising the size of the minimum
memory in all 370 CPU's for apparently anti-competitive reasons, the court held that the
field effect transistor memory integration as finally accomplished carried such overwhelm-
ing price/performance advantages as to raise a substantial question of the validity of the
Telex contention. These advantages included the elimination of the need for a separate
memory cooling system, power supply, and other equipment, all of which are required
when memory is not integrated with the CPU. The court also noted that CPU's had been
historically designed to include a minimum main memory and that such memory had
never been separately priced. The court further pointed out that PCM's were still free to
attach their memories to the 158 and 168 CPU's and that Telex and four other IBM
competitors had in fact announced intentions to do so.
The court similarly rejected the argument that the placing of integrated controllers
within System 370 CPU's created illegal ties. The integrated controller, unlike the pre-
vious independent controller, was able to use a part of the CPU's resources to perform its
functions and thus carried valid performance advantages. Indeed, the new controller was
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The court further concluded that IBM had attempted to
monopolize the relevant market and submarkets. The trial court
thought that the "great weight" of authority required that a rele-
vant market be established in attempted monopolization cases
and that the defendant's actions be shown to present a "danger-
ous probability" of achieving monopoly power therein." This
probability, like monopoly power in monopolization cases, can be
inferred from market share measurements. Attempted monopoli-
zation also requires a finding of specific intent to exclude compet-
itors. The district court believed that such intent was supplied by
the IBM documents which: (1) Demonstrated concern over PCM
advances, and (2) evidenced plans to defend IBM's peripheral
revenues by pricing actions not justified on the basis of lower
costs and undertaken only after specific study of their probable
impact on IBM competitors.13
IV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court on the monopolization issues." Be-
cause of the district court's definition of the relevant market, a
factual determination which the Tenth Circuit regarded as
clearly erroneous, the court then did not have to decide the issue
of attempted monopolization. It also held that the lower court
had incorrectly applied the law to IBM's actions which had been
challenged as acts of monopolization, because those actions,
being routine business tactics within the competitive context of
the industry, would not have constituted the "use" of monopoly
power even if IBM had possessed such power.65
The court stated that two important factors had been over-
looked by the district court in its market definition. The first
not strictly a tie-in at all because the customer was still given the option of using the
independent controller, although at a higher price. The court also noted that the chal-
lenged integrations had not been "shown to have been dictated by specific predatory
objectives on the part of IBM." 367 F. Supp. at 303.
" See the dictum in Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965). See also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
785 (1946), and the cases cited by the district court, 367 F. Supp. at 343.
:3 367 F. Supp. at 301-02.
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 926.
' Id. at 916.
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was "supply substitutability," the ability of a manufacturer to
change the interfaces on its peripherals at minimal cost and,
thereby, make them plug compatible with other computer sys-
tems. The second was the competition among computer systems
of which peripherals are a significant part. But aside from quoting
part of the district court's finding 38 to the effect that, indirectly
and "to some degree," peripherals attached to non-IBM systems
necessarily compete with peripherals attached to IBM systems,
the court did not develop its second point of systems competition,
but rather relied solely upon the supply substitutability con-
cept. 7
The court was impressed by the minimal development and
manufacturing outlay required to change the interfaces which
allow peripherals to be used with other systems, and pointed to
trial testimony by Mr. Grant, senior vice president of Telex, that
he had in the past advocated such interface modification and that
the engineering expense associated therewith was "minimal.""8
The court also noted that following RCA's decision to withdraw
from the computer industry and to turn its business over to
Sperry Rand Univac, Telex had begun to market its 6420 tape
unit, the Telex equivalent of the IBM fourth generation 3420, for
use with the RCA CPU's. The court further recounted a Telex
letter that was to be sent to systems manufacturers. This letter
had offered to sell plug compatible peripheral equipment to new
systems purchasers, with the equipment to be interfaced with
their CPU's at no cost to the purchasers. The court did not men-
tion whether such offers were accepted, and it seems that gener-
ally they were not. The court believed that the trial court had
been overly swayed by Telex's decision to compete for sales and
leases of peripheral equipment plug compatible only with IBM
CPU's. 9
As for the acts of IBM, the court stated that the district court
had failed to consider whether such acts were "ordinary business
17 Id. at 916-19.
" Id. at 916-17. For further discussion of interface adaptation see text accompanying
notes 129-30 supra. Supply substitutability is discussed in detail at pps 318-20 supra.
" Id. at 917.
VOL. 53
COMPUTER EQUIPMENT MONOPOLIZATION
practices typical of those used in a competitive market," 0 or
whether they constituted the use of monopoly power. The Tenth
Circuit thought that IBM had only utilized "ordinary marketing
methods available to all in the market" and, thus, had not used,
even if it had possessed, monopoly power.7' The court further
pointed to the profit margin of approximately 20 percent ex-
pected by IBM on the products covered by its acts and accord-
ingly viewed the record as failing to present a case of "an eco-
nomic giant" subsidizing unusually low prices with its outside
"reserves or other activities."72 Moreover, IBM's total costs of
development and manufacture were above those of the PCM's.
To support its view that liability attaches only for the use of
monopoly power, the court examined four leading monopolization
cases: United States v. Griffith," United States v. Grinnell
Corp.,7" United States v. Swift & Co.,7" and American Tobacco
Co. v. United States.7" The court pointed out that in Griffith the
defendants had used monopoly power to gain competitive advan-
tages in areas where they enjoyed no monopoly. In Grinnell there
had been "no issue" as to the presence of improper conduct used
to achieve and maintain monopoly power, once the primary issue
of the relevant market had been resolved. Swift had abused its
size and power. In American Tobacco an actual conspiracy had
been found. The court stated that such cases required a finding
of use of monopoly power and that the exceptions to monopoliza-
tion liability, for monopoly thrust upon a defendant by natural
economies of scale or by superior skill, foresight, or business acu-
men, must be "fitted in with" the requirement of a use of monop-
oly power.77 The court rejected that interpretation of United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America,78 which held that "the events
" Id. at 925-26.
Id. at 926.
72 Id.
73 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
7, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
M 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
7: 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
7 510 F.2d at 927.
79 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter cited as Alcoa]. The Second Circuit, per
Judge Learned Hand, decided the case upon certification of lack of a quorum by the
Supreme Court. A number of the Justices had participated in the Justice Department's
investigation and preparation of the case.
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or acts must be entirely involuntary" for the defendant to be
absolved of liability.79
The court believed that "[tihere must be some room to
move for a defendant who sees his market share acquired by
research and technical innovations being eroded by those who
market copies of its products."0 The court thus held that the
Sherman Act could not be construed to protect competitors from
"ordinary competition." Although IBM's task forces and studies
had focused in part on the effects of IBM actions on PCM com-
petitors, the court found that the record demonstrated that such
study was "part of the competitive scene in this volatile business
inhabited by aggressive, skillful businessmen seeking to market
a product cheaper and better than that of their competitors."',
The court concluded this section of its opinion by stating that this
issue was governed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States.12 It should be pointed
out, however, that the Times-Picayune language with regard to
a defendant's adoption of acts which have been utilized by its
competitors refers only to the specific intent required to sustain
a charge of attempted monopolization, and not to the general
intent required for a finding of monopolization itself. The Tenth
Circuit found it unnecessary to consider separately the issue of
attempted monopolization, given its view of the nature of IBM's
actions.
V. ANALYSIS OF Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.
A. Relevant Market
1. Supply Substitutability versus Cross-Elasticity of De-
mand
Neither the district court nor the Tenth Circuit made the
kind of complete analysis of the relevant market which the case
demanded. At the district court level, this failure was due in large
part to insufficient data from which to determine cross-
elasticities of demand. The Tenth Circuit, denying this factual
basis for reversal, opted instead for the "supply substitutability"
" 510 F.2d at 927.
I d.
Id. at 928.
82 345 U.S. 594 (1953), cited in 510 F.2d at 928.
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concept. This concept could enlarge the relevant market to fit
certain measurements which were in the record and which
showed IBM's share thereof to fall generally at or below 45 per-
cent."3
The supply substitutability concept is contrary to both pre-
cedent and proper concepts of market definition. The traditional
test for definition of the relevant market in monopolization cases
was laid down, as the Tenth Circuit recognized, by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nem-
ours & Co.58 The test is whether one product is "reasonably inter-
changeable" with another. The chief economic and legal determi-
nant of reasonable interchangeability is cross-elasticity of de-
mand. If a modest increase in one product's price will cause buy-
ers to turn to the other product, it can reasonably be assumed
that the two products compete in the same market. The essential
point is that the test revolves around what choices buyers will
make among products offered to them, not what choices manu-
facturers can or, in a court's opinion, should make in the offering
of products to buyers. It may be true that electronic data process-
ing manufacturers can, with relatively little additional expense,
fabricate interfaces enabling their existing peripheral products to
be used with different CPU's, but this phenomena is of absolutely
no help to a buyer who must choose from products presently on
the market. Thus, as the Tenth Circuit stated by quotation from
the du Pont case, the correct formulation of the rule must be:
Where there are market alternatives that buyers may readily use for
their purposes, illegal monopoly does not exist merely because the
product said to be monopolized differs from others.
Market definition depends upon "how far buyers will go to substi-
tute one commodity for another." 6
11 The district court found that IBM's share of the value of all 1971 shipments of
"electronic computers and peripheral equipment, except parts," was 36.7 percent, accord-
ing to the United States Bureau of the Census. Its share of the value of 1971 shipments of
"Electronic Computers, Digital, General Purpose," was 40.9 percent. Similar shares were
found for specific categories of peripheral equipment. But certain IBM internal docu-
ments, apparently based on unit sales and leases, put IBM's share of the domestic market
for systems and peripherals at 75.9 percent in December 1964 and 73.3 percent in Septem-
ber 1968, with IBM's share of CPU's decreasing during the same period from 68.6 percent
to 64.4 percent. 367 F. Supp. at 285-86.
" 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
510 F.2d at 917, quoting from 351 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).
11 510 F.2d at 918, quoting from 351 U.S. at 380.
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The other cases relied upon by the Tenth Circuit similarly
involved consideration of cross-elasticity of demand and func-
tional interchangeability among existing, not potential, products.
In United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co. 7 it was held that because
other acids could be used by the food and beverage industry for
the same purposes as citric acid, the Government could not pre-
vail on its contention that citric acid alone was the relevant mar-
ket. In Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 8
an attempted monopolization case, it was held that the relevant
market included paper for use in all copiers, not merely those
manufactured by SCM, because all buyers of machines employ-
ing the direct electrostatic process could turn to both SCM's
paper and that of other manufacturers. In South End Oil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc."9 it was held that the relevant market consisted of
all premium motor oils, not merely those of Texaco, because all
such oils are reasonably interchangeable by customers and mar-
keters, and in United States v. Grinnell Corp." the Supreme
Court defined the relevant market on the basis of what "custom-
ers may turn to."'"
As the district court pointed out, the cases relied upon by
IBM to establish the supply substitutability doctrine were merger
cases decided under section 7 of the Clayton Act. These cases
involved the potential competition doctrine, where the existence
of competitors poised at the edge of the market ready for entry is
important in determining the legality of a merger between such
a potential competitor and one already in the market. The doc-
trine thus goes beyond the effects of a merger between two exist-
ing competitors into a somewhat more speculative inquiry. It does
not, however, purport to include the potential competitor within
the relevant market. 92
246 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
287 F. Supp. 143 (D. Md. 1968), modified, 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 920 (1970).
" 237 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
384 U.S. 563 (1966).
" Id. at 571. It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit's characterization of the
Grinnell market as "broadly defined" is open to substantial question.
" There are, of course, a number of reasons that supply substitutability may never
manifest itself in the form of additional products to the consumer. Limited marketing or
manufacturing resources may, for a significant period of time, confine a firm to its existing
consumer markets, assuming that they remain as profitable as other markets. A firm may
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2. One General Peripheral Market versus Submarkets
The Telex trial court found that submarkets existed for each
type of peripheral equipment. These submarkets are the starting
point for a correct definition of relevant markets in the peripheral
equipment part of the computer industry. Judge Christensen took
note of the functional equivalence among, for instance, storage
devices (tapes, disks, and, to some extent, memories) but held
that sufficient differences existed in performance and user appli-
cation requirements to justify separate treatment of each peri-
pheral product. No statistics indicative of demand cross-
elasticities were presented, however, and the submarkets were
not further analyzed because of the similarly dominant IBM
share of each." The Tenth Circuit did not consider the issue.
If the district court is correct that each kind of peripheral
device has sufficient inelasticity of demand with functionally
similar products so as to constitute a separate submarket, it can
be argued that the submarkets are the only relevant markets. An
increase in the price of IBM tape drives, for example, will not
cause significant numbers of users to turn to anyone's disk drives,
whether manufactured by a plug compatible manufacturer, a sys-
tems competitor, or IBM itself. Each of the relevant markets
would include a system manufacturer of each particular kind of
peripheral, along with those who produce plug compatible equiv-
alents of each product type. Manufacturers of competing systems
and peripherals plug compatible with competing systems would
not be included.
Several considerations warrant caution, however, in defining
each type of peripheral as a separate submarket. As the trial court
itself noted, the trend among leading PCM's as well as systems
manufacturers is toward full-line manufacturing and package
selling of peripherals. Such selling may be dictated by design,
marketing, installation, and maintenance economies of scale that
enable peripheral manufacturers to offer product packages at a
significant discount over the regular prices of the packages' indi-
also refrain from taking on a large, successful competitor such as IBM and, instead,
concentrate on profitable sectors where the competition is less substantial.
'1 It would be impossible for IBM to have a high market share in a general peripheral
equipment market without having high shares of each of the major segments thereof (in
terms of units sold and revenue gained).
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vidual components. These packages would then become a new
"product" and market. 4 Moreover, constantly improving tech-
nology toward an accepted industry design goal of product inte-
gration may make the submarkets obsolete as more and more
functions are combined in a single box.
3. Systems Market versus Plug Compatible Market
The district court failed to distinguish between users who
replace peripherals on an existing system and those who buy
peripherals as part of a new system purchase. This latter group
can be viewed as comprising a separate market in which the
system itself is the relevant product. Since peripheral equipment
now comprises 50 to 75 percent of the price of a new system, it is
becoming an increasingly important factor in new system pur-
chases. Systems manufacturers' peripherals compete in the sys-
tems market to the extent that peripherals govern customer
choices among systems built entirely by such manufacturers.,'
Full-line PCM's compete in this same market either as formal
marketers of complete systems retailing their peripherals in com-
bination with other manufacturers' CPU's,16 or as de facto sys-
tems marketers when customers choose a system based on the
price/performance of its available plug compatible peripherals. "
" For example, assume that Telex offers IBM-compatible communication control-
lers, disks, and printers at arbitrarily chosen prices of $20,000, $23,000, and $19,000 respec-
tively. If Memorex offers its equivalents at $23,000, $22,000, and $16,000, a user would
ordinarily choose a Telex controller with a Memorex disk and printer. If, however, Telex
and Memorex each offer 6 percent package discounts, the user will choose the Memorex
package, which has therefore become the new "product." The tendency for packages to
become the relevant products will intensify with larger package discounts and with larger
numbers of peripherals per package. If the package becomes the product, many non-full-
line manufacturers who do not utilize products of others to assemble packages would
compete as suppliers to final manufacturers or package marketers.
,1 For example, if one systems manufacturer offers its CPU at a price of $24,000 and
its peripheral equipment for $20,000 (software, design, and installation costs being propor-
tionately divided between the CPU and the peripherals), while a second systems manufac-
turer offers its CPU for $23,000 but its peripheral equipment for $22,000, and assuming
equivalent performance characteristics between the two systems, the price of the peri-
pheral equipment will determine the choice of systems.
" Telex and other major PCM's have offered new systems consisting of their peri-
pheral equipment and IBM CPU's.
" For example, if the second competitor in the example given in note 95 supra were
IBM, and Telex could offer the user IBM plug compatible peripheral equipment for
$20,000 rather than IBM's price of $22,000, Telex would successfully sell both its peri-
pheral equipment and the entire IBM-based system.
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Smaller PCM's who make a limited range of products would be
included in systems competition only in the rare case where their
products account for at least one-half of a system's price. In addi-
tion, all systems manufacturers and PCM's face competition
within the district court's submarkets from makers of plug com-
patible equivalents as it is fairly common for customers to substi-
tute PCM products for standard peripherals at the time of system
purchase. As a manufacturer of a relatively wide variety of peri-
pherals, Telex should have faced substantial competition on a
systems level from the manufacturer of the system with which its
peripherals are plug compatible (IBM), non-IBM systems manu-
facturers, and those full-line plug compatible manufacturers
which make peripherals compatible with, or market, non-IBM
systems.
Once a user has installed a system, substantial conversion
costs are attendant to any attempt to change systems. These
costs include those of reprogramming, retraining personnel, and
installing the new system. In its Tenth Circuit brief, IBM argued
that, when a salesman of Control Data Corporation calls on an
IBM customer, he attempts to obtain a conversion to a Control
Data system as well as to sell Control Data peripheral replace-
ments on a box-for-box basis. 8 But his chance of obtaining the
system conversion is substantially less than that of obtaining the
box-for-box conversion. To the extent that peripheral-based
price/performance advantages of competing systems can, how-
ever, overcome the conversion cost barrier, their ability to do so
creates systems competition similar to that encountered with new
systems.9
While the district court recognized that systems competition
is distinct from box-for-box peripheral submarket competition, it
appears that the court did not follow its distinction in measuring
market shares, as it did not attempt to ascertain what proportion
s Brief for Appellant at 74.
" Certain classes of customers might be more amenable to systems conversions than
others. For instance, a large customer which has had experience with or employs several
different systems and also employs sophisticated personnel may well be able to absorb
more of what would otherwise make up the conversion cost barrier. Systems manufactur-
ers might also be especially willing to cut prices to gain a toehold on a significant portion




of the total IMM and PCM peripheral installations was made as
a result of new system purchases and what proportion was made
replacing on a box-for-box basis.
4. Third Generation versus Fourth Generation Products
How is the relevant market affected by the "fourth genera-
tion" peripheral products? IBM argued to the court of appeals
that the district court had unfairly lumped together fourth gener-
ation peripherals, in which IBM generally had the originator's
"natural monopoly" during the period under review, with third
generation peripherals, in which IBM's sales were rapidly declin-
ing. Telex replied that the statistics showed IBM's third genera-
tion erosion was due to customer replacement of IBM third gener-
ation peripherals with IBM fourth generation peripherals rather
than with PCM products.
Although the Tenth Circuit did not consider the question,
the answer lies in whether the fourth generation product actually
has, as the new "generation" nomenclature would imply, suffi-
ciently superior price/performance characteristics to constitute a
new market for a substantial number of users. It should be re-
membered, however, that while price and performance are theo-
retically two sides of a single balance, a point will be reached at
which some users will no longer require the improved perform-
ance of a new generation's products. Thus, any price increase may
result in their continuing with existing systems or employing
other systems which offer comparable performance at a lower
price, such as competitors' products of the same generation or
new, smaller systems.
If the fourth generation products offer markedly better
price/performance, substantial numbers of new customers will
purchase only fourth generation systems, including their peri-
pherals. Moreover, most of those who already have systems will
replace them with fourth generation systems or will, depending
upon available product combinations,'"" price, and need, replace
only their peripherals with fourth generation peripherals. Where
systems are to be replaced, a fourth generation systems competi-
tion would arise, as discussed above, among systems and full-line
"' In medium-sized and large systems, IBM fourth generation peripherals are fre-
quently plug compatible with third generation CPU's.
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peripheral manufacturers. Where the user replaces only its peri-
pherals, competition would be confined to the manufacturers of
plug compatible equivalents. Where the user seeks to replace only
its peripherals, but no fourth generation products are available
which are plug compatible with its present CPU, its need for
fourth generation products will create systems competition, be-
cause the price/performance characteristics of the new peripher-
als will overcome the conversion cost barrier; this is true even
though the system conversion might utilize a third generation
CPU with fourth generation peripherals. Once fourth generation
systems have been installed and PCM's have begun to develop
peripheral copies and/or competing systems manufacturers have
changed interfaces on non-compatible fourth generation products
to make them plug compatible, box-for-box submarket competi-
tion will arise.
In all fourth generation markets, some time will elapse be-
tween the innovator's first shipments and those of its competi-
tors. For the PCM's, this time should be regarded as one in which
the innovator, IBM, has a "natural monopoly" prior to the inevi-
table imitation of its product by Telex and others who will market
the copy at a lower price due to lower total costs. As to systems
competitors, who may or may not decide to compete in both the
systems and plug compatible markets, the length of time which
elapses could become important in a general computer industry
monopolization case should the competitor prove unable to pro-
duce fourth generation equipment of similar quality within a rea-
sonable time. This factor is not of importance here, however,
because IBM's declining market shares of general systems reve-
nues were held insufficient to raise an inference of monopoly
power.
Support can be found in the record for the proposition that
fourth generation products form separate markets, particularly
for tapes.'"' The first significant fourth generation tape shipments
apparently began in September 1971, and, between that time and
September 1972, 24,015 such units were shipped by IBM and the
PCM's. During approximately the same period of time, third gen-
eration tape installations decreased by 18,902 units, from 41,409
See text accompanying notes 102-04 infra.
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in June 1971 to 22,507 in December 1972. The district court found
that the 3420 tapes "incorporated significant technological inno-
vations not found in prior tape devices,"'0 2 and stated that the
"Aspen [3420] control units and tape drive embodied significant
new technology.""'3 In the 17 months following the first significant
shipments of fourth generation disks in August 1971, 12,723 of the
IBM and PCM disks were sold or leased. During approximately
the same period of time, third generation disk installations de-
clined by 4,596, leaving a total of 69,274 third generation disks
in use in December 1972. The district court described the Merlin
3830 disk control unit as "innovative.'
0 4
On the other hand, the continued growth through the same
period of PCM installations of third generation tapes and disks
combined with the significant decrease in IBM customers utiliz-
ing third generation products may indicate that for a substantial
number of users the third generation price advantages more than
offset performance benefits from fourth generation products. In
this connection it should be noted that one of the stated purposes
of the IBM 2319A disks was "to provide a lower priced and
smaller disk than Merlin [the fourth generation disk] for use
with the smaller versions of the new System 370 to meet systems
and peripheral competition .... ."10" In addition, IBM's Mr.
Whitcomb testified that IBM "viewed the combination selling of
products by Telex as threatening the migration of 360 users to the
370 system."''0
If the fourth generation peripherals do have sufficient advan-
tages to be considered a separate market, the district court erred
in grouping together third and fourth generation market shares.
In this event, third generation markets would include those cus-
tomers who are primarily concerned with price and not with in-
creased performance, as well as those who have not yet moved
into fourth generation products for financial or other reasons but
plan to do so. IBM's share of these markets should not be consid-
ered sufficient in itself to produce a strong inference of monopoly
"1 367 F. Supp. at 296.
" Id. at 318.
"' Id. at 323.
" Brief for Appellant at 83.
10 Brief for Appellees at 53.
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power. Even if the district court is correct in its definition of
"IBM" equipment as including user-owned and leasing-
company-owned peripherals and in its method of stating percen-
tage shares, the PCM share of third generation tapes rose steadily
from 10.2 percent in December 1970 to 21.6 percent in December
1972. The PCM share of third generation disks during the same
period rose from 6.8 percent to 20.6 percent. In fourth generation
products, IBM should be credited with natural monopoly advan-
tages, which were being rapidly eroded by the PCM's.107
B. Market Share Measurement'
Apart from the district court's failure to distinguish peri-
pherals installed on new IBM systems as part of system conver-
sions from those replaced on a box-for-box basis and the possible
need to distinguish third from fourth generation products, signifi-
cant problems remain in the district court's use of statistics to
produce an inference of monopoly power. The district court con-
sidered as "IBM" equipment at each of the five measuring points
in its December 1970 to December 1972 statistical measuring pe-
riod all tapes and disks which had been manufactured by IBM
a:id were owned by IBM, users, or leasing companies' 9 and in-
'" Telex's fourth generation tape copies became available in November 1971 and its
disk copies became available in October 1972. Telex's first memory copy was available in
November 1972.
" In the following discussion the district court's statistics referred to are those con-
tained in the table accompanying note 42 supra.
"' The trial court's inclusion of leasing company owned IBM equipment in the IBM
share, rather than viewing some or all leasing companies as in competition with IBM, was
not erroneous, although IBM argued to the Tenth Circuit that this inclusion was inconsist-
ent with other findings of the district court. IBM is paid full value for the product when
the leasing company buys it, and a measurement of manufacturer revenues should include
the full payment when received from the leasing company. For purposes of computing unit
sales, leases, or installations, however, IBM leases its equipment in competition with other
manufacturers within the structure of the retail marketplace only at the time of the lease
to the end user. The leasing company is analogous to an IBM wholesaler, not an IBM
competitor. The leasing company purchases equipment from IBM at, in effect, a whole-
saler's price, due to its use of accelerated depreciation allowances and the investment tax
credit. It then charges the end user a rental which is presumably below that charged by
IBM on direct leases. If the rental is sufficiently in range of that charged by IBM so that
it does not make the difference in the end user's choice of systems, the leasing companies'
product should be classified as that of IBM in the competition for the end user's business.
The offer to the end user by IBM itself is effectively replaced by a discount to which IBM
had separately committed itself in advance. If, on the other hand, the leasing company is
substantially below IBM in price so that it obtains a system contract which IBM would
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stalled on IBM-based systems. This number was then compared
with the "PCM" number at each point in the measuring period
to create the percentages relied upon. The district court indicated
that the PCM share includes installed PCM-manufactured
equipment owned by users and leasing companies."10 Since only
the total PCM share is given, it is impossible to determine the
separate effects of PCM sales and leases.
The trial court failed, then, to measure the market shares of
new sales and leases and new installations during the 1969-72
period. New leases should include renewals of lease contracts on
equipment already installed. The defendant should not be penal-
ized for dominating the market during an earlier time which may
not be the subject of any complaint and should be credited with
the full effect of progressively increasing sales of its competitors.
Market share measurements under section 7 of the Clayton Act
customarily examine annual sales, as in United States v. Von's
Grocery Co."' and United States v. General Dynamics Corp."2
The same principle has been followed in section 2 monopolization
cases. Judge Hand, in Alcoa, relied upon annual sales percen-
tages for each of a number of years."'
To determine the number of new sales and leases made by
IBM between December 1971 and December 1972, the increases
in all the peripheral categories of the IBM share within the period
should be compared with the total "PCM" increase during the
same period, i.e., the figures as of December 1971 should be sub-
tracted from those of December 1972. IBM equipment owned by
users and leasing companies in December 1971 clearly cannot be
otherwise lose, the leasing company offer should be similarly treated as an "IBM" price
reduction to win the contract. Leasing company owned equipment which was in inventory
and not on rent to customers correctly was not included in current unit installations by
the trial court.
,"' "[Bloth the PCM's and IBM's share including all devices marketed by them
whether leased or sold." 367 F. Supp. at 288. IBM argued to the Tenth Circuit, however,
that equipment sold by the PCM's had not been so included. Brief for Appellant at 29.
" 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
11 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
"I See also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). Von's Grocery,
General Dynamics, Alcoa, and Grinnell involved groceries, coal, aluminium, and protec-
tion services; the first three are commodities which are not leased, and the fourth is a
service not subject to the kind of leases found in the computer industry. Coal is also the
subject of long-term requirements contracts.
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said to have been sold thereafter. IBM-owned equipment leased
to users as of December 1971 should similarly not be considered
as having been re-leased within the next year, because by Decem-
ber 1971 it can be inferred the bulk of such leased equipment was
under the fixed-term plan.'" Assuming that the FTP penalty
provisions acted to hold FTP users to their leases, most IBM
equipment under FTP leases as of December 1971 must be
deemed to have been under the same leases for the next year. The
exception would be 1-year FTP leases signed prior to late Decem-
ber 1971, but, in the absence of statistics showing the number of
such leases, their effect cannot be measured. PCM leases in effect
as of December 1971 must also generally be deemed to have con-
tinued through the next year due to widespread PCM employ-
ment of long-term leases." 5
The numbers of certain models of installed IBM-owned and
leasing-company-owned IBM equipment actually declined be-
tween December 1971 and December 1972. These decreases
should not be subtracted from increases in user-owned equip-
ment, because a sale of a previously leased IBM product by either
IBM or a leasing company should be considered a new sale of IBM
equipment,"' even though the equipment was previously under
lease.
"' By July 22, 1971, within 2 months of FTP's introduction, 40 percent of IBM's
installed disks, tapes, and printers had been placed under the fixed-term plan. When
IBM's fourth generation disks and tapes became available in August and September 1971,
respectively, 90 percent of them were installed under FTP.
"I It is likely, however, that more PCM and IBM leases expired during the year
because many of them had commenced before IBM's initiation of FTP between July and
September 1971. Because the PCM shares are not subdivided into sold and leased equip-
ment, it is arbitrarily assumed that all PCM units were owned by PCM's and leased to
users.
"I This proportion is clear when applied to sales of formerly leased equipment which
is owned by IBM. With regard to leasing-company-owned equipment, see the discussion
in note 109 supra.
This inability to offset reduced numbers of leased equipment against increased num-
bers of newly sold equipment is not present with measurement of revenue shares, where a
unit's contribution to revenue resulting from its sale will be offset in part by its ceasing
to provide revenue as a leased product. To this extent, the combination of sales and leases
in one series of measurements, especially without revenue statistics, does not present a
complete picture of the market.
The only revenue statistics cited by the district court were for 1970 and, thus, did
not cover the period measured by the charts on unit sales and leases. The revenue statis-
tics showed that in 1970 IBM had 90 percent of tape revenues and 68 percent of disk
revenues, with the PCM's receiving 10 percent and 32 percent respectively.
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If separate markets do not exist for third and fourth genera-
tion products, new sales and leases can be computed by aggregat-
ing third and fourth generation equipment owned by both IBM
and the PCM's on December 1971 and subtracting the total from
the total number of such installations on December 1972. But, if
separate markets do exist for each generation, then, since IBM
third generation disk and tape installations and PCM third gen-
eration tape installations decreased over the year, these decreases
must be offset against the increases in fourth generation prod-
ucts, because both IBM and PCM leases in effect as of December
1971 are deemed to have been long term. These third generation
lessees are presumed to have been able to break or modify their
leases without incurring termination penalties only by switching
to the fourth generation products of their lessors. Thus, only the
number by which fourth generation leases entered into through
the year exceeds the decline in third generation leases during the
same period can be counted as the number of leases newly made.
When new sales and leases between December 1971 and
December 1972 are computed according to the methods just de-
scribed, the following market shares result. For all tapes, IBM's
share is 81.8 percent and the PCM share is 18.2 percent. In third
generation tapes, PCM installations declined, and IBM's increase
of 706 user-owned units thereby gives it 100 percent, even though
IBM suffered a decline in its leased units of 15,892. In fourth
generation tapes, IBM's share is 90.2 percent, and the PCM share
is 9.8 percent. For all disks, IBM's share is 54.7 percent and the
PCM share is 45.3 percent. In third generation disks, IBM's share
is 44.3 percent and the PCM share is 55.7 percent; IBM's share
is due to an increase of 1,556 user-owned units, as its leased units
declined by 8,937. In fourth generation disks, IBM's share is 99.1
percent, and the PCM's share is .9 percent."'
To measure new sales and leases between December 1970 and
December 1971, the same method should be used, with one possi-
"I The respective shares of new sales and leases of tapes and disks together, which
becomes important if the district court's submarket boundary between the two is not
justified, are as follows: IBM had 69.6 percent and the PCM's 30.4 percent of all tapes
and disks. IBM had 53.6 percent and the PCM's 46.4 percent of third generation tapes




ble exception. It could be argued that merely examining the in-
crease in IBM-owned product installations between December
1970 and June 1971, and possibly between December 1970 and
December 1971, does not accurately portray new leases during
those periods, because, prior to IBM's inauguration of FTP, all
of its leases were 30-day rentals. Thus, all of those who were IBM
lessees in December 1970 were making "new" decisions monthly
to lease IBM products without constraint from lease termination
penalties or other barriers until the introduction and widespread
acceptance of FTP during the second half of 1971. This exception
would not apply to leasing companies because of their general
employment of long-term leases. Similarly, it would appear that
PCM leases were largely long term during the entire 1970-72 pe-
riod.
If all installations of IBM-owned equipment are counted as
having been new leases made between December 1970 and De-
cember 1971, but only the increase in installations of PCM units
within the same period is counted as new leases, IBM's market
shares are extremely high. Because of the variance between these
high market shares and those obtained during the next year's
period as discussed above, not to mention the sharp increase in
the absolute number of PCM installations while the total number
of IBM installations was declining, this method of measuring new
leases is not thought to reflect accurately the dynamics of the
market between December 1970 and December 1971.1
"I Utilizing this method of measurement, IBM's share of third generation tapes sold
and leased between December 1970 and June 1971 was 94.5 percent. IBM had 87.5 percent
of third generation disks for the same period, since significant numbers of fourth genera-
tion products had not yet become available.
For December 1970 to December 1971, IBM had 93.1 percent of third generation
tapes, 99.7 percent of fourth generation tapes, and 93.8 percent of all tapes. For the same
period, the PCM's had 6.9 percent of third generation tapes, 0.3 percent of fourth genera-
tion tapes (PCM fourth generation tapes having just become available), and 6.2 percent
of all tapes. IBM had 84.6 percent of third generation disks, 100 percent of fourth genera-
tion disks, and 85.4 percent of all disks. The PCM's had 15.4 percent, 0 percent, and 14.6
percent, respectively, PCM fourth generation disks not having become available. It should
be noted that these market shares were computed by offsetting increases in user-owned
equipment with decreases in leasing-company-owned equipment, although the other
statistics on new sales and leases do not include such an offset as discussed above. Without
the offset, IBM's market shares were even higher.
When all PCM units as of December 1971 are counted as if they were on short-term
leases similar to those of IBM, the IBM shares decrease to about 80 percent for third
generation and all tapes and 78 percent for third generation and all disks.
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Examination of the shares of new installations as opposed to
new sales and leases shows that, of the combined third and fourth
generation increase in tape installations between December 1970
and December 1972, the PCM share was 48.6 percent. Of the total
increase in disk installations during the same period, the PCM
share was 80.6 percent. IBM installations of third generation
tapes declined substantially, while the PCM's posted an increase.
Both IBM and PCM fourth generation tape installations rose
quickly although IBM still held 91.3 percent of the fourth genera-
tion installations on December 1972. This share, however, seems
to be explained in large measure by IBM's lead time advantage.
IBM's third generation disk installations declined, while PCM
installations almost tripled. The PCM's were just beginning to
market their fourth generation disks at the end of the measuring
period. ",9
The above statistics thus indicate that between December
1971 and December 1972, when all of IBM's challenged acts in-
cluding FTP were in effect, IBM did not have sufficient shares of
new disk or combined tape and disk sales and leases to create an
inference of monopoly power, assuming that third and fourth
generation products should be combined in one market. IBM's
relatively high share of new tape sales and leases is considerably
These statistics are greatly at variance with those obtained for the second year (De-
cember 1971 to December 1972), even though the FTP leases, which apparently benefited
IBM, were only in effect during the second year. The counting of all of IBM's owned
equipment on December or June 1971 as newly leased is probably misleading because IBM
lessees, although renewing 30-day leases, may well have been abandoning such leases as
rapidly as possible. Telex installations were increasing sharply as IBM's lease base dec-
lined and PCM capacity may have been approaching its limits. Moreover, the period
involved is a very short one, and PCM marketing and installation personnel may have
been hard put to increase the conversion rate even had the necessary products been
manufactured. Only 6 months elapsed from December 1970 until IBM announced FTP,
and 40 percent of IBM's lessees signed up under FTP within 2 months after its announce-
ment. It therefore appears that for the 6 to 12 months prior to FTP's having come into
full effect, either statistics derived through the method used for the second year or shares
of sales growth, i.e., new installations, would more accurately portray market realities
than do statistics of actual sales and leases compiled on the assumption that all IBM-
owned equipment can be considered as having been newly leased within the said period.
"I The respective shares of new installations of tapes and disks together are 29.8
percent for IBM and 70.2 percent for the PCM's. The respective shares of new installations
between December 1971 and December 1972 are as follows: IBM had 76.1 percent of tapes
and 50.2 percent of disks; the PCM's had 23.9 percent and 49.8 percent respectively; for
tapes and disks together, IBM had 63.5 percent and the PCM's had 36.5 percent.
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less impressive when the heavy decline in leases is placed against
the increase in sales. If third and fourth generation products form
separate markets, IBM's large fourth generation shares can be
attributed to "natural monopoly" advantages, but with rapid
PCM advances having been made in tapes. The PCM's obtained
55.7 percent of third generation new disk sales and leases. In third
generation tapes, IBM obtained 100 percent, but this share is,
again, put into perspective by the decline in leased units. These
statistics, in conjunction with those pertaining to the relative
shares of new installations over the 2-year period for which statis-
tics were available, raise substantial questions of whether the
district court's aggregate IBM "market shares" in fact reflect the
dynamics of the relevant markets and submarkets during the
period under review.
In summary, the district court made three fundamental er-
rors in its market share measurements. First, it erred in not ex-
amining new sales and leases made within the 1970-72 period
(particularly those between 1971 and 1972) and in not computing
the percentage shares of new installations during the same period.
Second, the court apparently grouped together the peripherals
sold as parts of new systems with those sold as plug-for-plug
replacements, thus failing to distinguish between what it had
found to be two separate markets. A third probable error consis-
ted of joining third generation and fourth generation market
shares. The effect of the first error was to mask rather considera-
bly the market dynamics during the period measured. The effect
of the second is unclear, although it seems reasonable to infer that
the error hurt IBM more than it did Telex, because of IBM's
greater proportion of systems sales to total sales. The effect of the
third error was a failure to show strong PCM advances in the
third generation markets while wrongfully condemning IBM for
its high market shares in the fourth generation markets, where it
held the originator's "natural monopoly."
C. Other Pertinent Factors in Determining Whether Monopoly
Power Exists
Courts should apply to monopolization cases the type of
analysis found in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 120
1 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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where market share was held to be only one factor to be consid-
ered in determining the legality of a merger, one which must be
measured against those industry forces tending to explain or
change the market share.
In General Dynamics the Supreme Court conceded that the
Government's market share statistics as to industry concentra-
tion were "roughly comparable" to those in United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 2 ' which invalidated a merger of the third and
sixth largest grocery store chains in the Los Angeles market. The
merger produced an increase of 1.1 percent in the market share
of the two largest firms in the market and 3.3 percent in the share
of the six largest firms. The Court's opinion in Von's Grocery was
written over a strong dissent by Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
Harlan. The dissent detailed the competitive structure of the
grocery industry in Los Angeles and concluded that
[t]here is simply no evidence in the record, and the Court makes
no attempt to demonstrate, that the increment in market share
obtained by the combined stores can be equated with an increase
in the market power of the combined firm.'2
In General Dynamics Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, re-
stated what he viewed as the principle of Von's Grocery and other
leading merger cases of the 1960's, as allowing
the Government to rest its case [that a merger is likely to substan-
tially lessen competition] on a showing of even small increases of
market share or market concentration in those industries or markets
where concentration is already great or has been recently increasing
123
The Court also said that in the past "this Court has found prima
facie violations of [section] 7 of the Clayton Act from aggregate
statistics of the sort relied on by the United States in this case."' 2
But the Court emphasized that the Government's prima facie
showing should fail if outweighed by "other pertinent factors." In
General Dynamics these factors included the relative decline of
the coal industry vis-a-vis other energy sources, the coal indus-
try's widespread use of long-term requirements contracts which
1 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
I' Id. at 297.
415 U.S. at 497.
'* Id. at 496.
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effectively controlled and explained production statistics, and the
relatively small coal reserves held by the post-merger firm. These
factors were held to so outweigh the Government's market share
statistics as to render unnecessary a review of the district court's
rejection of the Government's proposed relevant markets, be-
cause "the Government's statistical presentation simply did not
establish that a substantial lessening of competition was likely to
occur in any market."'25
When one moves beyond measurement of market shares to a
more general examination of the peripheral equipment market,
other factors appear which make the claim of monopoly power
difficult to sustain. Perhaps the most important factor in addi-
tion to the market shares of those already in the market is the
ease with which potential competitors can enter. Monopoly power
is, after all, "the power to control prices or unreasonably restrict
competition.""'2 The district court found that
entry was initially easy for peripheral equipment manufacturers
because they could choose to copy only proven successful products.
Moreover, they could utilize in many instances systems hardware
provided by the system manufacturer and typically would sell only
after all systems engineering, systems marketing, site preparation
and systems installation work had been completed.'"
With lower total costs than the systems manufacturers, the
PCM's can allow them to incur all development costs, duplicate
their products through reverse engineering, and then bring copies
to market at a lower price.
Entry into the general computer industry has also been easy.
Between 1952 and 1970 the number of industry participants in-
creased from 13 to 1773. The number of systems manufacturers
increased from 3 in 1952 to 96 in 1972. The systems manufacturers
include some of the largest and most sophisticated electronics
companies, such as Sperry Rand Univac, Honeywell, Control
Data, Burroughs, and others. United States Bureau of the Census
figures show IBM's revenue shares of the general computer indus-
try to be well below 50 percent and generally in the 36 to 45
percent range. This share has consistently declined over time.'
Id. at 511.
" 367 F. Supp. at 336.
'" Id. at 286-87.
"2 The district court made reference to certain IBM internal documents, apparently
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Systems manufacturers generally need only change inter-
faces to adapt peripherals from one system to another. Both the
district court and the Tenth Circuit agreed that the cost of such
interface changes "has not constituted a substantial portion of
the development cost of the peripheral device."'' . The total cost
to Telex to adapt one of its early tape drives for use with an IBM
system was $42,000. IBM's evidence showed that the cost of an
interface modification is less than 1 percent of the product's pur-
chase price. ""
In addition major systems competitors are already active in
the IBM plug compatible market, although their products are
often marketed through intermediate assemblers and distribu-
tors. Control Data not only markets IBM plug compatible peri-
pherals under its own name, but also supplies Telex with printer
mechanisms. Sperry Rand, through its Information Storage Sys-
tems subsidiary, supplies Telex with its disk drives. Telex is pre-
sumably able to offer marketing and other economies which make
it feasible for Sperry to proceed through it rather than directly
marketing to IBM customers. As soon as IBM announced its
2319B price reduction, Information Storage Systems granted
Telex a 28 percent price reduction on disk drives. There has also
been some movement by PCM's toward full systems competition.
Memorex announced two complete systems in 1972. Texas Instru-
ments, originally a component manufacturer, markets what was
at the time of the district court trial the world's fastest CPU.
One specific consequence of the actual and potential involve-
ment of large systems manufacturers in the IBM plug compatible
market is to cast considerable doubt on any validity which the
district court's CPU offset theory might otherwise have. The
court found that IBM had offset FTP price reductions with 4 to
8 percent price increases on CPU's and other equipment in 1971
and had in 1972 offered Models 158 and 168 of its System 370
CPU at an unduly high price to subsidize the low price of the field
based on unit sales and leases, which put IBM's share of the domestic systems and
peripherals market at 75.9 percent in December 1964 and 73.3 percent in September 1968,
with IBM's share of CPU's decreasing during the same period from 68.6 percent to 64.4
percent. These and similar figures are relied upon by the Justice Department in its action
against IBM.
,,' 367 F. Supp. at 278.
' Brief for Appellant at 22.
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effect transistor memories offered with the 158 and 168 CPU's.
The offset holding has some initial difficulty in that such a notion
has usually referred to the use of monopoly power or similar re-
serves in one market to gain extra advantages in competitive
markets. ' And yet, the district court found that IBM's market
share of the general systems market did not in itself justify any
inference of monopoly power. This market was also described by
the district court as seeming "competitive and dynamic."'
' 32
Thus, any attempt by IBM to "offset" lower peripheral prices in
the plug compatible markets with price increases in the general
systems market should result in lost sales. Because the systems
and plug compatible markets are linked, such an attempted off-
set would also hurt both IBM and the PCM's in the plug compati-
ble markets by reducing the number of IBM systems which con-
stitute the latter markets.'3 3 Even if, however, such an offset were
economically feasible for IBM, there is nothing to suggest that the
other systems manufacturers who are active in the IBM plug
compatible markets could not engage in similar subsidization. In
its variety of products, Sperry Rand is far more diverse than IBM.
There would appear to be nothing to prevent Sperry from offset-
ting plug compatible pricing actions with systems price increases
or, for that matter, with price increases in its farm equipment or
other product lines, thus utilizing one of the supposed advantages
of the conglomerate or multi-industry company. 134
The extremely fast growth of the computer industry, from
revenues of $48 million in 1952 to $10.2 billion in 1970, militates
against stagnant and dominant market power, particularly that
resulting from single firm growth.'35
Another important factor to be weighed is the "marked in-
crease in the sophistication of EDP customers in the last few
13' See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
132 367 F. Supp. at 286.
'3- Another consequence of the interdependence between the systems and peripheral
markets is that IBM pricing actions in the former will bind it in the latter.
'31 Other plug compatible competitors, such as Honeywell and Control Data, should
likewise be able to engage in such subsidization.
' Gabriel Kolko, in the Triumph of Conservatism, provides a well-documented
study of the inability of even the classical turn-of-the-century monopolists to prevent
market share decline in the face of rapidly expanding markets. G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH
OF CONSERVATISM (1963). See also the dissent of Justice Stewart in United States v. Von's
Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 281 (1966).
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years." '' 'l The district court pointed out that most computer sys-
tems are installed in the 500 largest governmental and business
organizations. '3 Indeed, IBM's 2319 pricing actions were based
upon increasing concern with plug compatible competition which
had been
intensified in January of 1970 when IBM learned that the Bureau
of the Budget intended to encourage federal agencies to use equiva-
lent lower cost peripheral equipment compatible with CPU's sup-
plied by IBM and by other systems manufacturers and suggested
the utilization of standard interfaces. 138
The 1969-1972 time frame was a narrow one. PCM's had not
engaged in any significant marketing of IBM plug compatible
peripherals until 1966. In third generation products the substan-
tial effects of this competition were taking their toll throughout
the period measured. Telex did not offer its first IBM plug com-
patible disk drive until August 1969. Prior to this disk offering,
Telex had offered tapes in August 1966 and in March 1968. After
the August 1969 disk offering, other product introductions by
Telex continued throughout the period measured. PCM's had
barely begun to market fourth generation disks when the measur-
ing period ended and had only marketed fourth generation tapes
for approximately the last year of the same period.
IBM's success in the peripheral markets was not a result of
patent monopolies. IBM has developed over 10,000 computer in-
dustry patents which are freely licensed, none of which had been
abused or was directly involved in the Telex case.
Although the rate of decline was not always uniform, all of
IBM's market shares were in steady decline throughout the 1969-
1972 period. IBM and the other systems manufacturers have
higher total costs than the PCM's, and they can recoup such costs
against PCM competition only by the constant introduction of
improved products. In an internal document relied upon by the
district court, IBM stated with regard to the anticipated competi-
tive situation upon the expiration of the initial round of FTP
contracts:
' 367 F. Supp. at 272.
'3 Id.
"' Id. at 291.
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While the PC competitors will make a strong effort, it is assumed
that near-term 3330 erosion will be contained until the FTP con-
tracts approach maturity. By that time, Winchester, Iceberg [both
new products], the 3330A/B and the 333M will all be available as
customer options and should hold the market for IBM." 9
IBM could hope to slow its market share decline only by introduc-
ing products offering improved performance and by reducing its
prices where necessary, under pressure from both PCM's and
systems competitors. Rather than evidencing IBM's power to
raise prices or exclude competitors, the record shows that
"[g]enerally speaking, EDP customers have been furnished with
progressively better products at progressively lower prices," 4 " and
this trend was particularly characteristic of the plug compatible
markets during the period under review.
D. Acts of Monopolization
The Tenth Circuit held that IBM's acts did not constitute
the use of monopoly power because they involved ordinary mar-
keting methods utilized by or available to all competitors.' The
court relied particularly on the absence of below-cost pricing or
other subsidizing of plug compatible market activities. The cases
cited by the Tenth Circuit involved practices well beyond those
normally utilized by business competitors. In United States v.
Griffith4 ' the defendants clearly possessed monopoly power in
certain towns and were held to have used it to obtain competitive
advantages in other areas. In United States v. Grinnell Corp. 
43
improper contracts and acquisitions were found to have been ef-
fected. In United States v. Swift & Co.'44 abuse of size and power
was found. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States4 ' a con-
spiracy existed.
The fact that these four cases involved clearly predatory tac-
tics does not mean that such tactics are requisite for acts of mono-
polization. Alcoa stated that to limit acts of monopolization
3 Id. at 303, quoting from IBM internal documents.
"' Id. at 285. See note 40 supra.
510 F.2d at 926.
12 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
113 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
286 U.S. 106 (1932).
"5 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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to manuevers not honestly industrial . . . would in our judgment
emasculate the [Sherman] Act. . . . We disregard any question of
"intent." . . . [Once monopoly power is shown to exist], the issue
of intent ceases to have any importance; no intent is relevant except
that which is relevant to bring about the forbidden act . . . no
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing.'
The Tenth Circuit's requirement of use of monopoly power seems
to conflict with this language and the apparent Alcoa holding
that mere anticipation of increases in the demand for Alcoa's
product, aluminum ingot, and the constant expansion of capacity
to meet this demand, was a sufficient act of monopolization
under section 2. These acts of Alcoa were or would have been
normal competitive responses available to other competitors, and
in the absence of Alcoa's high share of what the Second Circuit
found to be the relevant market, they would indeed have been
laudatory. Justice Reed said for the Supreme Court in United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.:
[Tihis Court's conclusion in prior cases [has been] that, when an
alleged monopolist has power over price and competition, an inten-
tion to monopolize in a proper case may be assumed.'
Even the early authority supports the contention that, while
monopoly power does not give rise to a conclusive presumption
of an intention to monopolize, a rebuttable presumption may so
arise. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States' the Supreme Court
indicated that a presumption of intent to monopolize might arise
from proof of the existence of monopoly power under certain cir-
cumstances.'49
It is submitted, however, that the Tenth Circuit's concern
over acts which are not extraordinary is relevant to the issue of
whether monopoly power exists in the first place, particularly
under the General Dynamics approach. If a defendant has accom-
plished whatever success it enjoys by ordinary marketing meth-
ods, another weight has been placed on the balance against a
finding of monopoly power. But once this power is found to exist,
"1 148 F.2d at 431-32.
17 351 U.S. 377, 392 (1956) (footnotes omitted).
221 U.S. 1 (1911).




the Tenth Circuit's view of the required act of monopolization is
inappropriate, and the Alcoa standard should be followed.
Economic theory tells us that a rational, profit-maximizing
firm truly possessed of monopoly power cannot avoid its use. By
definition, the demand curve facing a monopolist is the same
curve that faces the entire industry. Accordingly, each unit of
output sold by the monopolist directly lowers the price per unit
which it can receive. As a result the marginal revenue curve for a
monopolist will always lie well below the demand curve. When
the monopolist, like the firm in a competitive market, maximizes
profits by setting its output and price at the point where marginal
costs equal marginal revenues, its output will tend to be more
restricted and its prices higher than if the marginal cost curve
were allowed to intersect a marginal revenue curve closer, or
equal, to the demand curve. Monopoly also tends to create long
run excess capacity and production at relatively high costs. 5 "
E. Attempted Monopolization
If this article's analysis of IBM's lack of monopoly power is
correct, there can be no finding that any acts of IBM came "dan-
gerously near" to accomplishing monopoly power in the relevant
markets or might accomplish such a result if continued un-
checked. The ultimate acts of IBM were ordinary and competi-
tive in and of themselves. With regard to causation, the worst
that can be said for all of IBM's acts taken together is that they
may have slowed, but did not stop or reverse, the steady decline
in IBM's market shares. They did not even slow the decline as to
third generation products, and the PCM's also made significant
'-1 DORFMAN, THE PRICE SYSTEM 92-96 (1964). It would seem that only two reasons
might exist for a monopolist's failure to maximize profits, assuming that its information
does not misstate costs or other factors. The first would be to prevent a competitor from
entering the market. In that case, competition is serving its purpose, and it is doubtful
whether monopoly power exists. The second would be a desire to avoid the attention of
antitrust authorities, or, failing that, to avoid liability for an "act" of monopolization.
Avoidance of prosecution by this tactic seems a remote possibility at best and would
probably have a chance of success only if the monopolist's profits were low in the first
place. Avoidance of liability should be impossible because failure to maximize profits,
which further impedes proper flow of capital and allocation of resources, should itself be
considered an act of monopolization in these circumstances, as should the waste of re-
sources inherent in deliberately paying more to produce an item than it is worth. Finally,
insuring that the monopolist continue not to maximize profits would require a regulatory
approach inimical to the purposes of the antitrust laws.
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advances in fourth generation products. IBM's absolute share of
fourth generation peripherals seems to have remained very high
only because PCM activities had just begun.'' It is suggested that
a "specific intent" to monopolize can be shown only by acts which
are not customarily used in business competition and which in
fact cause or threaten monopoly power.
The district court found that IBM had exhibited a specific
intent to monopolize because its actions were aimed directly at
the PCM's and were undertaken only after study of the impact
upon the PCM's and their future activities. Study of one's impact
on competitors, however, is inevitable in all markets, save those
of atomistic competition, and is widely engaged in by modem
firms. IBM cited authority to the Tenth Circuit that "70 to 90%
of American companies evaluate, study and analyze competitors
and competitive products."'' Such study is desirable because it
enables both competitors and potential entrants to rationally al-
locate capital and price/performance moves where they are
needed. Such study is virtua4ly indispensable to the process of
entry. Only by analyzing the position of existing competitors can
capital know what return it will receive and where. Only by such
study can one preparing to offer a better product or lower price
" Telex and the district court were concerned about the FTP attempt to "lock in"
customers, particularly on newly introduced fourth generation equipment. The leases,
however, were only for a 2-year term, which was less than the term offered in the leases
of many competitors. A large part of the 2-year period would have apparently, in the
absence of unlawful appropriation of trade secrets, been necessary as PCM lead time to
copy fourth generation IBM products. Furthermore, the strong and sophisticated custom-
ers in the computer industry might well have been willing to forego FTP in the expectation
of near-term competitive offerings if the PCM's were able to reduce IBM's lead time.
Howard Tilley, administrative assistant to Telex's chairman of the board, reported to the
president of Telex in March 1972, as follows:
Of twenty customers surveyed, only three admit that FTP was a signifi-
cant factor influencing their decision to cancel Telex in favor of IBM. Fur-
thermore, these three list other reasons in conjunction with FTP . . . . No
one indicated a willingness to be a witness although this point was not
pursued vigorously for fear of damaging future customer relationships.
Additionally, this may be a dangerous approach since IBM could proba-
bly produce witnesses to the effect that no FTP agreement was signed be-
cause the customer knew that Telex would be offering an IBM replacement
in the near future, probably at less cost. The survey found that Thiokol
Chemical took a monthly lease on IBM 3420's and that Amoco Production
did the same in anticipation of replacing them with Telex 6420's.
Brief for Appellant at 117.
"I Id. at 98.
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predict the marketplace's receptiveness. The record indicates
that Telex thoroughly studied IBM product offerings and the
effect of PCM pricing actions on IBM. It is inconceivable that
Telex and other PCM's did not make such studies prior to their
initial decisions to enter plug compatible markets. These studies
would seem to be especially needed in the computer industry,
where market definition is difficult due to the changing nature of
product combinations and advancing technology. Both IBM and
Telex must be able to identify those plug compatible markets
where room exists for competing away present profits, thereby
"injuring" present competitors. They must also be able to iden-
tify whether, and to what extent, their resources should be com-
mitted to plug compatible markets, as distinguished from sys-
tems competition.
Study of competitors, then, is a neutral and ordinarily ac-
ceptable technique. It is not an ultimate marketing action, but
is only a means for making decisions to undertake price cuts or
other activities. In no event should the requisite specific intent
be considered established by decisionmaking techniques or intra-
company memoranda, as distinguished from the objective char-
acter of ultimate acts. Memoranda may, in certain cases, help
explain the objective nature of the act, but they often tend to
confuse the issue. No matter how objectionable a memorandum's
words may be, they are of little consequence if their only outcome
is a routine marketing action. Conversely, a sophisticated com-
pany may well seek to mask arguably predatory acts, such as use
of monopoly power in one market to subsidize activities in a
competitive market, with the most innocuous of words. IBM en-
gaged in actions designed to produce a 20 percent profit and was
met by competitive responses on the part of the PCM's. In at
least some instances, IBM's actions also lowered costs. It is from
these characteristics that specific intent should be perceived,
rather than from internal documents projecting the acts' effects
on PCM's or, for that matter, expressing a hope that the effects
would be injurious. If a firm acts in a routine manner, its knowl-
edge that its actions will injure or destroy a competitor cannot
create an affirmative duty to protect the competitor and should
be of no consequence in determining specific intent to monopo-
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lize.' 3 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States'54 indi-
cates that when the acts relied upon to establish specific intent
are available to and used by other competitors, a finding of spe-
cific intent to monopolize is precluded regardless of the relevant
market and the defendant's influence thereon. '5 The sensible
justification for the Times-Picayune view is that, without its defi-
nition of specific intent, we are in reality back to the ordinary
monopolization test, but with the possibility that by establishing
only a "dangerous probability," rather than the actual existence
of monopoly power, the plaintiff can reduce its burden of proof.
VI. SUGGESTED CHANGES IN PRESENT MONOPOLIZATION LAW AND
POLICY
Now that the fear of conglomerates has been lessened by the
economic situation, if not by Justice Department action, concen-
trated or oligopolistic industries have again become a principal
concern of antitrust litigation and theory. The oil, breakfast cer-
eal, and tire industries are presently subjects of antitrust litiga-
tion. Professors Posner' and Turner' 7 are only two of the multi-
tude who have wrestled with the problem of the extent to which
companies, not shown to be in conventional agreement so as to
subject them to liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act' for
restraint of trade, can be attacked under section 2 for joint mono-
polization or can be subjected to new definitions of "agreement"
as including mere "parallelism" of action. Legislation has been
introduced in Congress which would permit dismemberment or
" The relation between the systems and plug compatible markets also makes it
difficult to label IBM's acts, particularly the fixed-term plan, as predatory because they
were aimed at PCM's. The district court found that FTP was undertaken in response to
systems competitors as well as PCM's. The systems market was competitive during the
period under review. And yet, IBM's prices in this competitive market will inevitably
carry over into the plug compatible markets. The irony is that the PCM's must in large
part depend on the systems pricing of IBM for their very existence, but are "injured" by
this pricing to the extent that it undercuts their prices or reduces their profits in the plug
compatible markets.
"' 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
Id. at 626-27.
Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562 (1969).
' Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallel-
ism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
:' 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
VOL. 53
COMPUTER EQUIPMENT MONOPOLIZATION
regulation of firms in industries with prescribed concentration
ratios.'
It is far from a universal belief that a positive correlation
exists between concentration and monopoly power, or even be-
tween concentration and enduring high profits.6 0 But it does
seem clear that all oligopolistic industries exhibit interdependent
decisionmaking which may produce an absence of competition,
especially in pricing. Even in Telex, which involved an extremely
competitive industry, the record discloses that Mr. Finnell of
IBM reported to the management review committee in January
1971, with regard to the 2319B and 3420 pricing policies:
[R]eaction to our recent tape and disk pricing action . . . were
[sic] as expected or lower. We are continuing to update our 1971
forecasts-raises the question of are you really ahead or are you back
to where you started before you adjusted your own prices.'61
It is this kind of statement, and not the drastically competitive
actions engaged in by IBM, which should alarm courts, econo-
mists, and consumers. Fortunately, IBM declined Mr. Finnell's
invitation to refrain from price competition. It has been persu-
asively suggested, however, that in concentrated manufacturing
industries similar invitations are accepted. Large firms live un-
easily under the watchful eyes of both the antitrust authorities
and the general public lest their market shares continue to in-
crease. It therefore seems reasonable to draw the inference that
such firms might deliberately refrain from actions, particularly in
pricing, which risk increase of their market shares and, instead,
take out whatever efficiency advantages they may possess in the
form of increased short-term profit.
Relaxation of present monopolization restraints on single
firm power achieved by internal growth, beginning with an imme-
diate move away from strict adherence to market shares and
toward the General Dynamics form of analysis, might well aid in
the restoration of dynamic price competition in concentrated in-
dustries. Assuming that they are not discouraged from actively
l5 Industrial Reorganization Act, S. 3832, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
1so Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:
THE NEW LEARNING (Goldschmid, Mann, Weston ed. 1974); Brozen, Bain's Concentration
and Rates of Return Revisited, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 351 (1971).
1 367 F. Supp. at 296.
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studying competitors, firms in such industries would then have
incentive to move immediately against competitors who because
of higher costs or other reasons are vulnerable to competitive
marketing techniques. Although interdependent decisionmaking
is supposedly permeated by the realization that a competitor's
response can wipe out a temporary advantage obtained by a lower
price, it is likely that perceived near-term advantages, such as
those which would accrue to General Motors if it forced Chrysler
to the brink, would produce recurring price competition. Another
advantage of relaxing monopolization restraints would be easier
detection of horizontal collusion in oligopolistic industries be-
cause injuring one's competitors would no longer be proscribed.
The classic argument for the imposition of monopolization
liability in the absence of collusion, merger, or unusually preda-
tory conduct is that once the potential monopolist had used its
advantage to drive competitors from the market, it would raise
prices and restrict output. Even if this prediction were valid, the
new "monopolist" would presumably have only a temporary ad-
vantage in the absence of governmental entry barriers and that
advantage must be weighed against the substantial savings which
may be realized by consumers on the road to such "monopoliza-
tion."
Any monopoly advantage should be quickly overcome. In the
General Motors example, Chrysler might be forced, and thus
able, to respond with methods of lowering its costs and directing
its efforts to more profitable specialties, perhaps with the aid of
partners. Even if forced to exit from the industry, its plants could
be purchased by Ford, American Motors, a foreign competitor, or
by a firm with supply substitutability and proven ability to at-
tract financing, such as International Harvester or Deere & Co.
The extent to which the turn-of-the-century monopolists in
fact possessed anything but a very temporary monopoly power,
and the role of antitrust actions in diminishing such power, has
been heavily discounted over the past two decades."' Alcoa is
perhaps the leading monopolization case, and it probably comes
"I See, e.g., G. KOLKO, supra note 135; McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LAW & ECON. 137 (1958). See generally A. KAPLAN, BIG
ENTERPRISE IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM (1954).
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closest of all leading section 2 cases to finding maintenance of
monopoly power without conduct independently violative of
other antitrust laws or at least clearly predatory. Like the district
court's holding in Telex, however, Alcoa may well be based on an
erroneous definition of the relevant market. Non-aluminum prod-
ucts were excluded, despite studies demonstrating that alumi-
num has always faced competition from various other materials
for all of its many uses." 3 There is no major use for aluminum
which cannot be, and has not been, filled by other products. Also,
Alcoa probably erred in excluding the effects of secondary alumi-
num ingot competition' 4 and in minimizing the effects of foreign
competition. For years after the Alcoa decision, only two other
major entrants appeared in the aluminum industry, and both
were thrust into their positions by solely governmental acts: The
creation of inflated wartime demand satisfied by new government
plants, which were then sold after World War II to create the new
entrants in an industry chronically plagued in the post-War pe-
riod by excess capacity. One can only speculate on the benefits
which would have resulted had the capital absorbed by this gov-
ernment financing been allowed to flow to potential competitors
in industries with high profits or poor products.
CONCLUSION
The district court in Telex erred in holding IBM liable for
monopolization and attempted monopolization. It relied heavily
on market share statistics rather than balancing those statistics
against other competitive factors in the industry. Moreover, the
accuracy of the district court's market share findings is open to
substantial question. It is also possible that some of the markets
were erroneously defined, particularly because third and fourth
generation products were not considered separately, although
more information is needed before a definite conclusion can be
reached on this point.
The Tenth Circuit overruled the district court's market divi-
sions and defined a new market unwisely founded on the market
" A. KAPLAN supra note 162, at 95-99.
2 S. WHITNEY. ANTITRUST POLICIES: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN TWENTY INDUSTRIES 90
(1958). Inclusion of secondary aluminum alone, with no other changes in the court's
market definition, would have reduced Alcoa's market share to 64 percent.
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definition concept of supply substitutability. It missed the
chance to point out the errors in the district court's market share
statistics and, more importantly, to forthrightly balance competi-
tive industry factors against the market share statistics. Finally,
the Tenth Circuit acted contrary to precedent and economic
theory by holding that an act of monopolization could not consist
of ordinary marketing methods available to other competitors.
Like the supply substitutability concept, however, the fact that
IBM relied only on such methods is important in the initial deter-
mination of the existence of monopoly power.
General Dynamics indicates a willingness by the Supreme
Court to examine all relevant data in taking a dynamic, rather
than static, view of an industry in merger cases, and it is sug-
gested that the same procedure be followed in monopolization
cases. It is also predicted that such an approach in single firm
monopolization cases, where the defendant's conduct has not oth-
erwise violated the antitrust laws, will result in few if any judg-
ments of liability. In attempted monopolization cases, proof of
specific intent and causation should be based on acts which are
beyond the pale of normal competitive conduct and clearly result
in a dangerous probability of monopoly power. This might be
shown by high and increasing market shares and an absence of
entry opportunities for other firms.
In a developed economy, a growing major industry will at-
tract entrants and competition.'65 IBM has successfully, but with
declining market shares, competed with RCA, General Electric,
and other major corporations in the computer industry. It has
been unable to stop the growth of PCM's and has been able to
slow their growth only by continually introducing superior prod-
ucts and by lowering prices. The period from 1969 to 1972 in the
computer industry demonstrated what can happen when a firm
believes it has competitive freedom of action: Competition and
consumers are benefited; some competitors are not.
- See generally F. HAYEK. THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 43-47 (1944).
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NOTE
SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW REFORM IN COLORADO-AN
ANALYSIS OF HOUSE BILL 1042
INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1975, with the signing into law of House Bill No.
1042,' Colorado joined the vanguard of a nationwide movement
toward reform of laws regulating unlawful sexual behavior.2 This
reform movement has been directed primarily toward achieving
two results: The elimination of distinctions in terminology based
on gender in order to deal with both heterosexual and homosexual
assaults in accordance with the level of violence involved;3 and
the protection of the victims of such assaults from undue
harassment and humiliation in order to encourage reporting of
sexual assaults and to facilitate the prosecution and conviction
of sexual offenders.4
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-401 to -410 (Supp. 1975), amending COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18-3-401 to -412 (1973). The law will be referred to herein as H.B. 1042, and the
various sections of the statute will be referred to in the text by section number, e.g.,
section 407(2), and cited in the footnotes as follows: C.R.S. § 407(2). H.B. 1042 is re-
printed in full in the Appendix to this note.
I See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 782(a), 1103(2)(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 261-264.1, 1127(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 794.011-.05 (West
Supp. 1975-76); IOWA CODE § 782.4 (1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520 to .520-1
(Supp. 1975).
1 A Michigan article noted the purposes of that state's new law, MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 750.520 to .520-1 (Supp. 1975):
The new law acknowledges that criminal sexual conduct is generally a pre-
meditated crime of violence rather than a crime provoked by the victim's
behavior ...
It should also be noted that the new law can be described as "sex-
neutral"-extending protection to men as well as to women.
Legislative Note, Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217,
220 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Michigan's Sexual Assault Law].
I Michigan's Sexual Assault Law 236. H.B. 1042 was drafted primarily by Richard
Wood of the Denver District Attorney's office and Representative Ted Bendelow of the
Colorado House of Representatives. Mr. Wood states the following purposes for the
changes in the law: To erect barriers for the defense in order to make the crime easier to
prosecute; to simplify the prior law; and to eliminate offensive terminology. Interview with
Richard Wood, Deputy District Attorney, in Denver, June 27, 1975. Denver District
Attorney Dale Tooley expects the new law to produce more "just results," if not more
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The states which have already enacted reformed sexual as-
sault statutes have attempted to achieve the desired results in
varying ways.5 By far the most significant and potentially
troublesome step' taken by the legislatures which have enacted
reformed sexual assault laws has been the limitation which they
have placed on cross-examination of the victim concerning his or
her7 prior or subsequent sexual conduct. This limitation has been
imposed with varying degrees of severity by the legislatures which
have adopted it.'
This note analyzes in depth the Colorado legislature's re-
sponse to the demand for reform of sexual assault laws. It begins
with an examination of the Act's changes in terminology and
convictions, by encouraging the reporting of sexual assaults. Telephone interview with
Dale Tooley, Denver District Attorney, in Denver, July 30, 1975. According to Rep. Bende-
low, "Violence is the whole premise of the bill, not sex." Telephone interview with Ted
Bendelow, Colorado legislator, in Denver, Dec. 16, 1975.
'-One initial step toward reform taken by many states has been elimination of the
requirement of corroboration of the victim's testimony. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
794.022(1) (West Supp. 1975-76); IOWA CODE § 782.4 (1975), repealing IOWA CODE § 782.4
(1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520h (Supp. 1975); ch. 374, § 8, [1975] Minn. Sess.
Laws 1088. Delaware, which has not substantially reformed its sexual assault laws, has
eliminated the corroboration requirement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 772 (Supp. 1974),
repealing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 772(c) (1974). For a general discussion of the
corroboration requirement, see Note, Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not
Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972).
However, in spite of recent reform of statutes concerning sexual assaults, New York
continues to require corroboration of the victim's testimony in certain types of cases. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.16 (McKinney 1975). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972). Colorado
has not required corroboration in sexual assault cases. See La Blanc v. Patterson, 294 F.
Supp. 607 (D. Colo. 1968); Amis v. People, 83 Colo. 400, 265 P. 909 (1928); Dickens v.
People, 60 Colo. 141, 152 P. 909 (1915).
Many states have also eliminated the requirement that the victim resist to the ut-
most. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i (Supp. 1975); ch. 374, § 8, [1975]
Minn. Sess. Laws 1088. The elimination of the resistance requirement is reflected statuto-
rily through the adoption by many states of provisions such as sections 402(1)(b) and (c)
of the new Colorado law, in which threats of force are given the same weight as actual
use of force in determining whether a crime has been committed. The resistance require-
ment is analyzed and criticized in Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation,
18 STAN. L. REV. 680 (1966).
See text accompanying notes 49-175 infra.
The author has chosen to use the pronoun "her" throughout the remainder of this
note when referring to a sexual assault victim, based on the empirical fact that the
majority of sexual assault cases involve a female victim.
See C.R.S. § 407. See also the laws of Michigan, California, and Iowa cited in note
3 supra.
VOL. 53
SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW REFORM
reclassification of offenses to determine whether the legislature
has achieved a coherent, rational result from a criminal law
standpoint. Next, the note considers constitutional issues raised
by H.B. 1042, focusing on two questions. The first, in the area of
separation of powers, is whether the legislature may have ex-
ceeded its constitutional authority in enacting the evidentiary
procedures of the new law. The second, in the area of sixth
amendment rights, is whether the legislature's evidentiary re-
strictions and procedures may impermissibly interfere with an
accused sex offender's right to confront the witnesses against him.
Furthermore, this note suggests throughout that the response of
the Colorado legislature, and that of other state legislatures
which have enacted similar laws, may be delusive in its proposed
solution to the problems inherent in the prosecution of sexual
assaults.
I. TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES
H.B. 1042 repeals and reenacts part 4, article 3, title 18 of the
Colorado Revised Statutes, 1973. The title of part 4 remains the
same-Unlawful Sexual Behavior-but the new terminology
emerges immediately thereafter in the definition section.' Gender
distinctions have been replaced by the use of the terms "actor"' 10
and "victim."" This permits the consolidation of offenses for-
merly known as "rape' '1 2 and "deviate sexual intercourse by
force""3 into one category, "sexual assault," which is then gradu-
ated in relation to the amount or type of force or violence em-
ployed.
Outstanding in the new terminology is the distinction drawn
between sexual penetration 4 and sexual intrusion. 5 When H.B.
1042 was originally introduced, sexual intrusion was included
within the definition of sexual penetration." The house of repre-
I C.R.S. § 401.
" C.R.S. § 401(1).
C.R.S. § 401(7).
12 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-401 (1973).
13 Id. § 18-3-403.
" C.R.S. § 401(6).
*s C.R.S. § 401(5).
" The submitted bill contained the following sections:




sentatives committee on the judiciary, however, apparently de-
termined that sexual intrusion should be segregated and treated
differently, and so amended the definition to read as it now does.1
7
The effect of this determination will be discussed in relation to
the classification of offenses."
The definition of the term "sexual contact"'9 is changed from
prior law to include the intentional touching of the actor's inti-
mate parts by the victim, and, also, to add the qualification that
the contact must be reasonably construed "as being for the pur-
poses of sexual arousal, gratification, -or abuse."' This qualifica-
tion is also a part of the definition of sexual intrusion, discussed
above. It would appear that in both definitions this qualification
is excess verbiage, when considered in light of part 4's built-in
medical exception" together with the "intentional" mens rea re-
quirement for sexual contact."
The new crime of sexual assault is classified into three de-
grees. Sexual assault in the first degree" includes the former
crimes of rape '5 and deviate sexual intercourse by force," with the
notable exception of "statutory rape," which, reflecting the mod-
em trend of classifying offenses in accordance with the level of
force or violence involved,2 is now classified as sexual assault in
(5)(a) "Sexual penetration" means:
(I) Sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse; or
(II) Any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body, or of any
object, into the genital or anal openings of another person's body.
(b) Emission need not be proved as an element of any sexual offense.
The submitted bill is on file at the Colorado Supreme Court library.
" HousE JOURNAL, Mar. 21, 1975, at 748-55. This amendment also added the act of
"analingus" to the definition of sexual penetration.
" Text accompanying notes 40-45 infra.
1" C.R.S. § 401(4).
2" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-409 (1973).
2 C.R.S. § 401(4).
" C.R.S. § 410.
23 Other than where the sexual contact is not inadvertent and where the sexual intru-
sion is not performed for bona fide medical purposes, it is difficult to conceive of a
situation in which the contact or intrusion could not reasonably be construed as being for
the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.
2 C.R.S. § 402.
25 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-401(1) (1973).
26 Id. § 18-3-403(1).
" Telephone interview with Ted Bendelow, supra note 4. See also note 3 supra.
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the second degree.2" A new section has been added to include,
as first degree sexual assault, instances where submission of the
victim is caused by the actor's "threatening to retaliate in the
future," provided that the victim reasonably believes that the
threat will be executed .2 Similar language has been added to the
section on submission of the victim caused by present threat-the
victim must believe that the actor has present ability to execute
the threat.3" One can only speculate as to the problems of proof
that the use of this type of language in a criminal statute may
create.'
Sexual assault in the first degree is a class 3 felony,32 as were
rape33 and deviate sexual intercourse by force. 34 However, a rape
conviction can no longer be reduced to a class 4 felony if the
victim "was a voluntary social companion of the offender upon
the occasion of the crime and had previously voluntarily engaged
in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with him. ' 3 In
fact, the new law has included aggravating factors which can raise
the offense to a class 2 felony. This reclassification comports well
with the legislative purpose to punish an offender in accordance
with the amount of force or violence involved and to eliminate
irrational reliance on the victim's prior conduct.
" C.R.S. § 403(e). It should be mentioned here that the new law narrows the marital
exception to sex crimes. Under prior law, the exception was inoperative as to conduct
between "spouses living apart under a decree of judicial separation." COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-3-411(2) (1973). The new law provides that the exception does not apply to
"spouses living apart, with the intent to live apart, whether or not under a decree of
judicial separation." C.R.S. § 409(2). It has been suggested by one author that a similar
differentiation in Michigan's new law between married couples living apart and those
living together may constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws. That author
commented on the law's failure to protect married persons from sexual assault by a
spouse: "[Tihe legislature decided to avoid bringing this difficult evidentiary and social
problem within the scope of the Act." Michigan's Sexual Assault Law 233.
' C.R.S. § 402(1)(c).
C.R.S. § 402(1)(b). Note that the word "reasonably" is not used in this section.
It was apparently the intent of the legislature in using this particular language to
control situations where the victim might be of superior strength. Telephone interview
with Ted Bendelow, supra note 4.
2 C.R.S. § 402(2).
a COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-401(2) (1973).
3' Id. § 18-3-403(2).
3 Id. § 18-3-401(2).
' C.R.S. §§ 402(2)(a)-(c). This provision was added to the submitted bill by the
house of representatives committee on the judiciary. HousE JOURNAL, Mar. 21, 1975, at
749-50.
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Sexual assault in the second degree" includes the former
crimes of gross sexual imposition,"8 deviate sexual intercourse by
imposition, 9 corruption of minors and seduction, 0 and statutory
rape." Also included in second degree sexual assault is sexual
intrusion, discussed previously. It should be noted that prior Col-
orado criminal law did not deal with the behavior now defined as
sexual intrusion. The distinction drawn between sexual penetra-
tion and sexual intrusion is that the former refers to the actor's
use of the penis, mouth, or tongue to perform a sexual act,
whereas the latter refers to the use of some other part of the body
or an object to perform the sexual act. It is when this distinction
is considered that the differing treatment given the two categories
begins to appear irrational.
The legislature has made sexual intrusion a second degree
offense,4" and thus a class.4 felony, unless extreme force or threat
is used, in which case sexual intrusion becomes a class 3 felony.
43
At first glance, this provision appears to make it possible to pun-
ish an offender who has violently committed sexual intrusion as
severely as one who has violently committed sexual penetration.
But further inquiry reveals the fact that first degree sexual pene-
tration can be elevated to a class 2 felony when certain additional
aggravating factors are present;" sexual intrusion cannot. This
- C.R.S. § 403.
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402 (1973).
g Id. § 18-3-404.
Jo Id. § 18-3-410. Corruption of minors and seduction was formerly a class 5 felony;
the new law raises the offense to a class 4 felony.
" The sections of H.B. 1042 dealing with statutory rape and sexual assault on a child
went through several changes in committee before attaining their final form. See House
JOURNAL, Mar. 21, 1975, at 749-50; id., Mar. 27, 1975, at 824. Apparently, a prosecutor
now has the option in a case where, for example, a 19-year-old actor causes a 14-year-old
victim to submit to sexual penetration by means of extreme force or threat, to proceed
under sections 402(1)(a), (b), or (c), or under section 403(1)(e), or under section 405.
Presumably, where extreme force or threat is present, the offender will be charged with
first degree sexual assault if there has been sexual penetration, but with sexual assault
on a child if there has been only sexual contact or sexual intrusion. See text accompany-
ing notes 41-47 infra. Where the activity is consensual, the offender can be charged under
either section 403(1)(e) or section 405, which are both class 4 felonies. This reflects the
legislature's effort to reduce the criminal sanctions imposed on consensual activity. Tele-
phone interview with Ted Bendelow, supra note 4.
4 C.R.S. § 403(1)(b).
C.R.S. § 403(2). This provision was added to the submitted bill by the house of
representatives committee on the judiciary. House JOURNAL, Mar. 21, 1975, at 750.
" See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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distinction is without rational basis if the purpose of the reclassi-
fication of the offenses is to punish offenders in accordance with
the level of force or violence involved. Surely an offender who
causes the victim to submit to a sexual act accomplished by use
of an object (sexual intrusion) and who causes this submission by
use of a deadly weapon" has committed as violent and reprehen-
sible a crime as the offender who causes the victim to submit to
a sexual act accomplished by use of the offender's mouth or penis
(sexual penetration). And yet, the first offender, under the new
law, cannot be punished as severely. Apparently, the legislators
were unable to rid themselves completely of the historical tend-
ency to view sexual assaults as crimes of passion or lust, rather
than as crimes of violence; reflecting this tendency, the Colorado
legislature determined to punish a sexual assault accomplished
by sexual means more severely than a sexual assault accom-
plished by use of an object or a part of the body not commonly
associated with sexual acts.46
Sexual assault in the third degree47 is quite similar to the
offense referred to under prior law as sexual assault.48 However,
one significant change is that, under the new law, third degree
sexual assault can be elevated from a class 1 misdemeanor to a
class 4 felony49 if extreme force or threat is used to cause submis-
sion to the sexual contact.50 Under prior law there was no elevat-
ing factor.' Sexual assault in the third degree can be read to
11 Use of a deadly weapon is one of the aggravating factors which can raise sexual
penetration to a class 2 felony. C.R.S. § 402(2)(c).
" See Michigan's Sexual Assault Law 223-24. The note discusses the "mythology of
rape" which has affected sex crimes legislation over the years, including society's tendency
to view rape as a crime of passion. See also Smith, History of Rape and Rape Laws, 60
WOMEN LAW. J. 188 (1974).
, C.R.S. § 404.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407 (1973).
" A possible explanation for the fact that the class 5 felony was skipped over in
providing for elevation is that there is little difference in sentencing between a class 5
felony and a class 4 felony. A class 4 felony is punishable by imprisonment from 1 day to
10 years and/or a fine of $2,000 to $30,000, and a class 5 felony is punishable by imprison-
ment from 1 day to 5 years and/or a fine of $1,000 to $15,000. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-
1-105 (Supp. 1975). With this type of "indeterminate" sentencing, any given offender will
probably serve the same number of years whether sentenced for a class 4 or a class 5 felony,
since his release date will depend primarily on individualized factors.
C.R.S. § 404(2).
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-407(2) (1973).
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include almost totally innocuous behavior; apparently, the legis-
lators were confident that police and prosecutorial discretion will
be exercised reasonably when bringing charges under this section.
II. EVIDENTIARY PROCEDURES AND JURY INSTRUCTION
The most outstanding feature of H.B. 1042, and of similar
laws being enacted in many states,"2 is the attempted exclusion
from trial of evidence of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual
conduct. Colorado's new law creates a presumption that opinion
evidence, reputation evidence, or evidence of specific instances of
the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct is irrelevant and,
therefore, inadmissible at trial. 3 There are two types of such
evidence which are excepted from this presumption: (1) Evidence
of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct with the defen-
dant; and (2) evidence of specific instances of sexual activity
showing the source of any semen, pregnancy, or disease, or any
similar evidence of sexual intercourse offered for the purpose of
showing that the act charged was or was not committed by the
defendant. 4 In short, the latter two types of evidence will be
freely admitted at trial, but any other evidence of the victim's
prior or subsequent sexual conduct will be inadmissible, unless
the statutory presumption of irrelevance can be overcome."
To rebut this presumption, the defendant must follow a spe-
cial procedure created by the legislature. 51 First, the defendant
must file a written motion, accompanied by an affidavit, 5 stating
that he has an offer of proof of the relevancy of evidence of the
victim's sexual conduct or of evidence of the victim's history of
false reporting of sexual assaults.58 If the court finds the offer of
proof sufficient, it must set an evidentiary hearing to be held in
52 See note 2 supra.
53 C.R.S. § 407(1).
54 C.R.S. §§ 407(1)(a), (b).
11 See C.R.S. § 407.
11 C.R.S. § 407(2).
1, C.R.S. § 407(2)(b).
11 C.R.S. § 407(2)(a). A problematical situation is created by the fact that section
407(2) describes the procedure to be followed if the defendant seeks to introduce evidence
of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct or of the victim's "history of false
reporting of sexual assaults," yet section 407(1) does not extend the presumption of irrele-
vancy to any matters other than the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct. There
is, thus, some confusion as to whether a victim's history of false reporting is presumed
irrelevant or not.
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camera prior to trial."9 At the conclusion of this hearing, if the
court finds that the evidence proposed to be offered is "relevant
to a material issue to the case," the court must order that such
evidence may be introduced at trial.6 0
A concomitant provision of the new law prohibits the jury
instruction known as the "Lord Hale" instruction."' The judge in
a sexual assault trial is now statutorily prohibited from instruct-
ing the jury "to examine with caution the testimony of the victim
solely because of the nature of the charge," or that "such a charge
is easy to make but difficult to defend against"; nor may the
judge give "any similar instruction." 2
The purpose of these statutory restrictions on evidence and
jury instructions is clear. The primary purpose is to diminish
personal harassment of the victim by controlling the introduc-
tion of evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior." Further
desired results are the encouragement of reporting of sexual as-
saults and the facilitation of conviction of offenders.
64
However, it should be noted that all of the evidentiary re-
strictions and procedures which have been enacted in the name
of equal rights for women and reform of antiquated and offensive
methods of prosecuting sexual assaults may fail to accomplish the
lofty goals set for them. A recent, exhaustive study of rape victims
indicates that the prospect of being cross-examined by a defense
attorney concerning their prior sexual conduct is not a highly
significant factor influencing sexual assault victims to refrain
from reporting or prosecuting the incident. 5 Much more influen-
C.R.S. § 407(2)(c).
C.R.S. § 407(2)(e).
, The Lord Hale instruction derives from a statement made by Sir Matthew Hale,
Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1671 to 1676, and found recorded at 1 M.
HALE. THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (S. Emlyn ed., published in this
country by R. Small 1847):
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore ought severely
and impartially to be punished with death; but it must be remembered, that
it is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to
be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.
62 C.R.S. § 408.
13 Telephone interview with Ted Bendelow, supra note 4. Mr. Bendelow noted that
the intent is also to ensure that each case is decided only on the merits of that charge
and to prevent other irrelevant instances from affecting the outcome.
1, Telephone interview with Dale Tooley, supra note 4.
11 A. BURGESS & L. HOLMSTROM, RAPE: VICTIMS OF CRISIS (1974).
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tial in such a decision are victims' fears concerning: Repeating
the details of the assault to police officers, prosecuting attorneys,
and all those who will be present in the courtroom; submitting
to physical and psychological examinations; facing and living
with the unknown reactions of family and friends or the possibil-
ity of reprisals by the accused; and surviving cross-examination
by the defense attorney (which can be a devastating experience
whether or not inquiry into prior sexual conduct is permitted)."
Any attempted solution to the complex social problems in-
herent in the prosecution of sexual crimes which relies on statu-
tory evidentiary restrictions may prove to be illusory at best, and,
at worst, an unconstitutional infringement on the rights of a crim-
inal defendant. The Colorado Supreme Court will not concern
itself with the "wisdom" of such legislation,67 but will undoubt-
edly be called upon to examine the constitutionality of the legis-
lature's enactments. The following sections deal with the consti-
tutional issues which will undoubtedly arise.
A. Constitutionality-Separation of Powers-Did the Colorado
Legislature Exceed its Constitutional Power in Enacting These
Provisions?
There are two aspects of H.B. 1042 which create concern in
relation to the separation of governmental powers. The first to be
resolved is whether the legislature may enact a procedural provi-
sion such as that embodied in section 407(2) without encroaching
on the Colorado Supreme Court's rulemaking power. It will be
argued herein that the Colorado constitution vests the rulemak-
ing power in the supreme court, thereby removing this power from
the legislative sphere. If the section in question may be consid-
ered procedural, it may also be unconstitutional and void because
enacted without authority by the legislature. But an inquiry into
11 See generally id. But see contra, J. Bellacose, Practice Commentary, 11A N.Y.
CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76):
This is not merely a bow to women's rights objectives, but a salutary protec-
tion of the rights of victims of crime. It further serves the public interest
because it should eliminate one of the psychological deterrents . . . which
caused victims of sex offenses not to report them. These changes should now
encourage such victims to do so and to see the prosecutions through to a just
conclusion.
Id. at 76-77.
11 See 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 154 (1956) and cases cited therein.
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the Colorado Supreme Court's historical reaction to legislative
encroachment on the rulemaking power of the judiciary reveals
that the court has long permitted such encroachment and ac-
quiesced in the legislature's actions. The conclusion to be drawn
is that, although the legislature may have exceeded its authority
in creating procedural rules, the Colorado Supreme Court will not
strike down this legislation on that ground, primarily because the
court itself has not yet exercised its rulemaking power in this
particular area.
A second point which raises separation of powers questions
is the more general problem of legislative invasion of territory
which is inherently judicial. It will be argued herein that the
legislature in sections 407(1) and 408 has done more than create
an evidentiary presumption (in itself an act within the legisla-
ture's power), but instead has attempted to legislate the
relevancy of certain evidence in a criminal trial. Also, in prohibit-
ing certain jury instructions, the legislature has attempted to
limit statutorily the power of a judge to instruct a jury. It will be
suggested, however, that since the presumption of relevancy is
rebuttable, and the limitation on jury instructions is not total,
the provisions will be construed by the court to allow the judiciary
to exercise its constitutional powers, and will not be stricken as
an unconstitutional encroachment on the judiciary.
1. The Rulemaking Power
a. Development of the rulemaking power in Colorado
The Colorado constitution embraces the concept of separa-
tion of governmental powers. 8 In 1965 the constitution was
amended to vest judicial rulemaking power in the supreme
court. 9 The effect of this amendment was analyzed in depth in a
"s COLO. CONST. art. III. The clause not only separates governmental powers into three
departments, but also forbids the exercise of powers of one department by any person
charged with exercising powers of another department, except as expressly permitted in
the constitution.
4 The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the ad-
ministration of all courts and shall make and promulgate rules governing
practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases, except that the general
assembly shall have the power to provide simplified procedures in county
courts for claims not exceeding five hundred dollars and for the trial of
misdemeanors.
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 21.
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1966 article by Professor Courtland H. Peterson,7" in which he
traced the convoluted history of the rulemaking power in Colo-
rado.7'
The Colorado Supreme Court apparently made no effort at
rulemaking until the legislature passed the Enabling Act of 1913,
which mandated that the supreme court would create rules of
practice and procedure for all courts of record, which rules would
then "supersede any statute in conflict therewith." 2 The court
then adopted such rules, "supplementary to the existing Code of
Civil Procedure,""3 which had been created legislatively. In cases
concerning the rulemaking power which emerged during the sub-
sequent period, the supreme court took a strong position overall
in protection of its rulemaking function."
The clearest picture of the court's position on rulemaking
emerged through the events surrounding the 1931 case of
Kolkman v. People.75 The supreme court had adopted a rule per-
mitting trial judges to comment on the evidence in jury trials,
patterned after the federal rule. The rule was challenged in
Kolkman and the court, in upholding the rule, stated:
The judicial power of the state is vested in the courts; the legislative
and executive departments are expressly forbidden the right to exer-
Peterson, Rule Making in Colorado: An Unheralded Crisis in Procedural Reform,
38 U. CoLo. L. REV. 137 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Rule Making in Coloradol.
11 According to Peterson, Colorado became a territory during a time "when legislative
dominance in the field [of rulemaking] was taken for granted." Id. at 140. Prior to this
time, during the eighteenth century and earlier, rulemaking was presumed to be an inher-
ently judicial function. But legislatures had intervened in this area in order to reform a
system of elaborate and rigid pleadings which had reached "a point where formalism
seemed as often to impede the administration of justice as to expedite it." Id. at 138.
Shortly after Colorado attained statehood, the legislature enacted a Code of Civil Proce-
dure, which was in effect until the enactment of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure in
1941.
" Id. at 141-42 & nn.30-31. Prior to the 1913 Enabling Act, conflicts between statutes
and rules of inferior courts were invariably resolved in favor of the legislature. Id. at 142.
73 Id.
See, e.g., Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 P. 780 (1929), wherein the court said:
We seriously question the power of the Legislature to make any rules or to
enact any laws relative to procedure in courts. It is doubtful if the Legislature
in Colorado could have enacted any law with reference to procedure in courts
of record unless that power had been expressly or tacitly surrendered to it
by the judiciary.
Id. at 21, 278 P. at 786-87.
" 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931).
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cise it, and the courts, charged with the duty of exercising the judi-
cal power, must necessarily possess the means with which to effec-
tually and expeditiously discharge that duty; this duty can be per-
formed and discharged in no other manner than through rules of
procedure, and consequently this court is charged with the power
and duty of formulating, promulgating, and enforcing such rules of
procedure for the trial actions as it deems necessary and proper for
performing its constitutional functions."6
Before the Kolkman opinion was released, the Colorado legis-
lature amended the Enabling Act of 1913 by adding the provision
that the supreme court shall not make any rule permitting trial
judges to comment on the evidence in a trial." As Peterson noted,
this amendment "was a direct assault on the Court's assertion of
inherent or constitutional powers . . . ."I' The legislature reiter-
ated this prohibition in the Enabling Act of 1939.11 When the
supreme court issued the current Colorado Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure pursuant to that
Act, it retreated from its hard-line language in the Walton and
Kolkman opinions and included prohibitions against trial judges'
commenting on the evidence. 0 The schizophrenia exhibited by
the court in relation to the Kolkman case has not been resolved
in the intervening years."'
The passage of the 1965 constitutional amendment, vesting
the rulemaking power in the supreme court, at least altered the
method of approaching the problem. Peterson noted: "No longer
can the problem be approached as one of statutory construction,
or through speculation about the historically inherent powers of
courts; it has instead become a question of basic constitutional
law."82 He felt that this constitutional provision resolved the
71 Id. at 33-34, 300 P. at 584-85.
1 Ch. 132, § 1, [19311 Colo. Sess. Laws 680.
7 Rule Making in Colorado at 146.
76 Ch. 80, § 1, [1939] Colo. Sess. Laws 264.
" Rule Making in Colorado 147 & n.50.
" In 1966 Professor Peterson drew four significant conclusions concerning the devel-
opment of the rulemaking dilemma: (1) There had been no case involving a true conflict
between a statute and a court rule in which the court rule was held to override the statute;
(2) the legislature had continuously and confidently passed statutes of procedural content;
(3) the court had consistently enforced such procedural statutes without objection and,
thus, conceded to the legislature at least a concurrent power to regulate procedure; and
(4) the court had, as in the Kolkman situation, acquiesced in the legislature's overriding
rulemaking power. Id. at 148-49.
" Id. at 149.
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problem of supremacy between court rule and statute in favor
of the court, and concluded that the constitutional provision
gave exclusive rulemaking power to the supreme court by con-
struing article III and article VI, section 21 of the Colorado
constitution.1
3
Peterson noted that a strict interpretation of the amendment
would require invalidating the innumerable statutory procedural
rules on the books-"an absurd and unjust result."" His sugges-
tion was that the supreme court "issue a general rule immedi-
ately, adopting the existing statutory rules in their entirety" ' s as
a stopgap measure until such rules could be revised and reissued
by the supreme court.
The court has not acted on Peterson's suggestion. The Colo-
rado legislature has continued, since the constitutional amend-
ment of 1965, to enact statutes of procedural content, and the
supreme court, on the infrequent occasions when it has been
squarely confronted with the issue, has not chosen to enforce
strictly its exclusive rulemaking power." The "crisis" heralded by
" By applying the expressio unius, exclusio alterius maxim, Peterson concluded that
the last phrase of article VI, section 21, excepting from the court's rulemaking power the
promulgation of simplified procedures for county courts, indicated that all other rulemak-
ing power was thereby vested in the supreme court. He supported his conclusion by
reference to the last phrase of article III of the Colorado constitution, which prohibits
anyone charged with exercising powers belonging to any one of the three branches of
government from exercising any powers belonging to either of the other branches of gov-
ernment "except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." This phrase
requires that the expressio unius, exclusio alterius maxim be applied in interpreting and
construing other sections of the constitution. On the basis of this analysis, Peterson stated:
"Except with respect to simplified procedures for county courts .. general rule-making
power for the courts must . . . be taken to be excluded from legislative competence." Id.
at 151-52 & n.59.
' Rule Making in Colorado 154-55. He stated:
In view of the fact that there are literally hundreds of statutes still on the
books in Colorado, dealing with details of practice and procedure and not in
any way duplicated by existing rules of court, the withdrawal of legislative
power in this area presents a potential crisis of major proportions.
Id. at 154.
0 Id. at 155.
Re We find no specific constitutional limitation that bears upon the ques-
tion of the form or type of procedure which must be employed to challenge
an annexation, and this court has not yet exercised its rulemaking power
under Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21. . . . [The court cites Rule Making in
Colorado.]
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Professor Peterson has been ignored so effectively that, in at least
one instance, court rule and statute now coexist contentedly in
spite of the fact that their provisions conflict." Title 16 of the 1973
Colorado Revised Statutes is replete with procedural provisions
created, presumably without any power or authority, by the legis-
lature.
Despite this impressive evidence that the court is uncon-
cerned about legislative encroachment into territory explicitly
ceded to the court by the constitution, it is still necessary to
consider what the court's reaction might be when it is squarely
presented with the issue in relation to H.B. 1042. How might the
court react to a challenge to the statute based on the argument
that the procedural provisions are unconstitutional and void be-
cause the legislature lacked the constitutional authority to enact
them?
The legislature rather than arrogate unto itself the right to establish a
review procedure has adopted a specific procedure from the rules promul-
gated by this Court. . . . The statute, although providing for procedure,
created a right which is substantive in nature . . . . The matter of who may
challenge the validity of an annexation involves a substantive right. Conse-
quently, it is a proper matter for legislative action.
Fort Collins-Loveland Water Dist. v. City of Fort Collins, 174 Colo. 79, 83, 482 P.2d 986,
988 (1971).
See also Smith v. Johns, 532 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1975), in which the court held that rule
35(a) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, allowing the court to correct an illegal
sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, and COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-
303 (1973), providing that an improper sentence to the Colorado State Reformatory will
be automatically corrected, do not conflict irreconcilably. The trial judge had corrected
the improper sentence pursuant to rule 35(a), and the defendant sought a writ of prohibi-
tion to prevent the judge from resentencing him to the state penitentiary. The supreme
court found that the trial judge acted without jurisdiction in altering the original sentence
on the theory that, since the statute corrects the improper sentence automatically, it
removes jurisdiction to change the sentence from the trial court. The court cited The
Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam:
"The [legislative] Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it."
532 P.2d at 51. The Colorado Supreme Court apparently feels helpless in the face of the
legislature's indelible power.
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-6-103 (1973), as enacted by the legislature, allows
change of venue in a criminal case to another county within the same judicial district if
it is shown that the offense was committed in more than one county within the same
judicial district. On the other hand, rule 18(b)(1) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal
Procedure allows such a change of venue if the offense was also committed or an act in
furtherance of the offense occurred in the county where the case is to be transferred.
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b. H.B. 1042's evidentiary procedures and the rulemak-
ing power
The threshold question is whether section 407(2) embodies
principles of substantive or of procedural law. It has been held in
cases of this type that any legislative attempt to create rules of
procedure constitutes an intrusion on the power of the supreme
court and, thus, would be in violation of the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers, unless the enactment were substantive in nature.m
The distinction between substantive and procedural matters has
been drawn fairly clearly: Substantive law creates and regulates
rights, whereas procedural law prescribes the method of enforcing
and implementing those rights and regulates the steps by which
one who has violated the rights of others may be punished. 9 Nev-
ertheless, in many instances it can be extremely difficult to define
a given provision as substantive or as procedural;' some statutes,
such as H.B. 1042, are of mixed substantive and procedural con-
tent.
It appears evident on the face of section 407(2) that it is
procedural in nature.9' Thus the basis exists for a legal challenge
on the ground that the legislature exceeded its authority in enact-
ing it. However, one significant factor militates against the su-
preme court's striking down section 407(2), the fact that there is
currently no court rule in effect which would control the matters
encompassed in that section.2 The statute thus creates no actual
' Johnson v. State, 308 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
,9 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, modified, 312 U.S. 655 (1940); Hardamon
v. Municipal Ct., 178 Colo. 271, 497 P.2d 1000 (1972); State v. Elmore, 179 La. 1057, 155
So. 896 (1934); State v. Rodosta, 173 La. 623, 138 So. 124 (1931); Barker v. St. Louis
County, 340 Mo. 986,104 S.W.2d 371 (1937); In re McCombs' Estate, 80 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio
P. Ct. 1948).
O Rule Making in Colorado 163-64.
" Section 407 reads in pertinent part:
(2) In any criminal prosecution under sections 18-3-402 to 18-3-405 ... if
evidence [of the victim's prior sexual conduct] . . . is to be offered at trial,
the following procedure shall be followed ....
(Emphasis added.) At this writing, at least one Colorado district court has held section
407 to be procedural. Brief for Defendant in support of Motion to Dismiss at 2, People v.
Madrigal. Crim. No. 3965 (Denver Dist. Ct., filed July 8, 1975).
,2 The closest parallel which can be drawn between currently used procedure and the
newly created evidentiary hearing procedure is the motion in limine (literally, "motion
at the outset"). This motion is frequently utilized prior to trial or during trial when a party
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conflict with an extant rule of court. A study of decisional law in
various states whose constitutions vest the rulemaking power in
their supreme courts indicates clearly that, in those cases in
which a procedural statute has been successfully attacked on
grounds of legislative encroachment on the power of the judiciary,
the statute in question has been in conflict with an existing court
rule on the same subject. 3 A Colorado case dealing with similar
issues was Denver Bar Association v. Public Utilities
Commission.94 In that case the court was called upon to consider
the validity of a legislative directive to the public utilities com-
mission to adopt rules and regulations for the conduct of commis-
sion hearings. The separation of powers issue involved in the case
related to the supreme court's exclusive power to regulate the
practice of law and the possibility that the legislative directive
constituted an infringement of the judicial prerogative. The
court, by "presuming that the Legislature had no intention of
infringing upon the court's authority," managed to construe the
directive in such a way as to preclude any interference with the
power to regulate the practice of law. In doing so, the court said:
In the determination of the qualifications for admission of persons
to practice law, and in the regulation and discipline of those licensed
to practice law, this Court is vested by the people through the Con-
stitution with the sole power to act. Legislation in any of these areas
does not add to or detract from the exclusive authority of this Court.
Wherever legislation conforms to our authority, it is gratuitous. Leg-
islation tending to limit the scope of that which constitutes the
practice of law would be abortive."
wants to limit or prevent the introduction of evidence on a certain point (for example,
cross-examination of a criminal defendant concerning prior felony convictions which de-
fense counsel contends are too remote in time to be admissible). The motion in limine is
a creation of the common law; there is no court rule (or statute) in Colorado providing for
the procedure.
g3 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 308 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (supreme court
rule concerning presentence reports indicates that the matter is within the court's power
and any legislative enactment on the subject violates the separation of powers; a rule of
procedure promulgated and adopted by the supreme court cannot be amended or su-
perceded by an act of the legislature); Lawrence R. McCoy Co. v. S.S. Theomitor III, 133
N.J. Super. 308, 336 A.2d 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. L. Div. 1975) (court rules extending to
matters of practice, procedure, and administration are not subject to overriding legisla-
tion).
154 Colo. 273, 391 P.2d 467 (1964).
Id. at 277, 391 P.2d at 470.
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It is possible to analogize between the supreme court's exclu-
sive power to regulate the practice of law and its exclusive power
to promulgate rules of court procedure. The last two sentences of
the above quotation are indicative of the court's probable reac-
tion to a constitutional challenge to section 407(2). There being
no preexisting rule of court on the procedure to be followed in a
motion to admit evidence presumed inadmissible," the legisla-
tion will in all likelihood be found not "tending to limit the scope
of" the court's rulemaking power, and will not be struck down on
this ground. 7
2. Legislative Encroachment on Inherently Judicial Func-
tions
a. The evidentiary restrictions
It is a well established principle in Colorado that the power
of the state legislature is plenary and only limited by restrictions
imposed by the state constitution. In questioning the validity of
a state statute, the constitution is examined only to determine
whether its passage is prohibited therein.9 In keeping with this
principle, it has been held that the legislature acts within its
power when it enacts substantive rules of evidence'00 or when it
declares one fact to be presumptive evidence of another.'"' So at
first glance it would appear that, in creating by statute the pre-
sumption that evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct is irrel-
" See note 92 supra.
7 See 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 128 n.68.5 (Supp. 1975) and accompanying text. An-
other approach the court might take in upholding the procedural provisions is that taken
by the Maryland Supreme Court in Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 335
A.2d 679 (1975). There, it was noted that "courts are under a special duty to respect the
legislative judgment where legislation is attempting to solve a serious problem in a manner
which has not had an opportunity to prove its worth." Id. at 684.
'" Colorado State Civil Serv. Emp. Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624 (1968);
Denver Milk Producers v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 116 Colo. 389, 183 P.2d 529,
appeal dismissed, 334 U.S. 809 (1947); Metzger v. People, 98 Colo. 133, 53 P.2d 1189
(1936); Colacino v. People, 80 Colo. 417, 252 P. 350 (1927); Jordan v. People, 19 Colo. 417,
36 P. 218 (1894); People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929 (1891);
Alexander v. People ex rel. Schofield, 7 Colo. 155, 2 P. 894 (1884); People v. Wright, 6
Colo. 92 (1881); People ex rel. Tucker v. Rucker, 5 Colo. 455 (1880).
" See cases cited note 98 supra.
People v. Smith, 182 Colo. 228, 512 P.2d 269 (1973).
City & County of Denver v. Smerdal, 165 Colo. 475, 440 P.2d 158 (1968); Bishop
v. Salida Hosp. Dist., 158 Colo. 315, 406 P.2d 329 (1965); Robertson v. People, 20 Colo.
279, 38 P. 326 (1894).
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evant in a sexual assault trial, the Colorado legislature is acting
within its authority.
However, it must be noted that in H.B. 1042 the legislature
has created more than a simple evidentiary presumption; it has
attempted to legislate the relevancy of certain evidence in a crim-
inal trial. Does the fact that the key word is "relevancy" require
a finding that the legislature is encroaching on the judicial func-
tion? '°
Determination of the relevancy of evidence in a judicial pro-
ceeding is generally considered to be a judicial, rather than a
legislative, function. 0 3 It has been suggested that "a legislature
may not determine relevancy directly, but only indirectly by de-
fining the crime of rape, and the defenses applicable to it," and
that "attempts via legislative fiat to remove discretion from the
courts and to rule all such evidence [of a victim's prior sexual
conduct] irrelevant and inadmissible must fail."'0 4
In Colorado, determination of the relevancy of this type of
evidence in a sexual assault trial was formerly left entirely to the
discretion of the trial court. In Olguin v. People'015 and Struna v.
People'6 objections to such questions of the victim as, "Have you
ever had any sex experience prior to this time?" were held pro-
16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 104 (1956):
[Clonstitutional government in the United States is distinguished by the
care that has been exercised in committing the legislative, executive, and
judicial functions to separate departments, and in forbidding any encroach-
ment by one department on another in exercise of the authority so
delegated ...
[It is an established and fundamental principle of constitutional law that
one department cannot interfere with, or encroach on, either of the other
departments, in the absence of an express provision therefor, notwithstand-
ing the constitution does not expressly so require.
lOS 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 104 (1956): "Generally, investigation of the facts involved
in a controversy and the determination of their relevancy are matters for the judiciary,
and not the legislature .... "
'", Note, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior
Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection of
Reality or Denial of Due Process? 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 418, 426 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Limitations on Evidence]. The quoted material refers to the new Michigan sexual
assault law, supra note 2, which conclusively presumes such evidence to be irrelevant
except in two limited situations.
" 115 Colo. 147, 170 P.2d 285 (1946).
" 121 Colo. 348, 215 P.2d 905 (1950).
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perly sustained because the questions were so general that any
answer would be improper and irrelevant."
7
Thus, it would appear that any exercise by the legislature of
the power to determine the relevancy of evidence would consti-
tute an encroachment on an inherently judicial function. But the
separation of powers in this area has not been strictly enforced.
While it has been said that the legislature may exercise judicial
powers which are "incident and essential to the discharge of legis-
lative functions""'" and that the legislature may determine that
certain evidence is inadmissible in certain cases,'"9 it has also
been held that the legislature cannot wipe out basic and funda-
mental rules governing the competency of evidence'I and that the
legislature may not act in such a way as to prevent the judiciary
from exercising its powers."'
Obviously, the law is not clear or precise on this point. Two
aspects of the issue are clear, however. One is that it is within the
power of the legislature to declare the public policy of the state."'
Clearly, the legislature intends to establish the policy that vic-
tims of sexual assaults should be protected from inquiry into their
past lives. But the legislature may not implement its policy in a
manner which is unconstitutional, e.g., by encroaching on the
power of the judiciary.
The other significant aspect of this issue is that the presump-
", According to Rollie Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, and Sherry Seiber,
Deputy Public Defender, in sexual assault trials prior to the passage of H.B. 1042, admissi-
bility of evidence concerning the victim's past sexual conduct was always subject to
relevancy standards. Interviews with Rollie Rogers, in Denver, Aug. 6, 1975, and with
Sherry Seiber, in Denver, June 24, 1975.
16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 108 (1956).
Id. § 128d.
W' illiams v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 136 Colo. 458, 319 P.2d 1078 (1958).
Dines v. Harris, 88 Colo. 22, 291 P. 1024 (1930). As early as 1890 the Colorado
Supreme Court said:
Undoubtedly, legislation may and must cover a wide range of subjects, con-
nected directly or indirectly with judicial action; but that a limit exists
somewhere to legislative power over the manner in which courts created by
the constitution shall perform judicial duties, and conduct judicial business,
will hardly be questioned.
DeVotie v. McGerr, 14 Colo. 577, 592, 23 P. 980, 985 (1890).
'" Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950); Isaak v. Perry, 118 Colo.
93, 193 P.2d 269 (1948); Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 P. 780 (1929). See also Michi-
gan's Sexual Assault Law 229.
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tion created in section 407(1) is rebuttable. Section 407(2) lays
out the procedure for rebutting the presumption of irrelevancy.
It is widely agreed that, although the legislature may create an
evidentiary presumption, it cannot create a presumption which
is conclusive." 3 The Colorado case of Garcia v. People"' held that
the power vested in the legislature to create presumptions in
criminal cases is subject to the qualification that the presumption
cannot be made a conclusive one." ' Since the presumption of
irrelevancy created by the legislature in H.B. 1042 is explicitly
made rebuttable, the bill permits the judicial branch to exercise
a modicum of discretion and, thus, may narrowly escape being an
unconstitutional encroachment by the legislature on this inher-
ently judicial function.
b. The jury instruction prohibition
A similar encroachment problem is encountered in relation
to the abolition of the Lord Hale instruction in section 408. Does
the legislature encroach on judicial territory when it determines
what instructions may or may not be given to a jury? Unfortu-
nately, the law is not clear or precise on this point either. It is
generally accepted that the determination of the jury instructions
which may or may not be proper in a given case is an inherently
judicial function."" While the legislature "may regulate the pro-
cedure of trial courts with respect to instructions to juries, it
cannot abridge the power of the judge to charge the law.""' 7
While there is apparently no precedent in Colorado for a
statutory limitation on the court's power to instruct the jury, a
study of California's new sexual assault law"' may provide some
insight into this problem. By amendment of the Penal Code, the
California legislature made significant statutory changes in the
type of instructions which may be given to the jury in sexual
16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 128d (1956).
" 121 Colo. 130, 213 P.2d 387 (1950).
Id. at 134, 213 P.2d at 389.
"' See 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 166 (1956).
17 Id. § 128g.
"I See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1127(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1975). Minnesota's new law also
abolishes a number of formerly used jury instructions, including the Lord Hale instruction
and any cautionary instruction concerning the victim's testimony. Ch. 374, § 8, [19751
Minn. Sess. Laws 1088.
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assault cases. One amendment"9 prohibits the giving of former
California Jury Instruction 10.06, which stated that the jury
could draw the inference that a woman who had previously con-
sented to sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent
again. Under the new amendment to the Penal Code, a judge may
not instruct that any such inference may be drawn except where
there is evidence of prior sexual conduct with the defendant. This
amendment also forbids any instruction that prior sexual conduct
in and of itself may be considered in determining the credibility
of the witness. Another amendment'20 banned the use of the term
"unchaste character" in any jury instruction. It is interesting to
note, however, that California's Lord Hale instruction was not
eliminated or otherwise affected by the recent amendments to the
Penal Code.' 2'
As of this writing, there has been no reported challenge to the
California legislature's power to enact these amendments. In Col-
orado, the changes wrought by section 408 affect only the Lord
Hale instruction,'22 which has operated in the manner of a cau-
tionary instruction: Where the testimony of the victim was
largely uncorroborated by other evidence, trial judges often
deemed it necessary to "remind" the jury that it is easy to accuse
someone of rape, yet difficult to defend against such a charge,
and, thus, the testimony of the victim should be viewed with
caution.'13 Section 408 prohibits the giving of such an instruction
or "any similar instruction."
It is in the interpretation and construction of the word "simi-
lar" that the constitutional salvation of this section may lie. The
objections which have been voiced to this section center on the
proposition that in certain cases, admittedly a small minority, a
cautionary instruction regarding the testimony of the victim may
be appropriate. 2 ' Such instructions are frequently given where
accomplice testimony or eyewitness testimony is involved.' If
SCAL. PENAL CODE § 1127d (West Supp. 1975).
' Id. § 1127e.
121 For a thorough analysis of the evidentiary provisions of the new California law, see
Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
1551 (1975) [hereinafter cited as California Rape Evidence Reform].
"2 For explanation of the Lord Hale instruction, see note 60 supra.
'11 Interview with Rollie Rogers, note 107 supra.
"I Interview with Sherry Seiber, note 107 supra.
21 Id. See also United States v. Lee, 506 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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this objection is considered valid, a court may construe the prohi-
bition against "any similar instruction" very narrowly in order to
allow an instruction that the jury should "examine with caution
the testimony of the victim," as long as the words "because of the
nature of the charge" are not used.'2 8 Thus, if the courts are still
permitted, under section 408, to give a cautionary instruction in
an "appropriate" case, the judicial function can still be per-
formed, and any legislative encroachment which has occurred
may be considered harmless.'1
B. Constitutionality-the Sixth Amendment-Do the
Evidentiary Provisions Violate a Criminal Defendant's Right to
Confront the Witnesses Against Him?
If H.B. 1042 survives the constitutional challenges based on
the separation of powers, it must face yet another challenge,
which may prove insurmountable. In the 1973 case of People v.
Smith'21 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the legislature
has the power to prescribe new rules or to change existing rules
of substantive evidence, "so long as they do not violate constitu-
tional requirements or deprive any person of constitutional
rights. '"12
The evidentiary provisions of H.B. 1042 impose limitations
on the defendant's opportunity to cross-examine the victim con-
cerning her prior sexual conduct. In order to do so, the defendant
must first submit an affidavit and offer of proof as to the rele-
vancy of such evidence, and the court must find these to be "suffi-
cient" before allowing in camera cross-examination of the victim
on the issue of her prior sexual conduct 30 An inquiry into the
constitutional propriety of such a limitation must begin with a
The quoted excerpts are from C.R.S. § 408.
" At least one state supreme court has concurred in the abolition of the Lord Hale
instruction. In State v. Fedderson, 230 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1975), the court specifically
disapproved the Lord Hale instruction, saying that the jury should not be asked to apply
a stricter test of credibility to the victim of a sexual assault than to other witnesses or to
victims of other crimes. The court said: "It is a subject for jury exhortation by the de-
fendant's lawyer but not a postulate for instruction by the court." Id. at 515. The "wis-
dom" of section 408 is apparent; it is only the method of affecting the change which is
subject to constitutional attack.
12 182 Colo. 228, 512 P.2d 269 (1973).
"I Id. at 234, 512 P.2d at 272 (emphasis added).
'D C.R.S. § 407.
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close look at the nature and scope of the right to confrontation of
witnesses.
1. The Right to Confrontation -Davis v. Alaska and Bias
Evidence
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution,
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, 3' states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to...
be confronted with the witnesses against him .... 31
It is established law that the object of the confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment is to ensure to a criminal defendant the
right of examination and cross-examination of witnesses against
him.' 3 But how broad is the right to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses? Is it totally unbridled, or is its scope limited?
The recent Supreme Court decision in the case of Davis v.
Alaska"' sheds considerable light on the question of the scope of
the right to confrontation. The parallel between the nature and
purpose of the limitations on cross-examination involved in that
case and the nature and purpose of the limitations imposed by
section 407 is evident from the Supreme Court's opening remarks:
We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Confronta-
tion Clause requires that a defendant in a criminal case be allowed
to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-
examination directed at possible bias deriving from the witness'
probationary status as a juvenile delinquent when such an impeach-
ment would conflict with a State's asserted interest in preserving the
confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of delinquency."'
The juvenile witness in that case testified that he had seen
the defendant at a location near the witness' own home, where
stolen property was found. Defense counsel wanted to introduce
the witness' juvenile record and probationary status solely for the
' Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" Morse v. Wilson, 500 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1974). Wigmore has said:
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent
the opportunity of cross-examination. . . which cannot be had except by the
direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.
5 J. WwIo, EVIDENCE § 1395 (Chadbourn ed. 1974).
415 U.S. 308 (1974).
' Id. at 309.
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purpose of showing the possibility of "hasty and faulty identifica-
tion of petitioner [the defendant] to shift suspicion away from
himself [the witness] . "... : The trial court refused to permit
the introduction of such evidence, thus allowing the juvenile
witness' testimony, on cross-examination, that he had never
before been interrogated by law enforcement officers, to stand
unchallenged. The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's ruling. In reversing, the Supreme Court said:
We cannot accept the Alaska Supreme Court's conclusion that
the cross-examination that was permitted defense counsel was ade-
quate to develop the issue of bias properly to the jury. While counsel
was permitted to ask Green whether he was biased, counsel was
unable to make a record from which to argue why Green might have
been biased . . . . In this setting we conclude that the right of
confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting a
juvenile offender ...
The State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of
a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a
constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an
adverse witness. . . .[Tihe State cannot, consistent with the right
of confrontation, require the petitioner to bear the full burden of
vindicating the State's interest in the secrecy of juvenile criminal
records. 7
In Davis the Supreme Court clearly delivered the message that
the right of a defendant to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses cannot be made to yield to a state's policy interests, at
least where a significant issue such as bias is involved. In order
to fall directly within the scope of the Davis holding, a limitation
on cross-examination must first be an expression of the public
policy of the state. Clearly, section 407 was enacted in further-
ance of the state's policy interest in protecting victims of sexual
assaults from unwarranted probing into their prior sexual activi-
ties. "' Secondly, such a limitation must operate so as to preclude
a showing of potential bias on the part of an adverse witness. It
is the Court's reliance on characterization of the evidence sought
as "bias" evidence that makes the Davis holding difficult to pin
down.
' Id. at 311.
Id. at 318-20.
'' See note 112 supra and accompanying text. See also text accompanying note 4
supra.
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If the Davis holding is to be limited to cases involving bias,
it is necessary to consider whether evidence of a victim's prior
sexual conduct can be considered to be evidence showing bias on
the part of the victim. Bias on the part of a witness has been
defined as: "A ground of impeachment; near relationship, sympa-
thy, hostility or prejudice."'' 9 It includes "[p]artiality, or any
acts, relationships or motives reasonably likely to produce it" as
well as various types of "self-interest."' 40 It is certainly conceiva-
ble that, in some sexual assault cases, evidence of the victim's
prior sexual conduct might be introduced to show bias on the part
of the victim/witness."' It follows from the holding in Davis that
if a defendant in a sexual assault trial seeks to introduce evidence
Rf the victim's prior sexual conduct in order to show the victim's
bias, then the state's policy of protecting the victim from unwar-
ranted questioning must yield.'42
2. The Right to Confrontation- Other Areas of Cross-
Examination
In many sexual assault cases bias of the victim per se may
not be the issue. Cross-examination concerning the victim's prior
sexual conduct in these cases may be for the purpose of showing
consent by the victim or to discredit her testimony on direct
examination.'4 3 The question remains whether the right to con-
" BALLANTINE's LAw DICTIONARY 133 (3d ed. 1969).
,0 D. MCCORMICK. EVIDENCE § 40 (2d ed. 1972); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 940-53
(Chadbourn ed. 1974).
" In order to determine whether section 407 will produce just results in all cases
arising under it, it is necessary to hypothesize a case in which the victim is fabricating
the charge and the defendant is in fact not guilty. The law must not operate in such a
way as to prevent an innocent defendant from being acquitted. If a case arises in which
the victim has a history of extramarital sexual relations unknown to her husband and the
victim charges her "discovered" partner with sexual assault in order to prevent her hus-
band from learning of her activities, introduction of evidence of her prior sexual conduct
would be authorized under Davis, in order to "make a record" from which to argue why
the victim might have been testifying from motives of self-interest.
1' More impressive considerations than a state's policy interests have been required
to yield to sixth amendment demands, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
in which executive privilege and presidential confidentiality were held to be subordinate
to a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights to confrontation of witnesses and com-
pulsory process.
"' The California law specifically prohibits the use of prior sexual conduct evidence
for the purpose of proving consent; the only potential use for such evidence in California
is for impeaching credibility. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1103 (West Supp. 1975). The laws of
Florida and Minnesota specifically permit introduction of such evidence, after an eviden-
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frontation extends beyond the area of bias evidence, as enun-
ciated in Davis, to other areas of cross-examination.144
As Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Davis indicates,
the right to confrontation has never been considered to be unlim-
ited:
I would emphasize that the Court neither holds nor suggests
that the Constitution confers a right in every case to impeach the
general credibility of a witness through cross-examination about his
past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions."'
However, at least one case applying Davis has extended its hold-
ing considerably. In Ohio v. Cox' the court held:
[A legislative] enactment may not impinge upon the right of a
defendant in a criminal case to present all available, relevant and
probative evidence which is pertinent to a specific and material
aspect of his defense." '7
tiary hearing, to show consent. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2) (West Supp. 1975-76); ch.
374, § 8, [19751 Minn. Sess. Laws 1088. The laws of Minnesota and New York specifically
permit introduction of such evidence, after an evidentiary hearing, to rebut the direct
testimony of the prosecutrix. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(3) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CraM.
Paoc. LAW § 60.42(5) (McKinney Supp. 1975-76).
" Many of the cases decided subsequent to the Davis decision have limited the
holding in various ways: Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1975) (refusing to admit
evidence of witness' false swearing five years earlier held harmless because too remote in
time and also because witness' testimony only corroborative); United States v. Duhart,
511 F.2d 7 (6th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 421 U.S. 1006 (1975) (Davis distin-
guished because here witness not crucial to prosecution's case); United States v. Miranda,
510 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1975) (held right to cross-examination had been denied when court
refused to allow questioning of prosecution witness concerning other employees who had
keys to cabinet from which funds were embezzled); United States v. Harris, 501 F.2d 1
(9th Cir. 1974) (reversible error to deny cross-examination of government witness-an
informant-to show bias); Gonzales v. State, 521 P.2d 512 (Alas.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
868 (1974) (Davis distinguished in holding not error to refuse to allow cross-examination
concerning witness' juvenile record where purpose was only to impeach general credibil-
ity); Hyman v. United States, 342 A.2d 43 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975) (not improper to limit
confrontation where opportunity to show bias not substantially impaired); State v. Hum-
mel, 132 N.J. Super. 412, 334 A.2d 52 (1975) (upheld trial court's refusal to permit de-
fendant to cross-examine sexual abuse victims, foster wards in defendant's home, concern-
ing prior fabrications, instances of misconduct, and disorderly behavior for purposes of
showing motive to fabricate against defendant, who enforced strict discipline; court distin-
guished Davis by finding proposed evidence would not show bias or motive to fabricate);
State v. Burr, 525 P.2d 1067 (Ore. Ct. App. 1974) (limiting Davis to bias evidence, not
evidence to show character generally).
" Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 321 (1974).




Applying this reasoning, the right to cross-examine a witness con-
cerning certain matters may depend on a judicial determination
of materiality of the evidence sought.
It has been argued that evidence of the victim's prior sexual
conduct is never material to the issues of consent or credibility.'48
Apparently, the Michigan legislature was of this opinion when it
enacted its new sexual assault statute. The evidentiary restric-
tions contained therein require the exclusion of all evidence relat-
ing to the victim's prior sexual conduct, with a possible exception
made for evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the
defendant or evidence of prior acts of intercourse to show the
source of any pregnancy, semen, or disease.'49 Even if a modicum
of materiality is granted to such evidence by proponents of laws
such as Michigan's, its probative value is said to be clearly out-
weighed by the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the jury.'5 0
And, of course, the policy considerations prompting the eviden-
tiary restrictions are given great significance. It is argued that,
even though such evidence could be "logically relevant," it may
not be "legally relevant."' 5 '
"I See Limitations on Evidence, supra note 104, which takes the position that unless
it can be proved that prior sexual conduct is not material to the issue of consent, sexual
assault laws such as Michigan's (which completely bars any evidence of prior sexual
conduct with two narrow exceptions, see note 149 infra) will be found to be an unconstitu-
tional restriction of a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights. The question is raised
whether a victim's prior sexual history is "probative of her propensity to consent to
intercourse." Limitations on Evidence, supra note 104, at 412. That author argues that
reputation evidence in today's society cannot be considered to be of any probative value
in this regard. Specific prior sexual acts may be a more reliable form of evidence if the
complainant's "propensity to have consensual intercourse is dependent on the quality and
quantity of her prior sexual experience," id. at 415, but he argues that today such a
conclusion cannot be drawn: "For women today, what they have done in the past has no
bearing whatsoever on their future decisions." Id. at 414. The author's conclusions are,
however, somewhat tentative; he seems to feel that there may be cases in which such
evidence might be material to the issues raised.
", MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (Supp. 1975).
See People v. Byers, 10 Cal. App. 3d 410, 88 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1970). See also the
comment on Lynn v. State, 231 Ga. 559, 203 S.E.2d 221 (1974), 8 GA. L. REV. 973 (1974),
where it is pointed out that admitting evidence of prior sexual conduct may permit the
jury to accept "presumed, instead of actual, consent as a defense." Id. at 981.
See also Michigan's Sexual Assault Law: "[Situdies indicated that juries are
strongly influenced by the behavior of the victim. Despite instructions by the judge, juries
often respond as though they were applying the legal theory of assumption of risk." Id. at
225.
" Michigan's Sexual Assault Law 229. The author of the Michigan note compares
the exclusion of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct to the exclusion of evidence
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On the other side of the issue, it has been argued just as
fervently that evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct is
always material to the issue of consent,' ' 2 or, even if the defense
is not consent, to impeach the credibility of the victim/witness.'
3
There is no clear resolution to this debate. The most reasonable
approach would appear to be the individualized approach: The
court must view each case in its own factual setting, and then
determine whether the probative value of evidence of the victim's
prior sexual conduct is of such potential magnitude that its preju-
dicial effect on the jury must be considered to be subordinate to
a defendant's right to refute the case against him.'54 This is the
of subsequent repairs in a personal injury case and finds no sixth amendment violation
in either case. The author argues that both types of evidence may be logically relevant,
but the legislature (in the case of prior sexual conduct) and the courts (in the case of
subsequent repairs) have determined that for reasons of public policy the evidence is not
legally relevant and is, therefore, inadmissible. In comparing the court-evolved rule of law
with the legislatively-enacted one, the author states: "The distinction between the two
law-making processes is probably too slight to support a finding that one is constitution-
ally valid and the other is not." Id.
The fallacy in this reasoning is that it is not the distinction between "court-evolved"
and "legislatively-enacted" which is significant in the comparison. The significant fact is
that the subsequent repairs rule operates in a civil context and the prior sexual conduct
rule operates in a criminal context. The rights of a criminal defendant are the most
zealously guarded rights in American jurisprudence; an exclusionary rule of civil law
cannot be so lightly correlated to an exclusionary rule which may operate to deprive a
criminal defendant of constitutional rights. See State v. Swenson, 62 Wash. 2d 259, 270,
382 P.2d 614, 625-26 (1963); 8 GA. L. REV. 973 (1974). Furthermore, the sixth amendment
does not even apply to civil proceedings, but only to "the accused" in a "criminal prosecu-
tion." See text accompanying note 132 supra. See also California Rape Evidence Reform
1567.
52 Clearly, evidence of a prosecutrix's past consensual sexual conduct
is illustrative of her capacity to consent and at least changes the probability,
no matter how slightly, that she might have consented on the occasion in
question.
8 GA. L. REV. 973, 979 (1974). See also People v. Sharpe, 183 Colo. 64, 514 P.2d 1138 (1973).
"I' See generally California Rape Evidence Reform. The author recognizes the opinion
that unchastity has no bearing on honesty or veracity, but points out that such evidence
may be used to prove bias, interest, or motive to fabricate, or to contradict the direct
testimony of the victim. See also Teagne v. State, 208 Ga. 459, 67 S.E.2d 467 (1951), and
Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case: An Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration, Consent, and
Character, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 309, 328 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Trial of a Rape
Case].
"I The "individualized" approach has gained more support than the two extreme
views.
The time has surely come to reject the automatic assumption that unchastity
is relevant to the issue of consent, but in the laudable effort to minimize the
trauma of trial for victims of rape, the pendulum should not swing so far as
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approach which should have been taken by trial judges under
prior Colorado law,'55 but it has been open to considerable
abuse. 151 It was to curb such abuse that H.B. 1042 was enacted.,57
If the evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct is mate-
rial to an issue in the case, whether its purpose be to show bias,
to show consent on the part of the victim, to contradict the vic-
tim's testimony on direct examination, or to prove any other spe-
cific and relevant matter,' the sixth amendment clearly requires
that the defendant be permitted to bring out the evidence on
cross-examination. 59 If the value of the proposed evidence is not
known, and if the inquiry itself may be highly prejudicial if con-
ducted before the jury, it may be necessary to conduct the cross-
examination in camera to make a preliminary determination of
the relevancy of the evidence. 60 But it is clear that at least this
preliminary determination must be permitted:
Counsel often cannot know in advance what pertinent facts may be
elicited on cross-examination. For that reason it is necessarily ex-
ploratory .... It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable lati-
tude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state
to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might de-
velop. "'
The clearest expression of the scope of the right to confronta-
to shift basic due process concepts from protection of the accused to protec-
tion of the accuser.
California Rape Evidence Reform 1570. See also 8 GA. L. REV. 973 (1974); Limitations on
Evidence, supra note 104.
"I According to Rollie Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, "The new procedure
doesn't change substantially what should have been happening before." Interview with
Rollie Rogers, supra note 107.
' Id.
'7 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
. See text accompanying note 145 supra. It is apparent from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Davis that what is required is, at the least, some specific use for the evidence
sought to be introduced in order to override a state's policy interest in preventing the
introduction of the evidence.
'5' Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
" This is the approach which has been attempted in the new evidentiary procedures
enacted in many states, including Colorado.
* Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931). In Alford the Court also stated:
[N]o obligation is imposed on the court ... to protect a witness from being
discredited on cross-examination .... There is a duty to protect him from
questions which go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely
to harass, annoy or humiliate him.
Id. at 694. See also Best v. United States, 328 A.2d 378 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974).
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tion as it may apply in Colorado is found in United States v.
Jorgenson, "2 a Tenth Circuit case, in which the court said:
The right to confrontation extends to areas of cross-examination. An
area which is properly subject to cross-examination cannot be de-
nied the accused. A limitation which prevents cross-examination
into an area which is properly subject to cross-examination does
constitute reversible error. The characteristic feature in this situa-
tion is the complete denial of access to an area which is properly the
subject of cross-examination; the extent of cross-examination is dis-
cretionary with the trial judge [citing cases]. This distinction has
long been recognized by this Court." 3
Assuming that there are at least some sexual assault cases
in which the "area" of the prior sexual conduct of the victim will
be material to the issues of the case, the inquiry must now be
directed toward section 407 in order to determine whether a de-
fendant's "access" to such evidence is impermissibly restricted.
3. The Right to Confrontation-The Evidentiary Restric-
tions of Section 407
Section 407(1) creates a presumption that evidence concern-
ing the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct is irrelevant
in a sexual assault trial. ' The presumption itself does not neces-
sarily interfere with the defendant's constitutional rights because
it is rebuttable.' 5 There are two types of prior sexual conduct
evidence which are excepted from the presumption and, thus,
apparently admissible at trial.' 8 Any proposed evidence of the
victim's prior sexual conduct which does not fall within these
narrow exceptions must first be filtered through the procedures
outlined in section 407(2)187 if it is to be admitted at trial.
The threshold requirement for a determination of the rele-
vancy of such evidence is the submission of a motion by the
defendant accompanied by an affidavit stating an offer of proof
that the evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct sought to
be introduced is relevant and material to the case.' 8 This means
82 451 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972).
"3 451 F.2d at 519-20. See also Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1975).
"3 See Appendix.
"3 See notes 113 & 114 supra and accompanying text.
" C.R.S. § 407(1).
87 See Appendix.
"3 C.R.S. §§ 407(2)(a), (b).
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that the defendant must know specifically what that evidence is
before being given an opportunity to question the victim about
it. "I Such knowledge is often difficult, if not impossible, to gain. 7
For example, if the victim has a history of false reporting of sexual
assaults'7' and if this information is not available through local
police or court records (as in cases where no charges were filed or
if the false reporting occurred in another state), the defendant
may have no other "access" to this "area" of cross-examination
than questioning the victim directly under oath. But under sec-
tion 407(2), the defendant may not question the victim (at trial
or in camera) on this subject unless he has first submitted an offer
of proof stating the nature of the evidence of which he has no
present knowledge! The discovery burden placed on the defen-
dant may be insurmountable, and the evidence left "undiscov-
ered" may be of significant materiality.
Submission to the court of such a motion and affidavit, even
if it is possible, does not lead automatically to an in camera
confrontation with the victim. Under section 407(2)(c), the court
must find that the offer of proof is "sufficient" before setting an
in camera hearing.' There are no standards set out for a determi-
"I It is possible through a narrow reading of section 407 to interpret it as permitting
the questioning of the victim about such evidence at trial, but prohibiting the introduction
of extrinsic evidence to show prior sexual conduct. This was not the intention of the
legislature-its purpose was to prevent any inquiry concerning prior sexual conduct unless
such inquiry had first been ruled admissible by the court. Telephone interview with Ted
Bendelow, supra note 4. Furthermore, since the evidence is presumed irrelevant, it can
be expected that an objection to any line of questioning in the area of prior sexual conduct
would be sustained by the trial judge in the absence of a prior ruling of admissibility.
The new sexual assault laws of Iowa and Minnesota state that no reference may be
made to the victim's prior sexual conduct in the presence of the jury except as their
evidentiary hearing procedures permit. IowA CODE § 782.4 (1975); ch. 374, § 8, [1975]
Minn. Sess. Laws 1088.
'T' Interviewing witnesses, especially the complainant, is not without
difficulties, for the prosecutor may insist that defense counsel (or his investi-
gator) identify himself and explain the purpose of the interview. Defense
attorneys complain that this introduction permits the witness the choice of
refusing to discuss the case, thus depriving them of a most critical means of
discovery.
Trial of a Rape Case 317 n.33. In practice it has been found that it is often impossible to
gain crucial information prior to the time of cross-examination itself. Interview with
Sherry Seiber, supra note 107.
'7' See note 57 supra.
See Appendix.
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nation of sufficiency.' Until the Colorado Supreme Court can
effectively define by decision the meaning of "sufficient," it may
well be that trial judges will differ considerably in determining
the sufficiency of the offer of proof, thus producing a serious situa-
tion of unequal justice.
The legislatures of Colorado, Michigan, California, and other
states have, in enacting their reformed sexual assault laws,
erected formidable and unprecedented barriers to a criminal de-
fendant's ability and opportunity to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him. A few states have taken a more rea-
soned approach by providing for a pretrial in camera hearing to
determine the relevancy of proposed evidence of the victim's prior
sexual conduct, without requiring the submission of an affidavit
and "sufficient" offer of proof as a prerequisite to such a hear-
ing.'74 In this way the purpose of sex crimes law reform-the pro-
tection of the victim from harassing and humiliating questioning
directed more toward swaying the jury by insinuation than to-
ward exposing relevant evidence-is achieved, and the defen-
dant's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him is protected. The Colorado approach, however, because of its
affidavit and offer of proof provisions, may fail to satisfy sixth
amendment requirements.'75
,13 See California Rape Evidence Reform where, in discussing California's new law,
the author also points out the lack of indication of what kind of showing is necessary for
the offer of proof or of the form of the supporting affidavit. Id. at 1558. The author also
notes an additional problem with the affidavit procedure: The prosecutor may reveal the
contents to the victim and she "will get a preview of the evidence with which the defense
intends to confront her." Id. Certainly in some cases, no matter how few, this will only
compound the defendant's difficulties in discovering relevant evidence.
,", TEX. CODE ANN. § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1975-76); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2)
(West Supp. 1975-76); IowA CODE § 782.4 (1975).
,7 [1In view of the comprehensive language used by the Court [in
Davis], it is . . . likely that it would require the state to find some alterna-
tive method of encouraging women to report rape other than restricting the
defendant's right to cross-examine.
California Rape Evidence Reform 1571-72. The Colorado legislators may have been unwit-
tingly drawn into this error by basing the Colorado law partially on Michigan's law.
Interview with Richard Wood, supra note 4. As has been noted, the Michigan law requires
an affidavit and offer of proof prior to a hearing on the admissibility of evidence of the
victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant or evidence of specific instances of sexual
activity for the purpose of showing the source of pregnancy, semen, or disease. See note
149 supra. The Colorado law requires the affidavit and offer of proof prior to a hearing on
the admissibility of other types of evidence of prior sexual conduct of the victim. C.R.S.
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CONCLUSION
A well-conceived criminal law must achieve the desired re-
sult in all cases arising out of the behavior which the law regu-
lates. This means that the law must operate to acquit the inno-
cent as well as convict the guilty. Although it is agreed that
changes in the present treatment afforded victims of sexual as-
saults are urgently needed, state legislatures must not act beyond
their constitutional authority and in derogation of constitutional
rights in attempting to effect such changes.
H.B. 1042 accomplishes much in the area of reclassification
of sexual offenses and elimination of offensive and antiquated
terminology. And the effort toward protection of victims from
unnecessary humiliation, while it may fall short of legislative
expectations in its effect on the reporting rate of sex crimes, does
represent an attitudinal change which is long overdue.
It is hoped, however, that the legislature will act as soon as
possible to correct the infringement of constitutional rights em-
bodied in section 407 by eliminating the affidavit and offer of
proof requirements. By doing so, the legislature could prevent an
extended period of uncertainty and case-by-case adjudication
concerning the method and extent of permissible limitation on
introduction of evidence in a sexual assault trial of the victim's
prior sexual conduct.
Elizabeth Lottman Schneider
§ 407. The difference is a significant one: The types of evidence covered by the Michigan
procedure would be known to the defendant or discoverable by normal discovery methods;
the types of evidence covered by the Colorado procedure would not necessarily be known
to the defendant or discoverable by him through any method other than cross-examination
of the victim.
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APPENDIX
House Bill No. 1042
SECTION 1. Part 4 of article 3 of title 18, Colorado Revised Statutes 1973,
is REPEALED AND REENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to read:
PART 4
UNLAWFUL SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
18-3-401. Definitions. As used in this part 4, unless the context otherwise
requires:
(1) "Actor" means the person accused of criminal sexual assault.
(2) "Intimate parts" means the external genitalia or the perineum or the
anus or the pubes of any person or the breast of a female person.
(3) "Physically helpless" means unconscious, asleep, or otherwise unable to
indicate willingness to act.
(4) "Sexual contact" means the intentional touching of the victim's inti-
mate parts by the actor, or of the actor's intimate parts by the victim, or the
intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's
or actor's intimate parts if that sexual contact can reasonably be construed as
being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.
(5) "Sexual intrusion" means any intrusion, however slight, by any object
or any part of a person's body, except the mouth, tongue, or penis, into the
genital or anal opening of another person's body if that sexual intrusion can
reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratifica-
tion, or abuse.
(6) "Sexual penetration" means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio,
analingus, or anal intercourse. Emission need not be proved as an element of
any sexual penetration. Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to com-
plete the crime.
(7) "Victim" means the person alleging to have been subjected to a criminal
sexual assault.
18-3-402. Sexual assault in the first degree. (1) Any actor who inflicts sexual
penetration on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree if:
(a) The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual applica-
tion of physical force or physical violence; or
(b) The actor causes submission of the victim by threat of imminent death,
serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyon e,
and the victim believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these
threats; or
(c) The actor causes submission of the victim by threatening to retaliate in
the future against the victim, or any other person, and the victim reasonably
believes the actor will execute this threat. As used in this paragraph (c), "to
retaliate" includes threats of kidnapping, death, serious bodily injury, or ex-
treme pain; or
(d) The actor has substantially impaired the victim's power to appraise or
control the victim's conduct by employing, without the victim's consent, any
drug, intoxicant, or other means for the purpose of causing submission; or
1976
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(e) The victim is physically helpless and the actor knows the victim is
physically helpless, and the victim has not consented.
(2) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class 3 felony, but it is a class 2
felony if:
(a) In the commission of the sexual assault the actor is physically aided or
abetted by one or more other persons; or
(b) The victim suffers serious bodily injury; or
(c) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon and uses the deadly weapon
to cause submission of the victim.
18-3-403. Sexual assault in the second degree. (1) Any actor who inflicts
sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the
second degree if:
(a) The actor causes submission of the victim to sexual penetration by any
means other than those set forth in section 18-3-402, but of sufficient conse-
quence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will; or
(b) The actor causes submission of the victim to sexual intrusion by any
means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission
against the victim's will; or
(c) The actor knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the nature
of the victim's conduct; or
(d) The actor knows that the victim submits erroneously, believing the
actor to be the victim's spouse; or
(e) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is less than fifteen
years of age, and the actor is at least four years older than the victim; or
(f) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is less than eighteen
years of age and the actor is the victim's guardian or is responsible for the
general supervision of the victim's welfare; or
.(g) The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institu-
tion and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and
uses this position of authority, unless the sexual intrusion is incident to a lawful
search, to coerce the victim to submit; or
(h) The actor engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than
bona fide medical purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with rea-
sonable medical practices.
(2) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class 4 felony, but it is a class 3
felony if the actor inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim by use of such force,
intimidation, or threat as specified in section 18-3-402(1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(c).
18-3-404. Sexual assault in the third degree. (1) Any actor who subjects a
victim to any sexual contact commits sexual assault in the third degree if:
(a) The actor knows that the victim does not consent; or
(b) The actor knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the nature
of the victim's conduct; or
(c) The victim is physically helpless and the actor knows that the victim is
physically helpless, and the victim has not consented; or
(d) The actor has substantially impaired the victim's power to appraise or
control the victim's conduct by employing, without the victim's consent, any
drug, intoxicant, or other means for the purpose of causing submission; or
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(e) At the time of the commission of the act, the victim is less than eighteen
years of age and the actor is the victim's guardian or is otherwise responsible
for the general supervision of the victim's welfare; or
(f) The victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other institu-
tion and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim and
uses this position of authority, unless incident to a lawful search, to coerce the
victim to submit; or
(g) The actor engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than
bona fide medical purposes or in a manner substantially inconsistent with rea-
sonable medical practices.
(2) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class 1 misdemeanor, but it is a
class 4 felony if the actor compels the victim to submit by use of such force,
intimidation, or threat as specified in section 18-3-402(1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(c).
18-3-405. Sexual assault on a child. (1) Any actor who subjects another not
his or her spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a child if the
victim is less than fifteen years of age and the actor is at least four years older
than the victim.
(2) Sexual assault on a child is a class 4 felony, but it is a class 3 felony if
the actor commits the offense on a victim by use of such force, intimidation, or
threat as specified in section 18-3-402(1)(a), (1)(b), or (1)(c).
18-3-406. Criminality of conduct. (1) If the criminality of conduct depends
on a child's being below the age of eighteen, and the child was in fact at least
fifteen years of age, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant reason-
ably believed the child to be eighteen years of age or older.
(2) If the criminality of conduct depends upon a child being below the age
of fifteen, it shall be no defense that the defendant did not know the child's age
or that he reasonably believed the child to be fifteen years of age or older.
18-3-407. Victim's prior history - evidentiary hearing. (1) Evidence of spe-
cific instances of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct, opinion evi-
dence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's
sexual conduct shall be presumed to be irrelevant except:
(a) Evidence of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct with the
actor;
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or
origin of semen, pregnancy, disease, or any similar evidence of sexual inter-
course offered for the purpose of showing that the act or acts charged were or
were not committed by the defendant.
(2) In any criminal prosecution under sections 18-3-402 to 18-3-405, or for
attempt or conspiracy to commit any crime under sections 18-3-402 to 18-3-405,
if evidence, which is not excepted under subsection (1) of this section, of specific
instances of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct, or opinion evidence
of the victim's sexual conduct, or reputation evidence of the victim's sexual
conduct, or evidence that the victim has a history of false reporting of sexual
assaults, is to be offered at trial, the following procedure shall be followed:
(a) A written motion shall be made at least thirty days prior to trial, unless
later for good cause shown, to the court and to the opposing parties stating that
the moving party has an offer of proof of the relevancy and materiality of evi-
dence of specific instances of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct,
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or opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, or reputation evidence of the
victim's sexual conduct, or evidence that the victim has a history of false report-
ing of sexual assaults which is proposed to be presented.
(b) The written motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit in which the
offer of proof shall be stated.
(c) If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court shall notify
the other party of such and set a hearing to be held in camera prior to trial. In
such hearing, the court shall allow the questioning of the victim regarding the
offer of proof made by the moving party and shall otherwise allow a full presen-
tation of the offer of proof including, but not limited to, the presentation of
witnesses.
(d) An in camera hearing may be held during trial if evidence first becomes
available at the time of the trial, or for good cause shown.
(e) At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that the evidence
proposed to be offered regarding the sexual conduct of the victim is relevant to
a material issue to the case, the court shall order that evidence may be intro-
duced and proscribe [sic] the nature of the evidence or questions to be permit-
ted. The moving party may then offer evidence pursuant to the order of the
court.
18-3-408. Jury instruction prohibited. In any criminal prosecution under
sections 18-3-402 to 18-3-405, or for attempt or conspiracy to commit any crime
under sections 18-3-402 to 18-3-405, the jury shall not be instructed to examine
with caution the testimony of the victim solely because of the nature of the
charge, nor shall the jury be instructed that such a charge is easy to make but
difficult to defend against, nor shall any similar instruction be given.
18-3-409. Marital exception. (1) The criminal sexual assault offenses of this
part 4 shall not apply to acts between persons who are married, either statuto-
rily, putatively, or by common law.
(2) The criminal sexual assault offenses of this part 4 shall apply to spouses
living apart, with the intent to live apart, whether or not under a decree of
judicial separation.
18-3-410. Medical exception. The provisions of this part 4" shall not apply
to any act performed for bona fide medical purposes provided that such act is
performed in a manner which is not inconsistent with reasonable medical
practices.
(Conforming amendments, effective date and safety clause omitted.)
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NOTE
MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES LIABILITY:
PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES LEGISLATIVE INNOVATION
AND JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
INTRODUCTION
Reflecting our societal awareness of consumer rights, courts
and legislatures have expanded general tort liability theories to
cover an increasing number of patient injuries. Recognizing this
trend, the specific purposes of this note are threefold: First, to
identify as doctrinally analogous the expansion of both medical
products and medical services liability; second, to consider some
of the currently significant problems related to the expansion of
medical services liability; and, third, since public needs are im-
mediate, to outline current approaches to the problem and to
suggest that both courts and legislatures utilize the successful
product liability contractile doctrines and restrictive legislative
formulae. Such an approach will help to ensure a more rational,
harmonious, and realistic treatment of medical services liability.
General tort liability may be based upon an intentional act
or negligence, or it may be based upon "strict" liability, a liabil-
ity without fault.' Whether a personal injury suit is based upon
nonnegligent strict liability for medical products or upon
negligence for medical services, the injured person may be placed
at a disadvantage by a statute of limitations; he may not know
of the injury and, therefore, may not be able to act within the
pertinent statutory time limit.' In personal injury cases several
points of time may be relevant: The time of the causative act, the
time of the injury itself, the time when the injured party first
knows of his injury, and the time when the injured party first
knows what has caused his injury.' Since statutes of limitations
normally begin to run when a cause of action accrues, the time
may expire before the person knows that he has been injured. In
' W. PROSSER. THE LAW OF TORTS § 6 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
Id. § 30.
See Note, Torts-Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Cases-Justice
Sought andAlmost Attained, 21 DF PAUl, L. REV. 234 (1971); 3 ST. MARY'S L.J. 111 (1971).
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order to mitigate this harsh result, judges4 and legislators' have
expanded doctrines such as fraudulent concealment and the dis-
covery rule.
I. DOCTRINAL EXPANSION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND MEDICAL
SERVICES LIABILITY
A. Fraudulent Concealment and the Discovery Rule
Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, when a poten-
tial defendant knowingly conceals his negligent act so that an
injured party is delayed from bringing an action, the statute of
limitations does not commence running until the plaintiff discov-
ers, or reasonably could have discovered, his cause of action.6 This
doctrine would be applicable where a plaintiff discovers an injury
but is reassured by the physician that nothing is wrong.'
Under the more general discovery rule, fraud and conceal-
ment are not necessary factors; the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered, or reasonably
should have discovered, his injury.8 Where both courts and legis-
latures have attempted to balance the equities of the parties, the
multifaceted problems with historically disfavored stale claims9
have been arguably outweighed by the inherent inequities of lim-
I Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970) (where misdiagnosis resulted
in unnecessary surgery but there was no concealment, the court adopted the discovery
rule); Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 248 N.E.2d
871 (1969) (court adopted the discovery rule for foreign objects); Acker v. Sorensen, 183
Neb. 866, 165 N.W.2d 74 (1969) (where a physician continuously made affirmative repre-
sentations as to the cure of a cancerous condition, the court applied the discovery rule).
CAL. CODE OF CIV. PRO. § 340.5 (West 1954) (establishes the fraudulent concealment
doctrine and the discovery rule for actions against health care providers); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-80-105 (1973). The Colorado legislature specifically clarified the statutory limi-
tation periods for medical malpractice claims by revising the statute to omit the word
"accrue" and substituting the more expansive "discovered or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence and concern should have discovered . . . his injuries and the negligence or
breach of contract .... ." Ch. 232, § 1, [19711 Colo. Sess. Laws 952. For examples of
the traditional use of the word "accrue" in statutes of limitations, see GA. CODE ANN. §
3-1004 (1975), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-510 (1964), and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753
(1965).
' See Note, Torts-Medical Malpractice-Statute of Limitations is Tolled When the
Plaintiff Produces Prima Facie Evidence to Raise Fraudulent Concealment as a Material
Issue of Fact, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 209, 214-15 n.46 (1973).
See Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 532, 474 P.2d 603, 607 (1970).
Id.
Comment, Choice of Law: Statutes of Limitation in the Multistate Products Liabil-
ity Case, 48 Tui.. L. REV. 1130 (1974).
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iting an injured person's right to sue upon first discovery of his
injury."'
B. Related Rules and Doctrines
The surgical exception doctrine is closely related to the more
general discovery rule, but it is limited to those cases where a
foreign object has been left in a patient's body during surgery." I
Also related to the discovery rule is the continuing treatment
doctrine. Under this doctrine the statute of limitations does not
begin to run from the time of the alleged malpractice act itself;
so long as the potential defendant continues treating the person,
the malpractice is also deemed to continue, and the statute be-
gins to run only when this continuing treatment has terminated.,2
The informed consent doctrine is based upon the physician's
duty to sufficiently inform a patient of the risks inherent in a
proposed treatment or procedure. 13 Among the factors to be con-
sidered in each case are the following: The likelihood and serious-
ness of possible bad results; the alternatives that are available;
the necessity or urgency of treatment; and the individual pa-
tient's mental capacity and emotional maturity. 4 A physician's
duty to inform involves a professional medical judgment in each
individual case; the proper standards for disclosure in each case
are based upon expert medical testimony as to what a reasonably
prudent physician would have told that patient.'"
Under the general tort evidentiary rule of res ipsa loquitur,
when expert medical testimony is unavailable the jury may be
permitted to infer the defendant's negligence if the injury would
not normally have occurred in the absence of someone's negli-
gence, the defendant had exclusively controlled the situation, and
there had been an absence of any contributory action on the part
of the plaintiff." This evidentiary rule has been applied in surgi-
I" Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970). See generally Comment,
Opening Pandora's Box? An Extension of the Discovery Rule to Negligent Diagnosis in
Idaho, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 370 (1972); authorities cited note 3 supra.
" PROSSER § 32; Note, Medical Malpractice-Statute of Limitations Tolled Until
Patient Can Reasonably Discover Foreign Object Negligently Left in His Body During
Surgery, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 244 (1971); 3 ST. MARY'S L.J. 111 (1971).
12 D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 269 (1973); Kroll, The Etiology, Pulse, and
Prognosis of Medical Malpractice, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 598, 612 (1974).
PROSSER § 32, at 165.
' Id. at 165-66.
" Id. at 165.
" Id. §§ 39, 40.
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cal cases where the plaintiff was anesthetized, the surgeon had
exclusive control, and other testimony was not available."
C. Concomitant Expansion of Hospital Liability
Hospitals historically avoided any liability for negligence
based upon their status as a defendant under the doctrines of
governmental or charitable immunity; however, courts have be-
come more willing to disregard this traditionally immune status.'8
When a hospital has liability insurance and a judgment will not
affect the hospital's trust fund or property, the doctrine of chari-
table immunity will not bar an action.'9 As the number of action-
able suits against hospitals has increased, insurance costs and
hospital charges to patients have also increased. 0
A hospital's potential liability may also be expanded under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under this doctrine the hos-
pital, as an employer, may be held liable for a tort committed by
an employee.2' Nurses and ancillary personnel have usually been
considered hospital employees, but physicians have traditionally
not been so considered. Distinctions, however, have been made
between staff and salaried hospital physicians and between
administerial and medical functions of a salaried physician."
The case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hospital3 has been widely recognized as a potentially significant
extension of a hospital's liability for physician negligence. In
Darling the plaintiff was treated for a broken leg in the hospital
emergency room. A general practitioner on emergency call casted
the leg, which subsequently became swollen, discolored, and very
painful. The plaintiff later lost the leg because the pressure of
swelling tissue inside the cast impaired his circulation. The court
held the hospital liable and found that liability could be sup-
ported under two theories. First, the hospital failed to fulfill its
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
PROSSER §§ 131, 133; Comment, Hospital Liability for the Negligence of Physicians:
Some Needed Legal Sutures, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 844 (1974).
g Michard v. Myron Stratton Home, 144 Colo. 251, 355 P.2d 1078 (1960); O'Connor
v. Boulder Colo. Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d 835 (1939).
" AMA, MALPRACTICE IN Focus 21, 32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as AMA REPoRT].
" PROSSER § 69.
" See Comment, The Hospital and the Staff Physician-An Expanding Duty of Care,
7 CREICHTON L. REV. 249 (1974); Comment, supra note 18.
' 33 Il. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1965).
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traditional duty to provide an adequate number of nurses to mon-
itor patients and report a patient's worsening condition to the
attending physician. Under the second theory, the hospital failed
to fulfill a duty to supervise physicians and require consultations.
Since this second theory is based upon an expansion of the hospi-
tal's own duty of care, and since the physician was not a salaried
employee of the hospital, 4 Darling may have extended a hospi-
tal's liability beyond the respondeat superior doctrine."5
D. Medical Product Liability Limited by Statute and Decision
There have been doctrinal expansions of liability for both
medical products and medical services; under the expanding
products liability doctrine, courts have emphasized "no-fault"
injury; under the expanding services liability doctrine, courts
have emphasized "discovery" of the injury. Both doctrines, how-
ever, have resulted in an increase in the total number of poten-
tially actionable injuries. For example, a potentially actionable
injury may occur under an expansive product liability doctrine
where defective whole blood is used for transfusions.
At the present time no positive method exists for detecting
hepatitis virus in whole blood; while the hepatitis virus is identifi-
able, the person responsible (the donor) cannot be identified, and
there is no way to be sure that blood for a transfusion is "clean.""6
Although courts in some jurisdictions have held proper a strict
liability tort action where a patient has received a blood transfu-
sion that contained the hepatitis virus,2 strict liability for "un-
clean" blood has been sharply limited in Colorado, first by the
courts29 and then by legislative action.
29
In Allen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.30 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that the
2 See Comment, supra note 18, at 850 & n.56.
25 Walkup & Kelly, Hospital Liability: Changing Patterns of Responsibility, 1974 INS.
L. 333, 338-40 (1974); Comment, The Hospital and the Staff Physicians-An Expanding
Duty of Care, 7 CRFIGHTON L. REv. 249, 252-55 (1974).
,. Schmaltz v. St. Luke's Hosp., 33 Colo. App. 351, 354, 521 P.2d 787, 789 (1974),
rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 534 P.2d 781 (1975).
21 Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Il1. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970),
modifying 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969).
21 St. Luke's Hosp. v. Schmaltz, 534 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1975).
CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-104 (1973).
"' 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
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statute of limitations (and also lack of privity) prevented the
plaintiff from recovering for an injury caused by taking birth
control pills. Eight days after the plaintiff commenced taking the
pills, she became ill and was hospitalized. The court used the
date that the plaintiff was first hospitalized for the illness to
begin running the statute of limitations, rather than a date ap-
proximately four months later when she was told by her doctor
that the defendant's pills had probably caused her illness.
By holding that the cause of action accrued from the date of
the injury, the court chose not to apply the discovery rule expan-
sively. While this suit was against a manufacturer, the court
noted and followed the usual Texas court application of the dis-
covery rule in medical malpractice cases, limiting the rule to
cases of fraudulent concealment or where foreign objects are left
in the body during surgery.' In explaining its rationale for using
this date to commence the running of the statute, the court
stated:
Although plaintiff may not have had actual knowledge of the cause
of her illness at that time, her symptoms were sufficient to permit
her to discover the source if she had acted with reasonable dili-
gence."
Thus, the court in Allen shifted the emphasis to the patient's
duty to act with reasonable diligence to discover the source of an
injury. This recognizes the sophistication of today's average
health care consumer, 33 and, therefore, the type of patient behav-
ior to be deemed reasonable, as well as the possible need to rebal-
ance the plaintiff-defendant equities in strict medical product
liability.
II. MEDICAL SERVICES LIABILITY-THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
PROBLEMS
Problems relating to both medical malpractice and medical
malpractice insurance are not new, but recently they have inten-
sified in the following interrelated areas: The increasing fre-
quency of malpractice claims; the increasing costs and decreasing
availability of medical malpractice insurance to protect health
1' Id. at 366.
32 Id.
13 A. SOMERS, HEALTH CARE IN TRANSITION: DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 81 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as SOMERS].
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care providers against the increasing claims; the tensions that
exist between what a physician and a court may deem as proper
medical care; the limited health care personnel and resources
presently available; and a rapidly changing societal milieu.34
When these factors are viewed simultaneously, the result is popu-
larly called the "malpractice crisis."35 While the word "crisis"
may have assumed a quotidian quality in English, in Chinese the
word "crisis" is written in two characters; one means danger and
the other means opportunity.
3
Senator Daniel Inouye, noting both the increased numbers of
medical malpractice claims and the increased costs of medical
malpractice insurance, compared the figures from 1960 to 1975 as
follows:
[T]en years ago, about 6,000 malpractice claims were filed each
year. By 1970 this number had risen to approximately 10,000 to
12,000, and today, it has been estimated. . . from 15,000 to 20,000
such claims are opened annually ...
In the period 1960-1970, nonsurgeon physician premiums went
up 540.8 percent, surgeon premiums 950 percent. Each year since
1970 has seen an additional increase of about 80 percent . . ..
There is a very real possibility that medical malpractice insur-
ance coverage may no longer be offered at all by private insurance
companies, or, if it is offered, that rates will become exorbitant.3"
A. Sources of the Problem
There is no single causative factor or reason for the sudden
and disruptive malpractice crisis phenomenon. Some of the rea-
sons that have been suggested are: The increased number of peo-
ple receiving health care services in this country; the changing
medical services as new drugs and new procedures introduce new
1, Id. See COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5-20 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT].
11 Id.; AMA REPORT 11.
31 SOMERS Vii, citing Romano, J.A.M.A., Oct. 26, 1974.
" STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 1ST
SESS.. AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 100-01 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter
cited as COMM. PRINT].
3 Id. at 6; AMA REPORT 22-23. Senator Inouye has suggested that exorbitant rates
will either be passed on to the consumer or will be so prohibitive that physicians may be
forced to retire or withdraw from the health care system. COMM. PRINT 101.
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risks of injury; and the changing and redefined expectations of
health care consumers and providers."
Under new health care programs, over twenty million per-
sons, including the elderly and medically indigent, are receiving
noncharity medical care for the first time in their lives.40 The
American Medical Association now recognizes the need for more
physicians.' From 1960 to 1970 twenty new medical schools were
started and health paraprofessional programs commenced; never-
theless, the physician shortage may account for a part of the
problem.42 Some medical experts have attempted to increase phy-
sician productivity by encouraging greater systemization, per-
haps at the expense of quality. This may also have led to a deteri-
oration in the physician-patient relationship.
Drug testing and quality controls are more rigorous than they
have been in the past,44 but, with new drugs and procedures being
discovered, a correlative number of new injuries may occur. Med-
ical discoveries, treatments, and cures receive wide publicity, but
all diseases are not curable and all patients are not cured, even
when the recommended treatment protocols are followed. Sugges-
tions that the increasing number of medical malpractice claims
may be related to a sudden increased incidence of physician mal-
practice or to a contingent fee system used by lawyers lack
merit; 9 the Secretary of HEW's Commission on Medical Mal-
practice found that it is an "inescapable fact that modem high-
quality medicine carries risks that unavoidably result in some
injuries to patients, no matter how much care, skill and judgment
is applied.""
The popularly expected "right to health" has effectively
masked part of the problem. 7 It "is very misleading [since it]
suggests that society has a supply of 'health' stored away" 8 which
" COMM. PRINT 100.
4 SOMERS 3.
" Id. at 8.
, Id. at 3, 8, 9.
' Id. at 9.
4 Id. at 3.
" HEW REPORT 32-33.
' Id. at 24.
, SOMERS 21.
Fuchs, The Jungle or the Zoo: What Price Health?, MED. EcoN., Apr. 28, 1975, at
160, 185.
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can be given to individuals on demand. The number of patients
has increased, patient demands have increased, and pressures on
physicians have increased.4" Traditionally, physicians have ac-
cepted heavy, self-imposed burdens in order to be available to
their patients. However, physicians as well as consumers have
become more sophisticated, and today's physicians are reexamin-
ing their traditionally accepted duty to be available2 °
B. Medical Malpractice Insurance
This past year, as medical malpractice insurance problems
became more acute in terms of the cost and the availability of
coverage, physicians in New York, Miami, and San Francisco
temporarily withheld nonemergency services." Unwilling to qui-
etly pass added insurance costs on to their patients, they have
effectively focused attention on the medical malpractice insur-
ance issues.5"
Two major types of medical malpractice insurance are
available: An "occurrence" policy covering claims from acts that
occurred during the policy period, whenever filed; and a "claims
made" policy that will only cover claims reported during the year
that the policy is in force.0 While lawyers, architects, and other
professionals have traditionally had "claims made" policies,
since medical malpractice claims for personal injury may not be
as discoverable as nonpersonal injury claims against other profes-
sionals and may not, therefore, be discovered until long after the
" SOMERS 6, 7, 25. Figures indicate an increase in the number of physicians in relation
to population, but this is misleading because factors not considered include the increasing
proportion of specialists, the uneven geographic distribution of physicians, and the in-
creasing numbers of foreign physicians who are not in this country permanently, but only
to complete their training. Id. at 7. Paradoxically, as patients become healthier, longer
lived, and more affluent, they need and demand more health care, yet they also become
more critical of the care they receive. Id. at 18-25.
50 Schwartz, The Changing Compact Between American Doctors and Society,
MODERN MED., June 15, 1975, at 32.
11 Id. See also Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 17, 1976, at 41, col. 3. But see Hendricks,
They Won Malpractice Relief-Without a Walkout, MED. EcON., Oct. 13, 1975, at 31
(description of response to these problems by Louisiana physicians).
52 Schwartz, supra note 50. The malpractice crisis has prompted a "Proposed Federal
Solution"-the National Medical Malpractice Insurance and Arbitration Act of 1975 (S.
482) introduced by Senators Edward Kennedy and Daniel Inouye; authorities cited, supra
notes 37, 38.
1 Hendricks, What Your Next Malpractice Policy May Look Like, MED. EcON., Apr.
14, 1975, at 29.
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alleged negligence, physicians have traditionally carried an
"occurrence" policy. To cover all the potential claims under an
"occurrence" policy, insurance companies need a large reserve
fund, popularly referred to as the "long malpractice tail. '54 How-
ever, while insurance companies acknowledge that the "villain is
that long claims 'tail',"55 most of them have also predicted that
a "claims made" policy premium will be as high as an "occur-
rence" policy premium in five years." Since an "occurrence" pol-
icy provides more than one year's protection and a "claims made"
policy provides only one year's protection, it is difficult to under-
stand how their costs could be equal.57
In a report prepared for the Colorado Medical Society, the
Hartford Insurance Company explained its rate increase for Colo-
rado physicians in 1975 as follows: Physicians purchasing the
minimum coverage of $100,000 had a rate increase of 15 percent
based upon the experience in Colorado, but physicians purchas-
ing $1 million coverage had a rate increase of 40 percent based
upon the country-wide phenomenon.5 8 The Colorado Medical
Society expects another rate increase of 94 percent in 1976.1' If the
medical malpractice insurance problems are not solved, insur-
ance companies may choose to leave the medical malpractice
marketplace, physicians may prefer to start their own insurance
companies, or legislatures (federal or state) may choose to regu-
late the field. 0
While they generally oppose any changes in traditional legal
doctrines and procedures, the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America (ATLA) has stated that medical malpractice insurance
I4 d.
I' d. at 35.
" AMA REPORT 22-23; Hendricks, supra note 53, at 35.
5' Hendricks, supra note 53, at 35. One approach to this problem is offered by Judge
Jamison who reasonably proposes that insurance companies be limited to pools based
upon claims successfully prosecuted by a statutory formula. Interview with Judge Francis
Jamison, Professor, University of Denver College of Law, Denver, Colo.
11 Warren & Sommer, Inc., Colorado Medical Society Professional Liability Insurance
Program (undated 1975 report on file with the Colorado Medical Society). Both physicians
and legislators in Colorado may question rate increases not based upon or justified by the
Colorado experience.
"' The Denver Post, Mar. 5, 1976, at 21, cols. 3, 4, 5 (statement by Colorado Medical
Society).
" MED. WORLD NEWS, June 16, 1975, at 20, 21, 22; AMA REPORT 22-23.
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must be made available at a reasonable cost,"' and has suggested
eliminating rate classifications between different risk medical
specialities, requiring deductibility clauses, and eliminating the
insured's consent as a condition for settlement." Legislation of
this type, permitting an insurance company settlement without
the insured's consent, may involve questions of constitutional
dimension. The proposals may be a denial of the physician's
equal protection and due process rights, but they are consistent
with the ATLA's position that "[t]he interests of the patient-
consumer must be paramount over those of the health care provi-
der, the lawyer, or the insurance carrier." 3 The American Medi-
cal Association (AMA) agrees with the ATLA that medical mal-
practice insurance must be made available at a reasonable cost,
but the AMA suggests the creation of a workmen's-compensation-
type program as an alternative to litigation. 4
C. Defensive Medicine
As the physician's potential liability has expanded, new pub-
lic policy questions have surfaced that are not yet answered. For
example, a fear of medical malpractice actions can lead physi-
cians to practice defensive medicine-order lab tests and diag-
nostic procedures at additional cost and possible risk to the pa-
tient to avoid a hindsight accusation of missing an unlikely diag-
nosis for lack of thoroughness."
Although physicians are aware of defensive medicine's higher
costs and nonessential utilization of scarce medical resources,6
hard cases may make bad medicine, as well as bad law. In Helling
v. Carey,7 the Washington Supreme Court unanimously held as
a matter of law that the defendant ophthalmologists should have
given the plaintiff a pressure test for glaucoma in spite of
uncontradicted testimony by plaintiff's and defendants' wit-
nesses that established defendants' compliance with the stan-
at Markus, A Position of Responsibility, TRIAL, May/June 1975, at 49, 50 (position
paper prepared by ATLA).
62 Id. at 50-51.
" Id. at 57.
, AMA REPORT 27.
6' COMM. PRINT 105.
, Id. at 6.
83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
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dards of the profession of ophthalmology which did not require
routine pressure testing for glaucoma in patients under 40 years
of age.
The plaintiff had first consulted the physician for nearsight-
edness and had been fitted with contact lenses in 1959.68 The first
time the plaintiff complained of a visual field problem was in
1968; at that time the defendant tested the plaintiff's eye pressure
and subsequently made the diagnosis of glaucoma. 9 The plaintiff
was 23 years old at the time of her first visit; the incidence of
glaucoma in people under age 40 is one in 25,000; in people over
age 40 the incidence is two or three percent. 0
Although the plaintiff's "theory of the case" had not in-
cluded the adequacy of the ophthalmologic standards of care,7
the trial judge had refused the plaintiff's proposed instructions
defining these standards, and it was this error that the plaintiff
appealed.7" The majority opinion stated that the pressure test was
relatively inexpensive and simple, and, therefore, the court de-
cided as follows:
The precaution of giving this test to detect the incidence of glau-
coma to patients under 40 years of age is so imperative that irrespec-
tive of its disregard by the standards of the ophthalmology profes-
sion, it is the duty of the courts to say what is required to protect
patients under 40 from the damaging results of glaucoma.
We therefore hold, as a matter of law, that the reasonable stan-
dard that should have been followed . . . was the timely giving of
this simple, harmless pressure test to this plaintiff and that, in
failing to do so ... the defendants are liable.73
After reviewing the current medical literature on the diagno-
sis and treatment of glaucoma, Dr. Ray Bradford, an ophthalmol-
ogist, made the following observations:
The measurement of intraocular pressure by . . . tonometer
. . or... applanometer ... is well known ... and is used...
in clinical practice.
Id. at 515, 519 P.2d at 981.
Id. at 516, 519 P.2d at 981.
Id. at 518, 519 P.2d at 983.
7' Id. at 521-22, 519 P.2d at 985 (concurring opinion).
72 Id. at 516-17, 519 P.2d at 982.
" Id. at 519, 519 P.2d at 983.
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There are, however, instances when it is not easy to get accurate
results and times when the test itself can be traumatic and
injurious .... 
Dr. Bradford described instances when pressure tests are contra-
indicated, listed the preferred diagnostic procedures, and sug-
gested that new studies indicate treatment should be withheld
until glaucomatous damage is definitely established." In addition
to risks inherent in the pressure test procedure itself, Dr. Brad-
ford noted that the predictive value of the test to diagnose glau-
coma is now questionable and that it is being done on a smaller
scale today since it is less valued as a screening procedure." He
concluded that the test is not definitive and suggested that a
judgment in each case determine the use and choice of instru-
mentation." Since a general anesthetic may be required to test a
child under age 14, anesthetic risks must also be considered in
determining whether the procedure should be performed."
The court in Helling noted that the issue-the ophthalmol-
ogic standard of care-was not argued at the trial.79 Neverthe-
less, the court concluded on the basis of evidence that had been
presented that the standard had been premised solely on the
lower incidence of glaucoma in people under age 40.1" Had the
issue been argued at the trial level, the record might have shown
the other factors to be considered, and the court might have
reached a different decision.
The testimony given did indicate that the professional stan-
dards required the test to be given if the patient's complaints and
symptoms revealed that glaucoma should be suspected."' Since
1, Bradford, A Unique Decision, 2 J. LEGAL MED., Sept./Oct. 1974, at 52, 53 (empha-
sis added).
71 Id. at 54.
76 Id.
17 Id. at 55.
7" Interviews with pediatricians and ophthalmologists in the Denver area. The physi-
cians interviewed indicated that the physicians in Helling may have been negligent under
medically accepted standards of care which are not absolute. There may or may not have
been enough questions directed to the physician-witnesses on the issue of whether or not
any of the specific earlier complaints of the plaintiff would or might have warranted an
earlier testing for glaucoma under the medical standards, since her case may not have
been routine.
7, 83 Wash. 2d at 516-17, 519 P.2d at 981-82.




the record did not contain evidence as to whether or not glaucoma
should have been suspected in this case or if the test could have
been timely and safely given to this plaintiff, the case could have
been remanded.2
Medicine depends upon the individualization of standards;
a physician, like Justice Cardozo, "struggles in vain for any ver-
bal formula that will supply a ready touchstone." 3 It is too early
to measure the effects of the Helling decision, but, when a court
presumes to determine proper medical care, it has assumed a
heavy responsibility. 4
III. MEDICAL SERVICES LIABILITY-PosSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Alternatives to Litigation
In the past few years no-fault or strict liability plans" and
arbitration or screening panels 6 have been suggested as alterna-
tives to the present litigation system. 7 While a no-fault or strict
liability plan could provide compensation to more injured per-
sons, it would be impractical in medical malpractice cases; cost
figures cannot be estimated and there are problems in determin-
ing causation.8 Since the eventual costs could be prohibitive, the
I d. at 518, 519 P.2d at 983; see note 78 supra.
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
g4 See note 78 supra; Comment, Physicians and Surgeons-Standard of
Care-Medical Specialist May be Found Negligent as a Matter of Law Despite Compli-
ance with the Customary Practice of the Specialty, 28 VAND. L. REV. 441 (1975); Com-
ment, Torts-Medical Malpractice-Judicially Determined Standard of Care-Helling v.
Carey, 20 N.Y.L.F. 669 (1975); Note, Medical Malpractice-Compliance with Professional
Standards Does Not Necessarily Absolve Ophthalmologist from Liability for Negligence
in Failing to Diagnose and Treat Glaucoma, 6 TEX. TEct. L. REV. 279 (1974). But see Note,
Helling v. Carey: Medical Malpractice Standard of Care Determined by Court, 11
WILLAMETTE L.J. 152 (1974).
1 Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault Approach to
Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INS. L.J. 69; O'Connell, An Elective No-
Fault Liability Statute, 1975 INS, L.J. 261; see Comment, Medical Malpractice: A Move
Toward Strict Liability, 21 LOYOLA L. REV. 194 (1975).
1S Lillard, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 26 ARB. J. 193 (1971); Morris,
Medical Report: Malpractice Crisis-A View of Malpractice in the 1970's, 38 INS. COUNSEL
J. 521 (1971); Note, The Medical Malpractice Mediation Panel in the First Judicial
Department of New York: An Alternative to Litigation, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261 (1974).
11 See generally King, A Commentary on the Report of the Malpractice Commission,
29 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 294 (1974); Kroll, The Etiology, Pulse and Prognosis of Medical
Malpractice, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 598 (1974); Lanzone, A Defense Lawyer Views Product
Liability and Professional Liability No-Fault, 1975 INs. L.J. 82.
11 See COMM. PRINT 32. Robert Keeton suggested that the problems with the no-fault
medical injury concept will be in determining awards, not because of the negligence issue
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benefits provided by this type of plan may in fact be chimerical.
Both compulsory and elective arbitration or mediation pan-
els have merit as screening panels and should be further studied
and considered by medical, legal, and legislative groups." How-
ever, the lack of sufficiently protective evidentiary rules, which
may not be overcome on review, limits the value of screening
panels as a settlement procedure in lieu of a trial.
B. Legislation-The Indiana Model
Recognizing the impact of medical malpractice insurance
problems on both health care providers and health care consum-
ers, in 1975 federal and state legislatures studied, proposed,
and/or enacted remedial statutes.' For example, the Indiana leg-
islature enacted a comprehensive statute specifically addressing
the medical malpractice issues.9'
1. The Statute of Limitations
The Indiana statute of limitations now limits all claims in
tort and contract against health care providers" to 2 years from
the date of the alleged act, failure to act, or neglect.9 3 A minor
under age 6 is given until age 8 to file, but otherwise the section
is specifically stated to apply to all, regardless of minority or legal
disability.94 A parent or a court-appointed guardian is not re-
quired by the statute to act on behalf of an injured child or one
who is legally disabled.95 When compared to the current Colorado
statutes," conspicuously, though perhaps purposefully, lacking
are any provisions relating to discovery of the negligent act.
but because of difficulties in determining causation; also, there can be no idea of the costs
that might be involved.
' See authorities cited, note 86 supra.
" See COMM. PRINT; Rhein, Malpractice: Grim Outlook for '76, MED. WORLD NEWS,
Jan. 12, 1976, at 71.
" IND. CODE §§ 16-9.5-1-1 to -9-10 (Supp. 1975). The Indiana Act is called the "bright-
est" spot in legislation for medical malpractice. MED. WORLD NEWS, June 16, 1975, at 20.
u2 The Indiana Act defines a "health care provider" to include
a person, corporation, facility or institution licensed by this state . . . as a
physician, hospital, dentist. . . nurse, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor,
physical therapist or psychologist, or an officer, employee, or agent thereof
acting in the course and scope of his employment.
IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1(a) (Supp. 1975).
11 Id. § 16-9.5-3-1.
I d.
See id.
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-80-105, 13-81-101 to -103 (1973).
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The Colorado statute of limitations"7 limits commencement
of actions against health care providers to 2 years after a person
discovers, or with reasonable diligence and concern should have
discovered, his injury. Although one is required to exercise "rea-
sonable diligence and concern to discover" and must commence
an action within 6 years of the act or omission complained of, an
exception is made for unauthorized or foreign objects left in the
body. " This 6-year limit could reasonably be reduced to 4 years.9
However, under the Colorado disability statutes, unless the court
has appointed a guardian for a minor, the applicable statute of
limitations is tolled for a minor until the minority is termi-
nated. 0 By statutory fiat, Colorado defines a legal representative
as "a guardian, conservator, executor, or administrator duly ap-
pointed by a court . . . ." Since the word "guardian" does
not encompass parents, by adding the words "the parent of any
child born or adopted" before the words "a guardian," the stat-
ute would recognize parents as the legal representatives of their
children, and the personal injury statute of limitations would not
be tolled automatically for most minors.'"'
Although a minor is certainly capable of owning property or
a cause of action, he is incapable of effectively dealing with it.
When a minor is required to file an income tax return for earned
income, if he is unable to complete the return himself, his parent
or guardian has an affirmative duty to file it for him. 103 While a
personal injury suit may not be obligatory, a parent or guardian
could be encouraged to file on behalf of the child. In this way an
injured child might be better protected, and any expensive reha-
bilitation or continued care treatments would not need to be post-
poned. In addition, tolling the statute for minors only up to age
7 effectively docks the long malpractice tail by 11 years. The
statute of limitations should specifically state that it applies to
" Id. § 13-80-105.
I d.
" See COMM. PRINT 197; ch. 75-9, § 7, [19751 Fla. Sess. Laws 20, amending FLA. STAT.
§ 95.11 (Supp. 1975).
'M COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-81-101 to -103 (1973).
'01 Id. § 13-81-101(2).
'a' Under current Colorado law a personal injury action can be brought up to 27 years
after an injury to a newborn infant. See Johnson v. Dodrill, 265 F. Supp. 243 (D. Colo.
1967).
"' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6012(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-1(a)(4) (1975).
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minors over age 7, and that a parent, or a court-appointed guard-
ian for a minor under age 7, has until the minor's ninth birthday
in which to file. While Indiana chose age 6, age 7 would seem
more reasonable, because by age 7 a physical or mental handicap
is usually recognized by the school, testing is more reliable, and
the child is better protected than he would be at age 6.104 Al-
though age 6 to 7 is only 1 year, developmentally it is quite signifi-
cant. '5
2. The Ad Damnum Clause
The ad damnum clause of a complaint names the specific
total dollar amount of damages claimed.'"' Since the amount
claimed in the ad damnum clause bears little relationship to the
amounts actually obtained or even expected, and since an in-
flated ad damnum clause attracts notoriety and sensational
newspaper coverage, it has been suggested that states should
enact laws to eliminate dollar amounts in the ad damnum clause
for medical malpractice claims, while allowing admission of evi-
dence of specific actual damages at the trial. 07 Indiana elimi-
nated the ad damnum clause for medical malpractice actions; 08
other states, including Colorado, might follow a similar format."9
3. A Limited Recovery
The Indiana Act limits a plaintiffs recovery for malpractice
to $100,000 from any one health care provider and the total
amount recoverable for any injury or death to $500,000.110 Any
amount due from a judgment or settlement in excess of the total
liability of all health care providers, up to the $500,000 allowed,
is to be paid from a state compensation fund."' Although the
constitutionality of statutes limiting awards has been questioned,
"'1 W. NELSON. TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS (7th ed. 1959); D. WECHSLER, WECHSLER
INTEL.IGENCE SCALE FOR CHILDREN (Manual) at 13, 14, 20, 21 (1949); Grossman,
Symposium on Learning Disorders, 20 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM., Aug. 1973.
"7 See authorities cited note 104 supra.
m BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 56 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
'7 HEW REPORT 38.
IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-6 (Supp. 1975).
"' See HEW REPORT. See also ch. 75-9, § 8, [1975] Fla. Sess. Laws 21, creating
section 768.042 which prohibits the stating of the amount of general damages in any
complaint for recovery of damages for personal injury or wrongful death.
".. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2 (Supp. 1975).
. The fund is created by levying a surcharge on all health care providers in Indiana,
the levy limited to 10% or less of the yearly cost of each provider's liability coverage. Id.
§ 16-9.5-4-1. The pool of funds is limited to approximately $15 million. Id. § 16-9.5-4-1(f).
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the arguments to support these doubts are not persuasive.2 For
example, in Colorado one's right to sue may be limited by stat-
utes proscribing theories under which one may sue," 3 the time in
which one may sue,"' or the amount for which one may sue." ' The
Colorado Supreme Court, in upholding the validity of a time-
limiting statute for medical malpractice in McCarty v.
Goldstein"' explained as follows:
The classification of ... professions for limitation or regulation is
a matter for legislative determination, and when based upon reason-
able grounds will not be interfered with by the judiciary."7
Legislation that is reasonably related to the public health
and safety may provide equal protection as well as procedural due
process and be upheld constitutionally under several theories: An
implied consent to limit damages; an implied contract to limit
damages; or the general police power of the state."' If a fair and
reasonable procedure is provided, due process is satisfied; there
is little reason to doubt the validity of reasonable statutory time
limits or damage award limits that apply to both adults and
minors, particularly if concomitant legislation requires health
care providers to carry liability insurance." 9
"' Curran, Law-Medicine Notes: The Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Short-term and
Long-term Solutions, 293 NEw ENG. J. MED., July 3, 1975, at 24, 25. (The arguments are
not persuasive because support is essentially nonexistent.)
"' CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-104 (1973) (prohibiting any no-fault recovery for
injuries due to transplants or transfusions).
"I Id. §§ 13-80-101 to -81-107 (various statutes of limitations).
'i Id. § 8-42-204 (limits damages for personal injury resulting solely from negligence
of a coemployee to $25,000).
uS 151 Colo. 154, 376 P.2d 691 (1962).
"7 Id. at 158, 376 P.2d at 693.
" School Dist. No. 1 v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Colo. 580, 185 P. 348 (1919). The
Workmen's Compensation Act was passed under the police power of the state. Cf. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (the Court notes the broad and
inclusive concept of public welfare and that debatable issues of public welfare should be
left to legislative decision).
"' See Finn v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Colo. 106, 110, 437 P.2d 542, 544 (1968), where
the court affirms the legislature's power to provide a different remedy; the fact that a
workmen's compensation award may deprive an injured person of compensation or a
common law action does not make such a statute unconstitutional. See also O'Quinn v.
Walt Disney Prods., Inc., 177 Colo. 190, 193, 493 P.2d 344, 345 (1972), where the court
stated that "so long as a statute in abrogation of the common law does not attempt to
remove a right which has already accrued, there is no taking."
In the case of a child who had been injured at birth and who is now five years old,
the recommended law would not remove the right to sue; it would merely limit the time
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C. Legislation-Colorado
If the legislature determines that a limitation on awards is
prophylactically desirable in Colorado, the Indiana format ap-
pears reasonable. A less comprehensive, but sufficiently protec-
tive, legislative formula might combine a requirement that all
health care providers carry a specified level of malpractice insur-
ance with a limit on malpractice judgments to that statutory
amount. The statutory limit would not apply to health care provi-
ders who fail to carry the specified coverage. At this time it is not
possible to judge how these types of statutes will work; however,
if insurance companies continue to base rates on the national
experience, the effects of state legislation limiting the amount of
an award may be negated.'2
In 1975 the Colorado legislature passed three statutes affect-
ing review of a physician's conduct. These statutes will enable
physicians to institute disciplinary proceedings against a fellow
physician without fear of retaliatory litigation.'2 ' A physician re-
view committee may recommend disciplinary action to the Colo-
rado State Board of Medical Examiners;'22 when such a recom-
mendation is made, follow-up procedures are established to pro-
vide investigations, hearings, and determinations.'1 The Colo-
rado Court of Appeals has initial jurisdiction to review actions
taken by the board in revoking or suspending a license or in
placing a physician on probation. 4 These codified procedures
will ensure sufficient protection both for the physician accused
and the health care consumer, since physicians will be able to
discipline themselves more effectively.' 5 The present Colorado
statutes also allow incorporated physicians to limit their liability
for a corporate associate's negligent malpractice, if the required
within which that right could be exercised and, therefore, since it would not amount to a
taking, could be applied retroactively. See note 131 and accompanying text infra.
' " See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
" CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-43.5-101 to -103 (Supp. 1975), provides the members
of the review committee with immunity from any civil action if they act in good faith.
" Id. § 12-43.5-102(3)(d).
,9 Id. §§ 12-36-118(1), (2).
124 Id. § 12-36-119(2).
' Physician-representative Frank Traylor should be commended for his leadership
in sponsoring this type of legislation. Dr. Traylor is presently studying a pretrial screening




statutory formalities are followed and if the professional
corporation or the physician himself carries the required mini-
mum malpractice insurance. 2
The Colorado Legislative Committee on Medical Malprac-
tice has prepared several bills for consideration in 1976; however,
the committee has failed to recognize some of the crucial issues
involved'27 and, in attempting to protect consumers, concomitant
rights of health care providers have been ignored.2 8 One of the
proposed bills provides that the patient records in a physician's
office, including the physician's work product notes to himself,
shall be available to the patient, or a copy made upon payment
of a reasonable fee. (There is an exception made for psychiatric
or psychological problems; in these cases a summary rather than
a copy must be provided.)' 9
Proposed legislation for Colorado should include statutes
limiting the amount of pooled reserves that insurance companies
can maintain and/or a program similar to Indiana's so that health
care providers can self-insure. Additional insurance company reg-
ulatory statutes might also be considered, since, out of each dollar
presently collected for medical malpractice insurance, between 62
"' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3 6 -13 4(1)(g) (Supp. 1975), requires the articles of
incorporation of a professional service corporation for the practice of medicine to provide
that all shareholders (physicians) are jointly and severally liable for employee acts or that
they are exempt when they maintain professional liability insurance that meets listed
minimum standards. This type of legislated minimum liability insurance standard was
upheld in Walkovzsky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966).
"I Rep. Frank Traylor, M.D., committee member, stated that the committee was
hostile to physicians and concentrated on consumer (patient) problems. Rocky Mountain
News, Jan. 11, 1976, at 30, col. 1.
"" COLO. COMM. ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INTERIM REPORT (1975-1976). Contained in
the INTERIM REPORT is Proposed Bill H-1 which would amend the COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
as follows: Section 10-4-804 would require health care providers to purchase professional
liability insurance in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars per occurrence as a
basic coverage (this is not the same amount that is required by the professional corpora-
tion statute); section 10-4-803(1) would authorize the commissioner to levy an annual
surcharge on all health care providers for an extraordinary loss fund; section 10-4-803(2)
would state that failure to purchase the basic coverage or to comply with the other
provisions shall result in the suspension or revocation of a health care provider's license;
section 10-4-804(5) would authorize the commissioner to defend, litigate, settle, or com-
promise any claim in excess of the basic coverage (the insured's consent as a condition
for settlement is eliminated). Proposed Bill H-1 does not consider the ad damnum clause.
" Id. Proposed Bill E.
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and 84 cents goes to the insurance companies for costs and
profit. 130
In any legislation, since it is "well established that statutes
of limitation . . . will not be given retroactive application in the
absence of an express direction from the legislature to do so,''131
it is suggested that the legislature expressly provide for any de-
sired retroactive application.
D. Judicial Action
The Colorado Supreme Court has shown acumen in its re-
sponses to rapidly changing societal demands, 132 and restraint in
cases dealing with the liability of hospitals. While Moon v. Mercy
Hospital3 3 was decided prior to the Darling case, 34 the court,
under an independent contractor rationale, did not find the hos-
pital liable for the actions of a staff physician; the court recog-
nized that hospitals do not practice medicine and that strict lia-
bility would be inappropriate. Recognizing the inherently per-
sonal relationship between a physician and a patient, and refus-
ing to make artificial distinctions between a staff physician and
a hospital-employed physician, the Colorado Supreme Court did
not apply a Darling type doctrine but stated:
[T]he hospital cannot and does not practice medicine and, hence,
cannot be charged with the careless and negligent performance of
medical services by a doctor on the staff of the hospital or employed
by the hospital .... 35
St. Luke's Hospital v. Schmaltz136 is a recent illustration of
the court's restraint in dealing with hospital liability. The deci-
sion quoted the statutory language dealing with blood transfu-
sions (although the statute itself was not effective on the date of
the incident):
[Tihe imposition of legal liability without fault upon the persons
and organizations engaged in such scientific procedures may inhibit
'~' COMM. PRINT 15.
Valenzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 34 Colo. App. 5, 9, 521 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1974).
,.2 As the court of appeals notes in Valenzuela, in 1971 the Colorado legislature merely
codified existing case law by incorporating the discovery rule. 34 Colo. App. at 9, 521 P.2d
at 1289. See note 5 supra.
150 Colo. 430, 373 P.2d 944 (1962).
,3, See text accompanying note 23 supra.
Moon v. Mercy Hosp., 150 Colo. 430, 433, 373 P.2d 944, 946 (1962).
534 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1975).
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the exercise of sound medical judgment and restrict the availability
of important scientific knowledge, skills, and materials. It is, there-
fore, the public policy of this state to promote the health and welfare
of the people by emphasizing the importance of exercising due care,
and by limiting the legal liability . . . to negligence or willful mis-
conduct.'"
There had been no prior cases in Colorado extending hospital
liability in this area, and the court chose not to do so in this
decision. 11
In Owens v. Brochner,'11 a leading Colorado medical mal-
practice case, the Colorado Supreme Court used the term "rea-
sonable diligence" to describe a patient's duty to discover the
physician's negligence. 40 Brochner indicates that whether the
statute of limitations bars a particular claim is a fact question;
thus, whether a plaintiff can reasonably be expected to know the
cause of an injury is a question for the jury.' While this recog-
nizes the fluidity of the "patient's duty" standard, the court's
instructions to the jury could be determinative. When the
Brochner ruling was applied in Nitka v. Bell, 42 the plaintiff's
status as a layman was emphasized.4 3 There may be a question
of whether or not a layman (plaintiff) today can be justifiably
ignorant; his behavior may need to be measured by rapidly
changing standards.' Following Brochner, the Colorado legisla-
tors clarified the statute of limitations for actions against health
care providers by substituting the words "discovered or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence and concern should have discov-
ered . . . his injuries and the negligence or breach of contract"
for the word "accrued.' 45
In balancing the equities between physician and patient, the
Colorado Supreme Court recognized that the burden of stale
'3 Id. at 782.
Id. at 783.
131 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970).
"I Id. at 532, 474 P.2d at 607.
1 Id. at 529, 474 P.2d at 605.
"1 29 Colo. App. 504, 487 P.2d 379 (1971).
Id. at 509, 487 P.2d at 381-82.
' See SOMERS 81. Since the discovery of insulin and its use in the physician-directed
but patient-administered treatment for diabetes, there have been other equally complex
and serious therapies that require a knowledgeable and responsible patient.
"I See notes 5 & 132 supra.
VOL. 53
MEDICAL PRODUCT & SERVICE LIABILITY
claims is outweighed by the needs of a plaintiff (patient) to have
his day in court.4 "' In balancing the equities today, however, sev-
eral new factors must also be considered. One factor is the sub-
stantive duty of a patient today. Professor Prosser, quoting Mr.
Justice Holmes, notes that "the law takes no account of the infi-
nite varieties of temperament, intellect and education ....
Perhaps a patient should, therefore, be held to that degree of care
generally to be expected from a reasonable and prudent person
in the same or similar circumstances. 4 While the Colorado Su-
preme Court has noted that the degree of care to be expected is
a jury question,'49 in any review of a lower court's ruling on a
motion for a judgment non obstante verdicto or on the appropri-
ateness of any jury instructions given or not given, the reviewing
court must consider the level of sophistication of today's patient,
because "the public is much better informed than it used to be,
and it no longer regards a doctor's views as law."' 50 Other
medical-legal concepts such as informed consent also recognize
the increased sophistication of today's health care consumer.,'
A second factor to consider in balancing the equities between
physician and patient is the duty of today's health care provider.
The law does not require the impossible, yet today's rapidly
changing situation may be latently presenting physicians with
impossible choices. For example, in Michigan physicians found
that the malpractice crisis and insurance costs were "affecting
the availability and quality of the state's medical care to a critical
degree."'52 In Colorado and other states with growing populations,
there are not enough primary care physicians to meet the con-
sumer demand.'5 3 A fatigued physician's failure to treat might be
"' Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970).
"' PROSSER § 32, at 152.
", Id. at 151.
", Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970). But see Valenzuela v.
Mercy Hosp., 34 Colo. App. 5, 521 P.2d 1287 (1974), where the court found that, even as
a layman, the plaintiff should have known that she had a cause of action.
11 TIME, June 16, 1975, at 49; COLO. SuP. CT. COMM. ON CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, COLO.
,JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 15:8 (1969) (duty of patient to follow instructions). See notes 33 &
144 and accompanying text supra.
"' SOMERS 81. The consumer must learn to prevent illness and also frequently to assist
in his own care and treatment.
"2 Hendricks, The $42,000 Premium that Closed a Practice, MED. ECON., Apr. 28,
1975, at 142.
11 See SOMERS 7.
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deemed negligent, yet he might also be deemed negligent in at-
tempting to treat. The lines of moral and legal culpability are
fuzzy.
Third, and perhaps most important for a court to consider in
balancing the equities, are the alternatives and public policy
implications.
While public policy requires that the general populace be protected
in its dealings, it is submitted that public policy also commands
that the medical practitioner be equally insulated in his pursuit of
his profession.'5
CONCLUSION
In order to meet the needs of health care providers and health
care consumers, it is essential that the legislature work with the
judiciary to provide a solution to the problem. Suggested statu-
tory additions for Colorado may be summarized as follows: (1)
Reduce the 6-year absolute limit in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
80-105 (1973); (2) add to COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-81-101 (1973)
the words "the parent of any child born or adopted" and, thereby,
for purposes of COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-81-101 to -103 (1973),
recognize a parent as the legal representative of a child; (3) spe-
cifically state that COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-105 (1973) ap-
plies to a minor over age 7, that a parent or court-appointed
guardian for a minor under age 7 has until the minor's ninth
birthday to file, and that a parent or court-appointed guardian
of a minor over age 5 at the date of the act has at least 4 years
from the effective date of the act within which to file; (4) elimi-
nate the ad damnum clause for medical malpractice actions; (5)
require health care providers to purchase minimum malpractice
insurance coverage (allow physicians to set up their own com-
panies to do this if needed), limit the maximum awards for
medical malpractice injury cases to this amount, and limit insu-
rance companies to rate-setting rationally related to those limits;
and (6) expressly provide for retroactive application of these
changes.
These suggested additions for Colorado are less dramatic
than Indiana's new statute, but they would be compatible with
" Comment, Contractual Liability in Medical Malpractice-Sullivan v. O'Conner,
24 DE PAUTI, L. REv. 212, 226 (1974).
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Colorado's existing legislative framework and philosophy of pro-
moting "the exercise of sound medical judgment [and] the
health and welfare of the people . ..."I5
Following its established practice of attempting to balance
the physician-patient equities, the Colorado Supreme Court fash-
ioned a flexible tool in Brochner. 5 While the factors to balance
have now changed-from the 1970 choice of stale claims or one
patient's right to sue, to the more complex needs of all health care
consumers for medical services-the court-fashioned tool of
"should have discovered" '57 can be swiftly utilized to ensure fair-
ness to both health care providers and health care consumers in
a rapidly changing society.
The Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare summarizes the situation as follows:
The gradual expansion of the discovery rule to an increasing
number of treatment-injury situations may have an adverse effect
on other aspects of the malpractice problem, particularly in the area
of establishing rates for malpractice insurance.
Unquestionably, the trend . . . has been towards the imposi-
tion of greater liability on health care providers . . . . [T]his trend
may be extended unreasonably and unfairly in the future . .. and
S.. this is bound to have a deleterious effect on the delivery of
health care."'
Although the courts have generally deferred to legislative pro-
nouncements of public policy,'59 when a balancing of equities has
required the courts to lead, they have done so.'6 0 Perhaps a court
knows that a refusal to make a decision is in itself a decision.
Judith Steinberg Bassow
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-104 (1973). For a unique approach to legislation in
the malpractice area, see Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM.
BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 87, which suggests that there be a contractual limitation of
damages between physician and patient. One problem with this suggestion is that the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAl. CODE, a relevant codification of commercial law principles, declares
that a damages limitation for personal injury "is prima facie unconscionable .... "
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(3). Although Epstein's suggested legislation is imagi-
native and perhaps practical, it would be difficult to base it upon commercial practices
and even more difficult to persuade legislatures and courts that it is not unconscionable.
,5, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970).
"' Id. at 532, 474 P.2d at 607.
14' HEW REPORT 30-31.
See Moon v. Mercy Hosp., 150 Colo. 430, 373 P.2d 944 (1962).




LENDER-VENDOR'S LIABILITY FOR STRUCTURAL
DEFECTS IN NEW HOUSING
INTRODUCTION
The current economic tensions in today's financial com-
munity have affected the construction lending industry, particu-
larly in the area of housing. Construction lenders are frequently
forced to bring foreclosure actions against builders and devel-
opers, or to take deeds in lieu of foreclosure. After title has been
transferred, the lender proceeds with reselling, or completing and
then reselling, the housing projects. The lender's concern is the
preservation of his investment, but in recouping his investment
a lender may place himself in a position of liability for structural
defects. No court has yet ruled on the lender's liability when the
lender has actively participated in reselling, but, with the numer-
ous foreclosures being brought, the issue is sure to arise when a
purchaser of a defective dwelling seeks redress and must look to
someone other than the insolvent builder.
This note addresses the problem of potential liability to sub-
sequent purchasers which a construction lender may incur by
foreclosing on a housing development or condominium project. In
ruling on this issue a court must analogize to the law applicable
to the following three roles a lender assumes. First, by providing
the funds for the project which are disbursed after inspections of
the construction site at various stages of completion, the lender
performs the role of a typical construction lender. Second, by
accepting ownership of the development and then selling the
units to the public, the lender acts as a vendor of real property.
Third, if title to the project passes to the lender prior to comple-
tion and the lender is forced to finish and then sell the develop-
ment, the lender assumes the role of a builder-vendor. By acting
in these three capacities, the construction lender is in effect a
"lender-vendor."
This note begins with a review of the present law of liability
of a lender, vendor, and builder-vendor for structural defects in
housing, to provide the basis for an analysis of the as yet undeter-
mined liability of a person who occupies the unique status of
lender-vendor. Then it examines the factors which a court might
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consider in deciding whether or not a lender-vendor should be
liable for defective construction. Finally, it discusses the ways a
lender-vendor may avoid liability.
I. LIABILITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION LENDER
In the past the construction lender was liable to a home
purchaser only if it could be established that the lender was en-
gaged in a joint venture' with the builder-developer. Under the
law of joint venture the mortgagee is jointly and severally liable
as if a formal partnership existed with the builder.'
The definition of joint venture has not been explicitly set
forth by the courts because a joint venture does not arise by mere
operation of law. Instead, a joint venture's legal force is derived
from the voluntary agreement, either express or implied, of the
parties.3 However, one test to determine the existence of a joint
venture arose out of an Oklahoma case4 in which the court set
forth the following three requirements necessary to establish a
joint venture:
(1) There must be joint interest in the property by the parties
sought to be held as partners;
(2) there must be agreements, express or implied, to share in the
profits and losses of the venture; and
(3) there must be actions and conduct showing co-operation in the
project. None of these elements alone is sufficient.'
Under Colorado law "[t]he chief characteristic of a 'joint
adventure' is a 'joint and not a several profit.'"' This requirement
of joint profit has been strictly interpreted, as evidenced by one
case in which the Colorado Supreme Court found that no joint
venture between a construction lender and a homebuilder was
present where the lender's profits were set at $500 per house,
because the $500 had no correlation to the builder's profit.7
For a discussion of joint ventures, see Note, Joint Ventures, 36 VA. L. REv. 425
(1950).
2 Rowe v. Brooks, 329 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1964).
Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1968); Realty Dev. Co. v. Feit, 154 Colo. 44, 387 P.2d 898 (1963); Vern Shutte & Sons
v. Broadbent, 24 Utah 2d 415, 473 P.2d 885 (1970).
White v. A.C. Houston Lumber Co., 179 Okla. 89, 64 P.2d 908 (1937).
Id. at 91, 64 P.2d at 910. This test has been adopted in Colorado. See Realty Dev.
Co. v. Feit, 154 Colo. 44, 387 P.2d 898 (1963), citing Commercial Lumber Co. v. Nelson,
181 Okla. 122, 72 P.2d 829 (1937).
Fedderson v. Goode, 112 Colo. 38, 145 P.2d 981 (1944).
Realty Dev. Co. v. Feit, 154 Colo. 44, 387 P.2d 898 (1963).
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Therefore, in Colorado it is fairly simple to prevent a lender's
liability under a theory of joint venture by severing the return to
the lender from the builder's potential profits.
Actions by purchasers against construction lenders in other
jurisdictions have also been unsuccessful where the suits were
based on a theory of joint venture. For example, in one case, even
though the lender and the builder combined their property, skill,
and knowledge, shared control of the development, and each
expected profits to result, the court held it was not a joint venture
as "neither was to share in the profits or losses that the other
might realize or suffer."' Because of the reluctance of courts to
find a joint venture between a lender and a builder, home buyers
have sought recovery from lenders under different theories.
The theory of construction lender liability based on negli-
gence was introduced in Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan
Association.' There the California Supreme Court dismissed an
action against a lender based on joint venture, relying on negli-
gence in its effort to establish liability of the lender. The immedi-
ate barrier to recovery under negligence was privity. The con-
struction lender's duty to the shareholders of the lending institu-
tion had been established; however, no duty had been established
between a lender and a home buyer who was not the mortgagor
of the lender.'0 In Connor the court ruled that the construction
lender owed a duty to "buyers of the homes to exercise reasonable
care to protect them from damages caused by major structural
defects."" The facts of Connor became important when the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals, in Bradler v. Craig,'2 limited Connor to
Connor v, Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 863, 447 P.2d 609, 615, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1968).
Id.
Id. at 865-66, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377. The duty test used by the court
consisted of the six-point test established in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d
16 (1958). The six-point test included:
[11 [Tihe extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plain-
tiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [31 the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, [41 the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [5] the moral blame attached
to the defendant's conduct and [6] the policy of preventing future harm.
Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
69 Cal. 2d at 866, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
, 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
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its facts. In Connor the court had characterized the defendant
lender as being
much more than a lender content to lend money at interest on the
security of real property. It became an active participant in a home
construction enterprise. It had the right to exercise extensive control
of the enterprise. Its financing, which made the enterprise possible,
took on ramifications beyond the domain of the usual money lender.
It received not only interest on its construction loans, but also sub-
stantial fees for making them, a 20 percent capital gain for "ware-
housing" the land, and protection from loss of profits in the event
individual home buyers sought permanent financing elsewhere.,3
A year later, the Bradler court limited the holding in Connor to
a situation where a construction lender acted beyond his normal
capacity and the borrower was undercapitalized.' 4 Moreover, the
California legislature displayed its concern over Connor and its
possible adverse effect upon the state's housing industry by
adopting a statute limiting the possible application of the case's
doctrine. '5
Since the decision in Connor, neither California nor any
other jurisdiction has found a construction lender liable to a sub-
sequent purchaser in a negligence action based on structural de-
fects. The courts have refused to find the necessary extra involve-
ment of the construction lender,'" and, given the lack of the case's
69 Cal. 2d at 864, 447 P.2d at 616, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
CAL.. CIv. ConE § 3434 (West 1970). The statute provides:
A lender who makes a loan of money, the proceeds of which are used or
may be used by the borrower to finance the design, manufacture, construc-
tion, repair, modification or improvement of real or personal property for sale
or lease to others, shall not be held liable to third persons for any loss or
damage occasioned by any defect in the real or personal property so de-
signed, manufactured, constructed, repaired, modified or improved or for
any loss or damage resulting from the failure of the borrower to use due care
in the design, manufacture, construction, repair, modification or improve-
ment of such real or personal property, unless such loss or damage is a result
of an act of the lender outside the scope of the activities of a lender of money
or unless the lender has been a party to misrepresentations with respect to
such real or personal property.
Id.
" See, e.g., Callaizakis v. Astro Dev. Co., 4 Il1. App. 3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512 (1972);
Schenectady Sav. Bank v. Bartosik, 77 Misc. 2d 391, 353 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1974);
Christiansen v. Philcent Corp., 221 Pa. Super. 157, 313 A.2d 249 (1973).
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development, the legal community's initial concern over Connor
seems to have been unwarranted. 7
II. LIABILITY OF THE VENDOR
When the lender forecloses, or takes a deed in lieu of foreclo-
sure, on a completed housing or condominium project and then
resells the completed units, he may be acting as a vendor for the
purpose of determining liability for construction defects. Gener-
ally, the vendor of real estate is not liable for a vendee's or third
party's personal injuries which were proximately caused by a
defective condition of the property." In some cases this is true
even if the vendor had personal knowledge of the defect which
caused the injury." Clearly, the vendor is not liable if the harm
arises from a condition which came into existence after the sale
of the property."0
The lender needs to be aware of recently developed excep-
tions to the general rule of the vendor's nonliability. Vendors have
been held liable for injuries resulting from defects which created
an unreasonable danger to those using the premises, if the vendor
knew of the defects and could reasonably have anticipated that
the vendee would not discover them.' If the vendor actively con-
17 Comment, Construction Financer Held to Have Duty to Protect Purchasers of
Defective Homes Against Loss, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 639 (1969); Comment, Liability of the
Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in New Housing, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 739 (1968);
Comment, New Liability in Construction Lending: Implications of Connor v. Great West-
ern Savings & Loan, 42 So. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1969).
" Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal. App. 2d 623, 288 P.2d 90 (1955); Combow v. Kansas City
Ground Inv. Co., 358 Mo. 934, 218 S.W.2d 539 (1949); Hut v. Antonio, 95 N.J. Super. 62,
229 A.2d 823 (1967). The Restatement of Torts provides:
Except as stated in § 353, a vendor of land is not subject to liability for
physical harm caused to his vendee or others while upon the land after the
vendee has taken possession by any dangerous condition, whether natural or
artificial, which existed at the time that the vendee took possession.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 352 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
" Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 16 (1925).
2) RESTATEMENT § 351.
' Herzog v. Capital Co., 27 Cal. 2d 349, 164 P.2d 8 (1945); Southern v. Floyd, 89 Ga.
App. 602, 80 S.E.2d 450 (1954). According to the Restatement:
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any
condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to
persons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the
land with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm
caused by the condition after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the
risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or
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cealed the defect, potential liability exists until the vendee dis-
covers the defect or has a reasonable opportunity to do so. Other-
wise, the vendor is liable until the vendee has had a reasonable
time to discover the defective condition and take the necessary
precautions." Despite a trend toward expansion of liability in this
area, there are still many recent decisions in which courts have
not accepted this exception to vendor nonliability.23
Another exception to the general rule of vendor nonliability
is recognized where a public or private nuisance exists. If, for
example, the condition of the subject property is such that an
unreasonable risk of harm is created to those outside the prop-
erty, the vendor remains liable for a reasonable time after the
transfer of possession for injuries proximately caused by the con-
dition of the premises.
24
III. LIABILITY OF THE BUILDER-VENDOR
A construction lender taking title to a partially-completed
condominium or housing development by foreclosure or a deed in
lieu of foreclosure might be held liable as a builder-vendor25 for
defective construction. The courts have distinguished the
builder-vendor from an ordinary vendor, who is commonly an
inexperienced consumer not involved in the building process. A
should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the vendee
will not discover the condition or realize the risk.
RFSTATFMENT § 353.
22 E.g., Cavanaugh v. Pappas, 91 N.J. Super. 597, 222 A.2d 34 (Union County Ct.
1966); Pavelchack v. Finn, 153 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1956), afi'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 841,
176 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1958); Rufo v. South Brooklyn Say. Bank, 268 App. Div. 1057, 52
N.Y.S.2d 469 (1945), appeal dismissed, 295 N.Y. 981, 68 N.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1946). See
also RESTATEMENT § 353(2).
21 Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942); Day v.
Frederickson, 153 Minn. 380, 190 N.W. 788 (1922); Riley v. White, 231 S.W.2d 291 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1950).
21 Derby v. Public Serv. Co., 100 N.H. 53, 119 A.2d 335 (1955); Wilks v. New York
Tel. Co., 243 N.Y. 351, 153 N.E. 444 (1926); RESTATEMENT § 374. See also W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 64, at 413 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
22 The definition of builder as used in this article is:
One whose occupation is the building or erection of structures, the control-
ling and directing of construction, or the planning, constructing, remodeling
and adopting to particular uses buildings and other structures.
Bi.ACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 243-44 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See also Howard v. State, 85 Cal. App.
2d 361, 193 P.2d 11 (1948). The term "builder," as used in this discussion of implied
warranty and strict liability, refers to a "mass builder," or one who builds on a scale
similar to that of a manufacturer of chattels.
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builder-vendor, on the other hand, has expertise in the construc-
tion business and expects profits from his building activity. Be-
cause of this distinction, courts have imposed liability for struc-
tural defects by analogizing the builder-vendor to the manufac-
turer of chattels in product liability cases. Suits against the
builder-vendor can, therefore, be based upon fraud,"5 breach of
contract,2" breach of express" or implied warranty," negligence, 3
and strict liability."' In considering the liability of the lender as
a builder-vendor, this note will limit its scope to developments in
the areas of implied warranty, negligence, and strict liability.
A. Implied Warranty
A brief discussion of express warranty provides an introduc-
tion to an examination of implied warranty. In the builder-vendor
classification, even statements of a general nature made concern-
ing the quality of the construction may be interpreted by courts
as an express warranty.2 The plaintiff bringing an action under
express warranty faces many obstacles to recovery, such as the
parol evidence rule,3 3 the merger doctrine,34 and a classification
of the statement as mere "puffing.
' '35
Implied warranty, first applied to the sale of realty in 1957, 3
is now generally accepted as a cause of action in lawsuits involv-
ing real estate sales. 31 Courts have variously stated the content of
25 E.g., Borriss v. Edwards, 262 Ala. 172, 77 So. 2d 909 (1955).
" E.g., Caparrelli v. Rolling Greens, Inc., 39 N.J. 585, 190 A.2d 369 (1963).
25 E.g., Jackson v. Buesgens, 290 Minn. 78, 186 N.W.2d 184 (1971).
E.g., Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
E.g., Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1178 (1972).
E.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
32 See, e.g., Jackson v. Buesgens, 290 Minn. 78, 186 N.W. 2d 184 (1971); Caparelli v.
Rolling Greens, Inc., 39 N.J. 585, 190 A.2d 369 (1963); LaBar v. Lindstrom, 158 Minn.
396, 197 N.W. 756 (1924).
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955); Moore v.
Werner, 418 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
See text accompanying notes 47-54 infra.
"' See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(2), for a definition of "puffing" as it
applies to the sale of goods.
:5 Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
7 Cases applying the doctrine of implied warranty are: Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala.
439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970);
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); Glisan v.
Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Sup. 476,
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a builder-vendor's implied warranty as a warranty of fitness,"'
or merchantability,"0 or as a warranty that construction has been
completed in a workmanlike manner.4 Although some jurisdic-
tions have eliminated implied warranty through statute,4' and
some courts have refused to adopt it,4" the modern court attitude
is reflected in Gable v. Silver.43 There the court stated that appli-
cation of the doctrine of implied warranty to sales of realty is
"based upon present day trends, logic, and practical justice in
realty dealings.""
The original rule was that an implied warranty arose only
from the sale of unfinished dwellings. Colorado has taken the lead
in extending the rule to homes purchased after completion of
construction,' and, although the Colorado extension has been
266 A.2d 200 (Super. Ct. 1970); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Hanavan v. Dye, 4 Ill. App. 3d
576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (1972); Theis v. Heuer, 149 Ind. App. 52, 270 N.E.2d 764 (1971);
Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, aff'd, 384 Mich.
257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972);
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Jones v. Gatewood,
381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Yepsen v. Burgess, 525 P.2d 1019 (Ore. 1974); Padula v.
J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff,
254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 47,
154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Rothberg v.
Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d 461 (1970); House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1969).
For general discussions of movement away from caveat emptor, see Bearman, Caveat
Emptor in Sales in Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961);
Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 835 (1967).
' E.g., Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [19311 2 K.B. 113.
' E.g., Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
E.g., Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., 4 All E.R. 390 (1937).
" ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-435(A) (1974); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1113 (West 1954); MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 26.524 (1970); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1297 (1962).
" E.g., Allen v. Wilkinson, 250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515 (1968).
258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
Id. at 18.
Carpenter v. Donohue, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). The Colorado Supreme
Court stated:
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is
near completion than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems
incongruous. To say that the former may rely on an implied warranty and
the latter cannot is recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for
it . . ..
We hold that the implied warranty doctrine is extended to include
agreements between builder-vendors and purchasers for the sale of newly
constructed buildings, completed at the time of contracting. There is an
VOL. 53
LENDER-VENDOR'S LIABILITY
followed,4" it has yet to be accepted by a majority of the states.
The doctrine of merger affects the law of both implied and
express warranty. The majority of states have followed the rule
"that in a contract to convey real property the deed merges with
the contract and the only redress of a purchaser may be found in
the covenants in the deed or in an action to rescind based on fraud
or mistake.""7 To circumvent the problem in Colorado, the su-
preme court has held that warranties on a contract for construc-
tion and sale of a house do not merge with the deed, as delivery
of the deed is only part performance of such a contract." In other
jurisdictions, courts have not allowed the doctrine of merger to
limit the scope of implied warranty in this area.4" For support,
they cite reasons of public policy, ' characterize the nature of the
defect as latent rather than patent,5' look to the intent of the
parties," and refer to state statutes. 3
The standards of conformity required by implied warranties
are as diverse as the rationales for adopting the doctrine of im-
plied warranty.54 In Colorado the standard of reasonable conform-
ity with respect to the implied warranty in new housing has been
expressed as "what the workman of average skill and intelligence
(the conscientious worker) would ordinarily do."5 A much quoted
standard of conformity is contained in Hubler v. Bachman:5"
implied warranty that builder-vendors have complied with the building code
of the area in which the structure is located.
Id. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.
,' Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, aff'd 384
Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970).
11 Note, Builder Vendor Liability for Construction Defects in Homes, 55 MARQ. L.
REV. 369, 372 (1972).
19 Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 280, 387 P.2d 260, 263 (1963). In Georgia, the
doctrine of caveat emptor is more or less preserved by the merger doctrine. Amos v.
McDonald, 123 Ga. App. 509, 181 S.E.2d 515 (1971).
" See generally Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Mer-
chant Did It, 52 CORNElL L.Q. 835 (1967). See also 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 723, at
2058 (rev. ed. 1936).
5o E.g., Staff v. Lido Dunes, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 322, 262 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1965).
Id.
' E.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
3 See Note, supra note 47.
See, e.g., cases cited note 37 supra.
Shiffers v. Cunningham Shepherd Builders Co., 28 Colo. App. 29, 41, 470 P.2d 593,
598 (1970).
11 12 Ohio Misc. 22, 230 N.E.2d 461 (C.P. Ashland County 1967).
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It is the duty of a builder of a structure to perform his work in
a workmanlike manner, that is, the work should be done as a skilled
workman should do it and the law exacts from a builder, ordinary
care and skill only."
Therefore, the standard of conformity is flexible and subject to
local interpretation. The construction lender who becomes a
builder-vendor can only take notice of the inexact standards and
proceed with appropriate caution, knowing only that perfection
is not demanded.
The potential liability of the builder-vendor can be limited
in two ways: First, warranties can be held to apply only to the
first purchaser;"5 and, second, statutes can be used to limit the
time in which an action must be brought. 9
B. Negligence0
The introduction of negligence into the field of real estate
initially was blocked by the requirement of privity of contract.'
This doctrine held that a duty was owed only to a party in privity
of contract with the defendant; adherence to privity resulted in
liability of the builder-vendor only to the parties with whom he
had contracted.2 The doctrine was first eroded in cases involving
chattels. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.6 3 the plaintiff was
allowed to bring suit against the manufacturer of the plaintiffs
automobile even though he had purchased from a retail dealer
and appeared to be without privity of contract. In circumventing
the privity requirement, Judge Cardozo stated:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of
Id. at 22, 230 N.E.2d at 463.
H.B. Bolas Enterprises, Inc. v. Zarlengo, 156 Colo. 530, 400 P.2d 447 (1965); Galle-
gos v. Graff, 32 Colo. App. 213, 508 P.2d 798 (1973); Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., 323
N.E.2d 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). In one case, however, warranty was extended to the
homeowner, even though he was technically the second purchaser, because the first pur-
chaser was a realty company. Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 503 P.2d 365 (1972).
5' See note 100 infra.
" For a general discussion of the historic development of the doctrine, see Bearman,
Caveat Emptor in Sale of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541
(1961); Note, Application of Strict Liability to the Production of Defective Realty, 13 Aiuz.
L. REv. 643 (1971).
61 Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 A. 244 (1891); Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M.
& W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
2 Buttery Food, Inc. v. Deer Lodge County, 148 Mont. 350, 420 P.2d 845 (1966).
.3 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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danger. . . . If to the element of danger there is added knowledge
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and
used without new tests, then, irrespective of contracts, the manufac-
turer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully. 4
At first the courts refused to extend the MacPherson ration-
ale to realty,6" but exceptions to the strict requirement of
contractual privity were gradually developed." The trend toward
the elimination of privity in construction liability was begun in
1932 in Wright v. Holland Furnace Co.67 The defendant in Wright
argued that the-only party to whom he was liable was Mrs.
Wright, because she was the only party with whom he had con-
tracted; the court, however, found privity on the part of her hus-
band and son. Later, in Hanna v. Fletcher,6" the common law rule
of privity was specifically rejected and the MacPherson doctrine
was adopted in its place.
Colorado has applied the MacPherson doctrine to real prop-
erty. The Colorado Supreme Court has held, in a negligence ac-
tion, that liability results because of a breach of duty owed to
others, and not because of a breach of a contractual relationship. 9
In 1972 the court of appeals stated:
By applying the MacPherson doctrine to the building of structures
on real property, we hold that where the completed work is reason-
ably certain to endanger third persons if negligently constructed, a
contractor or builder of real property is liable for injuries or death
of third persons occurring after the completion of the work and after
its acceptance by the owner."0
In other jurisdictions application of the MacPherson doctrine
to cases of builder-vendor liability has become almost the univer-
Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926). The court stated that
the negligence of a contractor in constructing a building will not render him
liable to a third person, who is injured in consequence thereof after the work
has been completed and accepted by the owner of the building.
This case still provides the basis upon which modern courts have refused to extend to real
estate the MacPherson view of tort duty.
68 Prosser states that the historic exceptions to the privity rule developed in cases
involving fraud, inherently dangerous objects, and implied privity. PROSSER § 104, at 680-
81.
7 186 Minn. 265, 243 N.W. 387 (1932).
231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956).
Lembke Plumbing & Heating v; Hayutin, 148 Colo. 334, 366 P.2d 673 (1961).
70 Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 580, 498 P.2d 1179, 1181-82 (1972).
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sal rule.7 A builder is held liable to those who are foreseeably
expected to use the premises where injuries are caused by the
defective structure when dangerous conditions known to the
builder are not disclosed to the purchaser. 2 The rule has been
extended to work done negligently," to negligent design of a
building,74 and to repair as well as to original construction." This
last extension is very important to the construction lender who
forecloses on a completed project, for he may be considered a
builder-vendor for liability purposes if he undertakes any repair
work in order to sell the housing units. Recently, a builder-vendor
was held liable for an injury caused by a sliding glass door after
possession of the property had been surrendered by the builder-
vendor and the plaintiff had, in remodeling, moved the door that
caused the accident.
76
Liability for negligence can be based upon a builder's "rea-
son to know" of the defect, as well as upon actual knowledge.77
The rationale for not requiring actual knowledge is the pur-
chaser's lack of familiarity with the complexities of home con-
struction, and the feeling of courts that the purchaser should be
able to rely upon the builder's skill.78
7' PROSSER § 104, at 681.
72 Thompson v. Burke Eng'r Sales Co., 252 Iowa 146, 106 N.W.2d 351 (1960); Krisov-
ich v. John Booth, Inc., 181 Pa. Super. 5, 121 A.2d 890 (1956); Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis.
2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961).
71 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 846 (1948).
Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972).
Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989 (1956). The
Restatement says of builder liability in negligence:
One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any
other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the
land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the
structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor,
under the same rules as those determining the liability of one who as manu-
facturer or independent contractor makes a chattel for the use of others.
RESTATEMENT § 385.
7B Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972).
" Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 240
F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
7 The question arises as to the standard of care a builder must use in his attempt to
discover construction defects. The homebuilder is in a strong position to argue that he
should not be held to the same duty as the manufacturer of chattels to which MacPherson
initially applied. Bearman, supra note 60, at 569. Such an argument would draw upon
the inherent differences between the more complex home and the ordinary chattel. To
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The difficulty in establishing all the elements composing
negligence79 renders this form of action unsatisfactory in meeting
the needs of the plaintiff. Purchasers, therefore, have relied upon
other theories of law, such as implied warranty or strict liability,
in actions against builders.
C. Strict Liability"0
In the past half century, the law of negligence has experi-
enced a whittling down of the idea that there is no liability with-
out fault, because policy considerations have demanded the re-
emergence of the even older rule of strict liability.8 ' Strict liabil-
ity is codified in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts" and, if extended to real estate cases, section 402A could
illustrate, it has been estimated the average home consists of 30,000 parts, six times as
many as an automobile. American Housing-Problems and Prospects, 20th Century
Fund, 1944, at 41. Also, a home is far more vulnerable to weather-created defects than
the ordinary chattel. For these reasons, the lender could argue that a homebuilder should
be held to a lower standard of care than a manufacturer of chattels. For a discussion of
why MacPherson should not be extended to real property, see Judge Prettyman's dissent-
ing opinion in Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989
(1956).
, The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if:
(a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, and
(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the other, or a class
of persons within which he is included, and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
(d) the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from bringing
an action for such invasion.
RESTATEMENT § 281.
The action of negligence has assumed a much more favorable position with respect to the
plaintiffs through the emergence of res ipsa loquitur. Id. § 328D. When applicable to the
circumstances of a case, all of the elements of negligence are satisfied by res ipsa loquitur
with the exception of proximate cause. For a discussion of what constitutes proximate
cause, see Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876):
The true rule is that what is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a
question for the jury. It is not a question of science or of legal knowledge. It
is to be determined as a fact, in view of the circumstances of fact attending
it.
Id. at 474.
" See Note, Application of Strict Liability to the Production of Defective Realty, 13
ARIZ. L. REv. 643 (1971).
" PROSSER § 75, at 494.
2 Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
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provide for the imposition of liability on a builder-vendor re-
gardless of the degree of care exercised in the construction pro-
cess. This extension of section 402A seems reasonable, in light
of a recent amendment to the section to allow recovery for "any
product," including, arguably, realty. Although the concept of
strict liability for products has been accepted by a majority of
the states,"3 the application of strict liability to the field of real
estate first occurred in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. 4
In Schipper plaintiffs' infant child was scalded by water dis-
charged from a bathroom faucet. The defendant, a mass builder
of homes, had deliberately failed to follow a manufacturer's rec-
ommendation that a mixing valve be used to prevent the dis-
charge of excessively hot water. In imposing strict liability on the
homebuilder, the court said:"
The law should be based on current concepts of what is right
and just and the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need
for keeping its common law principles abreast of the times. Ancient
distinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend to
discredit the law should be rejected . . . . We consider that there
are no meaningful distinctions between Levitt's mass production
and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT § 402A.
Professor Prosser has said in reference to section 402A that:
This was accompanied by a comment saying that if anyone wished to
treat this as a "warranty," there was nothing to prevent it; but if so, it should
be recognized, that the "warranty" was a very different kind of warranty
from those usually found in the sale of goods, and that it is not subject to
the various contract rules which have grown up to surround such sales.
PROSSER § 98, at 657.
" PROSSER § 98, at 658.
" 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
" The court relied on Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960), and Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
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and that the pertinent overriding policy considerations are the same.
That being so, the warranty or strict liability principles of Henning-
sen and Santor should be carried over into the realty field, at least
in the aspect dealt with here. 6
Schipper presented the perfect factual situation for imposing lia-
bility because Levitt & Sons, as a mass producer of homes, was
analogous to the manufacturer of chattels.
California has further extended this imposition of strict lia-
bility in realty to cover economic loss87 and loss attributable to
defective building sites sold by a developer, in addition to allow-
ing recovery for personal injuries.8 These decisions demonstrate
the far-reaching effects of adoption of the principle of strict liabil-
ity.
Although it had been predicted that strict liability would
rapidly become the rule in the housing construction industry,89
opposition to such an extension of the doctrine into realty has
been expressed. Schipper, therefore, has gained only limited ac-
ceptance in the real estate field. 0 The Colorado Court of Appeals
enunciated such opposition in Wright v. Creative Corp."' where
the plaintiffs relied on Schipper to establish strict liability for
injuries sustained by their 5-year old child who walked through a
sliding-glass door. The court stated:
Even if we assume that Creative was a mass producer of homes, this
court would be remiss in its responsibilities if it did not closely
consider the need for awarding damages without requiring a specific
showing of negligence on the part of the mass producer.2
The court concluded that the purposes served by the doctrine of
strict liability would not be achieved by its application to the
44 N.J. at 90, 207 A.2d at 325.
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
The court found the builder liable for the $5,073.18 diminution in the value of the home
due to the corroding of a radiant heating system rendering it nonfunctional.
" Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). The
developer was liable for a defective building site where the rear portion of the site, which
had been improved with a residential structure, had failed due to poor drainage and
inadequate soil compaction. Another example of California's extension of the law is pro-
vided in Stuart v. Crestview Mutual Water Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 802, 110 Cal. Rptr. 543
(1973), where a developer was held liable for fire damages caused in part by a failure to
supply an adequate water distribution system.
' PROSSFRa § 104, at 682.
*o E.g., State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966); Worrell v.
Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971).
30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972).
g7 Id. at 581, 498 P.2d at 1182.
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housing industry because of distinctions between real property
and chattels. Stating that the underlying reason for development
of the doctrine of strict liability was to assure that the cost of
injuries attributable to a defective product would be borne by the
manufacturers who put the product on the market, rather than
by the powerless purchaser who was the subject of the injury, the
court said: "[T]he predominant problem with effectuating re-
covery for injuries caused by a chattel is the difficulty of finding
the negligent party and effecting a recovery from that party."' 3
It pointed out that a builder cannot limit his liabilities by express
warranties and disclaimers as easily as a manufacturer can, and
it noted that a defect is more readily traced back to the builder
than to a manufacturer, since there are more opportunities to
inspect the real property while under construction than there are
to inspect the manufacturing of a chattel. 4
A plaintiff thus has three possible causes of action against a
builder-vendor: negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability.
Depending on the jurisdiction, a plaintiff may bring suit on all
three theories concurrently." ' Regardless of the theory behind an
action, the state statutes govern the time period in which the
action must be brought. In Colorado the plaintiff is allowed up
to 10 years to bring an action, and so a builder is open to potential
liability for a considerable length of time.96
Id. at 582, 498 P.2d at 1182.
I d. See also Macomber v. Cox, 249 Ore. 61, 435 P.2d 462 (1967). In this case Oregon
refused to extend strict liability into the area of real property.
See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
6 The applicable statute provides:
(1) All actions against any architect, contractor, engineer or inspector
brought to recover damages for injury to person or property caused by the
design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of
construction of any improvement to real property shall be brought within
two years after the claim for relief arises, and not thereafter, but in no case
shall such an action be brought more than ten years after the substantial
completion of the improvement to the real property, except as provided in
subsection (2) of this section.
(2) In case such injury to person or property occurs during the tenth year
after substantial completion of the improvement to real property, said action
shall be brought within one year after the dat6 upon which said injury oc-
curred.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period or
periods provided by the laws of Colorado or by agreement of the parties for
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IV. PROSPECTIVE LENDER-VENDOR LIABILITY FOR STRUCTURAL
DEFECTS
Having reviewed the law as it presently applies to the three
roles a construction lender may fill in a foreclosure situation, this
note turns now to an analysis of what potential liability a lender
may incur by foreclosing and to the protections available against
such liability.
Foreclosure may have special implications to the lender-
vendor's liability in his role as a lender. As noted in the discussion
of the construction lender's liability,97 the court's primary interest
has focused on the lender's acting beyond his capacity as an
ordinary mortgagee. The foreclosure and subsequent completion
and sale of the units may, in the eyes of the court, satisfy this
condition of acting beyond the ordinary lender's capacity. By
foreclosing before completion of the housing project, the construc-
tion lender functions beyond his normal operations in completing
and marketing the units. In addition to a change in the lender's
activities, the nature of the lender's economic return also
changes. After foreclosure, rather than realizing a set rate of in-
terest, any profits to be realized will be directly tied to the success
in marketing the housing units." Imposition of liability on the
lender, then, would be dependent upon his activities and on the
altered nature of his return due to the foreclosure.
On the other hand, there are strong arguments against impo-
sition of liability on the lender-vendor. While completion and
resale of a project are not common functions of the lending indus-
try, they become common functions when a borrowing developer
is in default. To rebut the argument that the lender-vendor's
financial interest is "beyond the ordinary," a distinction can be
drawn between the situation of the foreclosing mortgagee and
that of the defendant in Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan
Association.9 In Connor the nature of the lender's return was
bringing any action, nor shall this section be construed as creating any cause
of action not existing or recognized before June 1, 1969.
CoiLo. REXV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-127 (1973).
" See text accompanying notes 1-17 supra.
" It is assumed that, if the project is sold only for loss minimization, it would still
be viewed as a nontypical form of return to the lender by the court.
" 49 Cal. at 647, 320 P.2d at 16.
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determined prior to the closing of the loan, whereas in a foreclo-
sure proceeding the change in the lender's return does not occur
until well after the closing, and is not planned by the lender at
the time the loan is made.'""
The potential liability of the lender-vendor, where construc-
tion of the development is completed, arises because of the mort-
gagee's characterization as a vendor. Normally, a vendor's liabil-
ity has been limited to defects of which he had actual knowledge,
with exceptions to the general rule of nonliability in cases which
involve the existence of a public or private nuisance on the prop-
erty.'0 ' This rule is generally adequate to protect the lender-
vendor from liability. However, the factual situation considered
in this note differs from that of the normal real estate transaction,
which would be subject to the general rule of vendor's nonliabil-
ity.'12 Here, the units to be sold by the lender have never been
occupied by him; thus, the chance for his discovery of defects for
which he would be liable are minimal.'
0 3
As opposed to the normal lender-vendor, the construction
lender, although not technically involved in the construction of
the units, will normally conduct periodic inspections of the con-
struction and review the plans and specifications prior to the
committal of funds. This minimal involvement and expertise ex-
ceeds that of an ordinary vendor and may be another reason for
courts to deny the application of the general rule of vendor nonlia-
bility. The construction lender, moreover, maintains a profit mo-
tive dissimilar to that of an ordinary vendor. Based upon the
construction lender's involvement as an inspector and his profit
motive, courts should not treat this lender like a "mere vendor"
concerning potential liability for structural defects.
When a construction lender takes over an uncompleted pro-
"' This article assumes that the construction lender makes the loan without expecta-
tion of inevitable default and foreclosure. The problem that may be created when the
lender has knowledge that the borrower will inevitably default is not considered.
" See text accompanying note 24 supra.
'* Analogy may be made to Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 503 P.2d 365 (1972), in
which the court held that a realty company should not be considered an ordinary home-
owner for purposes of establishing privity between the builder and the second purchaser
of the house.
"I In the normal vendor situation, the vendor has occupied the premises and has had
a reasonable opportunity to discover defects for which he may be held liable.
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ject, the greatest chance of liability arises. In such a case, courts
are likely to apply the law of builder-vendor, which is much more
strict than that imposed upon the lender or vendor, because a
builder-vendor faces actions arising out of implied warranty,04
negligence,'' and strict liability. 00 It is doubtful that the lender
will be able to argue that he is not actually a builder, since courts
have already extended liability beyond actual builders to devel-
opers.' "7 Therefore, it would be difficult for the lender to prove
that he did not at least become a developer in assuming the
responsibility for completing the units.
Under the theory of implied warranty, the construction
lender might avoid liability if he sold the units after comple-
tion-at least in those jurisdictions which have not extended war-
ranty to houses purchased after construction. In Colorado and
other jurisdictions'8 extending the rule to completed housing,0 9
however, liability could not be circumvented in this manner.
It is clear that the lender-vendor should be liable for defects
in construction completed under his ownership. The question is
whether he should also be liable for defects in work completed by
the defaulting developer. Since the construction lender inspects
at various stages of construction prior to the foreclosure, it is,
arguably, reasonable to burden him with the warranty of the
builder's work. This argument is strengthened by the fact that,
in completing the project, the lender would have an even better
opportunity to inspect the work of his predecessor and to deter-
mine and correct any defects. In support of the lender-vendor, it
can be argued that it would be too burdensome for him to warrant
all of the builder's construction. Due to the time and costs in-
volved, the opportunities for such inspections are somewhat lim-
ited. Also, the lender's expertise in construction is limited in that
the inspectors cannot be expected to be qualified engineers, archi-
tects, and contractors, but rather are more likely to be specialists
in the area of real estate finance, appraisal, and development.
"' See text accompanying notes 25-59 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 60-79 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 80-98 supra.
Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
,o See cases cited notes 45-46 supra.
Carpenter v. Donohue, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
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The complex nature of the housing units makes it impossible to
detect all of the potential errors.
In recognition of these conflicting arguments, a court might
reach a compromise between the extremes of no warranty for the
work of the original builder and absolute warranty once the lender
does work as a builder. Perhaps courts will impose a warranty
against any defects created by the builder which should have
been discoverable.
The concept of "deeper pockets," recently expanded in con-
sumer credit cases, may provide courts the argument necessary
to tip the scales against the lender-vendor. The courts, under this
doctrine, tend to place the financial burden upon the party best
able to bear it."' The problem presented involves a home buyer
against an institutional construction lender. Doubtless the lender
is in a far better position to bear the financial risk of structural
defects, but imposing increased costs on the construction lender
could well result in higher interest rates, increased cost of hous-
ing, and a greater shortage of housing. At the same time, however,
the lender is more aware of the problems which arise in housing,
and is able to reduce his potential liability through other means;
thus, the arguments against the lender-vendor seem to outweigh
the arguments in his favor. The lender stands in a position to
minimize the risk to the consumers, and, through insurance, to
minimize his own risk.
Negligence actions have given rise to builder's liability for
defects in design as well as in construction."' The lender, as
noted, is not an expert in the area of architectural design, and it
is, therefore, arguable that he should bear no liability for defec-
tive design. However, the lender inspects the preliminary plans
of the project before construction, and at this time is presented
with the opportunity to require alterations. Moreover, while it is
conceded that the construction lender does not have the expertise
of an architect, he does have a far greater knowledge of functional
dwelling designs than does the average purchaser. Many lenders
may very well have expertise in housing designs comparable to
C' ross v. M.C. Carlisle & Co., 368 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1966).
E.g., Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1178 (1972).
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that of a builder, who, even though he is not a licensed architect,
is held liable for defects in design.
Strict liability under section 402A requires that the defen-
dant be "in the business of selling such a product""' 2 and a major
problem arises as to whether a lender can be considered a seller
within the meaning of the section. The builder-vendor is clearly
in the business of selling houses and condominiums and so may
be liable under strict liability as a seller of "any product.""' 3
However, the construction lender is in the business of lending
money at a set rate of interest, and is not normally involved in
marketing real estate. It is difficult to conceive of a court holding
that a construction lender, who obtained ownership by involun-
tary circumstances beyond his control, was "in the business of
selling" for purposes of strict liability.
In summary, the theories of liability against the lender-
vendor as lender, vendor, or builder-vendor may be sufficient in
themselves for courts to impose liability for injuries resulting
from construction defects. If a court cannot fit a lender-vendor
into any one role, the multiple theories, taken in the aggregate,
may convince a court that a lender-vendor should be liable to
purchasers of new housing for such injuries.
CONCLUSION
There are several possible alternatives by which a lender-
vendor may avoid liability. The lender could, at the time of resale
of the units, include in the contracts an "as is" clause or other
express disclaimers of warranties. The lender might advertise the
sale of the units as a liquidation and characterize itself not as a
vendor, but as a mortgagee attempting to minimize its losses in
recovering debt. The lender could publicize any disclaimers, but
this would be undesirable because its probable result would be
depressed market values and a larger potential loss to the lender.
The lender could reasonably expect that the disclaimers would be
challenged in the event of physical injury; moreover, disclaimers
would not protect a lender from liability for its own negligence.
It seems unlikely, given the bargaining position of home buyers,
that courts will give much credence to such disclaimers.
"I RFSTATEMENT § 402A.
113 Id.
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Another possible solution is the use of indemnity contracts
with the borrower-builder for any liability to which the lender is
exposed. But, as the borrower is in default on the loan and, there-
fore, may well be judgment proof, it appears futile for the lender
to require such an assurance.
The lender may be able to limit liability through the creation
of a subsidiary to perform the function of selling the units, or of
both purchasing them at foreclosure and reselling them."4 The
pitfall of the subsidiary solution is that courts may pierce the
corporate veil of the subsidiary if there is inadequate capitaliza-
tion. Adequacy of a subsidiary's capitalization is measured by the
nature and the magnitude of the subsidiary's undertakings, and
courts look for a reasonable "cushion" for creditors."5 If the cor-
poration will not have sufficient funds to meet its debts or pro-
spective liabilities, then the capitalization will be held inade-
quate."6
Liability of the mortgagee can depend upon the lender's
functioning as an inspector of the construction process. With re-
spect to this function, the lender can avoid liability by subcon-
tracting the inspection function to a title insurance company.
The title insurance company would then make the necessary
inspections prior to the loan disbursements. This solution ap-
pears insufficient, however, because the lender is relying on a
delegation of duty to relieve him from liability, and such reliance
will probably be unacceptable to the courts."7
Large institutional lenders can use smaller institutional
investors or mortgage banking firms to provide a possible shield
"I The applicable statute permits a national bank to purchase, hold (for 5 years), and
convey real estate "conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts previously contracted in the
course of its dealings." 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1970). If a bank or its subsidiary is unable to
dispose of the real estate within 5 years, it should comply with regulations of the Comp-
troller at 4 CCH FED. BANKING LAW REP. 60,853, 60,854 (1969). The subsidiary of a
national bank may perform any business functions which the parent bank is permitted to
perform. Comptroller's Manual for National Banks, 2 C.F.R. § 7.7376b, 4 CCH FED.
BANKING LAW REP. 60,915 (1969).
H. HENN. LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 146 (2d ed. 1970).
' 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 44.1 (perm. ed.
rev. repl. 1974).
,, The lender, attempting to avoid liability by delegating his duty, would probably
be held liable for the acts of his delegatee under the doctrine of vicarious liability. See
PROSSER § 69, at 458-59.
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from liability. Under such an arrangement a loan participation
agreement would be entered into between the two lenders, where
the funds for the loan are provided by both lenders but primarily
by the larger mortgagee. The smaller lender takes care of the
inspections, disbursements, and loan servicing with the larger
lender playing a passive role by collecting the interest and wiring
funds. Since the active lender performs almost all the functions
to which liability can be attributed, it seems likely that the pas-
sive role of the loan participant will place him outside of liability
for structural defects. The argument is further strengthened in
that the passive lender in many instances will be geographically
separated from the project. The only problem arising from this
solution is that courts may impute the negligence of the active
lender to the passive one, thus establishing liability on behalf of
the passive mortgagee.
The only safe alternative for the construction mortgagee is
insurance. Vast improvements in warranty insurance of housing
and condominium units have recently been made by the insur-
ance industry. In Colorado, homeowners warranty insurance is
being instituted by the home building industry. ,,8 The policy pro-
vides for 10-year protection to the home buyer. The lender-
vendor, by requiring builders to take out this type of warranty
insurance, provides the best possible protection for itself against
potential liability for structural defects in the housing units as
well as providing adequate economic protection to the new home
purchaser.
John W. O'Dorisio, Jr.
" Homeowners warranty insurance has been extended to high-rise condominiums.




STANDING OF STATE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS TO
CHALLENGE STATE AGENCY RULINGS UNDER THE
COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
INTRODUCTION
It is the purpose of Colorado's Administrative Procedure Act'
(APA) to provide a uniform system of rulemaking and licensing
procedures for designated state agencies. With respect to judicial
review of rules promulgated thereunder the statute provides:
In order to assure a plain, simple, and prompt judicial remedy to
persons or parties adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions,
the provisions of this section shall be applicable.'
Since it appears that the statute provides a remedy to any person
or party adversely affected by an agency decision, one might as-
sume that there is a broad scope of judicial review. Before such a
conclusion may be reached, however, it is necessary to examine
the definitions of "person" and "party" in the APA. It is only
from the organic definitions of these terms, and subsequent judi-
cial interpretation which either expands or confines them, that
the scope of review provided can be determined. Two recent Colo-
rado Supreme Court cases, in which boards of county commis-
sioners were denied standing to challenge decisions of state agen-
cies, are illustrative of the manner in which a seemingly broad
statutory mandate may be limited by the courts.
In both cases, Board of County Commissioners [of Dolores
County] v. Love3 and Board of County Commissioners [of Otero
County] v. State Board of Social Services,4 the issue to be re-
solved was whether a county has standing to seek judicial review
of an agency decision which directly affects it. Since there are no
political subdivisions of the federal government with a status
equivalent to that which a county occupies in relation to its par-
ent state, the federal APA and decisions interpreting it are not
relevant to an analysis of the issue by the Colorado court. Other
CoO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-4-101 to -107 (1973) (hereinafter cited as APA).
Id. § 24-4-106(1).
172 Colo. 121, 470 P.2d 861 (1970).
528 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1974).
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state courts have faced the issue,5 and, although those courts
applied persuasive rationales, none of the cases involved statu-
tory provisions for judicial review identical to those of the Colo-
rado APA. Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court was relatively un-
assisted by precedent. Nevertheless, given Colorado's statute and
the definitions contained therein, neither decision is logically
supportable. In attempting to reach a result which it may have
considered the lesser of evils, the court, in contrast to its usual
approach to statutory construction' circumvented the plain
meaning of the statute and weakened the definitions of "person"
and "party." The confusion created by these decisions will neces-
sarily be inherited by subsequent cases brought under the APA.
A careful analysis of the relevant APA provisions will illuminate
the issues faced by the court and provide a basis for examining
the alternatives available to it.
I. WHAT IS A "PERSON OR PARTY"?
Judicial review of agency action is granted by the APA to all
aggrieved "persons or parties."' Therefore, in order for a county
to have standing to challenge an agency action, it must be in-
cluded within one of those terms. The statute defines "person"
as "an individual, partnership, corporation, association, and pub-
lic or private organization of any character other than an
agency. "I Although the judicial review section had been ex-
panded in the 1969 revisions to include "parties," the court in
Dolores County relied on the 1963 provisions which granted judi-
cial review only to aggrieved persons.' The effective date of the
amendment was July 1, 1969, and Dolores County was not argued
Cooper Township v. State Tax Comm'n, 393 Mich. 58, 222 N.W.2d 900 (1974); In
re St. Joseph Lead Co., 352 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1962).
1 "JA] statute that is clear and unambiguous is not subject to interpretation. Such
an act is held to mean what it clearly says." McMillin v. State, 158 Colo. 183, 187, 405
P.2d 672, 674 (1965), citing Andrews v. Lou, 139 Colo. 536, 541, 341 P.2d 475, 478 (1959),
Montrose v. Niles, 124 Colo. 535, 542, 238 P.2d 875, 878 (1954), Isaak v. Perry, 118 Colo.
93, 95, 193 P.2d 269, 270 (1948), and People v. Mooney, 87 Colo. 567, 571, 290 P. 271, 272
(1930). See also Harding v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 59, 515 P.2d 95, 98 (1973),
citing Lidke v. Industrial Comm'n, 159 Colo. 580, 583, 413 P.2d 200, 202 (1966), and Jones
v. Board of Adjustment, 119 Colo. 420, 428, 204 P.2d 560, 564 (1949); Clayton v. People,
53 Colo. 124, 127, 123 P. 662, 664 (1912).
7 APA § 24-4-106(1).
Id. § 24-4-102(11) (emphasis added).
1 172 Colo. at 126, 470 P.2d at 863, citing COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-5 (1963). The
court failed to cite ch. 33, § 6, [19691 Colo. Sess, Laws 89, which amends section 3-16-5.
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until January 12, 1970. Thus, the amendment had been pub-
lished, but, perhaps through oversight, was not presented to the
court."'
What should have been available in Dolores County, and was
subsequently argued in Otero County, is the alternative basis for
standing as an aggrieved "party." "Party" is defined as includ-
ing:
[Alny person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly
seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any
court or agency proceeding subject to the provisions of this article."
If a "person" is anything but an "agency," and if "party"
includes "agencies," it is apparent that the definition of "agency"
is critical to the statute's interpretation. Part of the confusion in
these cases may have arisen because there are two sections of the
APA which are relevant to that term. "Agency" is first defined
as:
[Any board, bureau, commission, department, institution, divi-
sion, section, or officer of the state, except those in the legislative
or judicial branches and except state educational institutions
12
The jurisdiction of the APA is further qualified by a section added
in 1969:
This article applies to every agency of the state having statewide
territorial jurisdiction except those in the legislative or judicial
branches, courts-martial, military commissions, and arbitration and
mediation functions. It applies to every other agency to which it is
made to apply by specific statutory reference; but, where there is a
conflict between this article and a specific statutory provision relat-
ing to a specific agency, such specific statutory provision shall con-
trol as to such agency. 3
Thus, the definitional section explains what an "agency" is, while
the jurisdictional section specifies to which "agencies" the APA
will apply. 4
" The Clerk of the Colorado Supreme Court has no record of briefs filed for either
the plaintiff or defendant. However, Mr. Guy B. Dyer, Jr., counsel for plaintiff, confirmed
by interview on March 22, 1976, that, although he was aware of the amendments, he did
not argue them before the court.
APA § 24-4-102(11) (emphasis added).
12 Id. § 24-4-102(3).
Id. § 24-4-107.
" Interview with Hubert D. Henry, Colorado Legislative Draftsman, July 16, 1975.
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As with the addition of the term "party" in the amendment
to section 106, the jurisdictional provision was not argued in
Dolores County. Relying solely on the definition of "agency," the
court concluded that plaintiff Dolores County was an "agency"
and, therefore, not a "person" who had standing to sue.1" The
court's determination that a county is an "agency," if logically
extended, would require counties to follow other APA provisions
in regard to rulemaking and licensing procedures. There can be
no doubt that political subdivisions of the state are unable to bear
the cost of the administrative procedures mandated by the APA.
It is fortunate that the amendment which limits the application
of APA requirements to agencies of statewide territorial
jurisdiction, thus eliminating counties, was later recognized by
the court in Otero County. Nonetheless, the inclusion of "coun-
ties" in the definition of "agencies" is a questionable interpreta-
tion of the statute which should not have been made if there were
more reasonable alternative interpretations.
II. Dolores County
The dispute in this case arose from an administrative
decision by the Colorado State Board of Equalization and the
Colorado Tax Commission to review appraisals made by the Do-
lores County assessor and to order reappraisals. The county com-
missioners charged that, in making their decision, the agencies
abused their discretion and exceeded their authority. The com-
missioners sought review under alternative theories: First, under
rule 10611 in the nature of mandamus and prohibition against the
defendants, and, second, under the APA as an aggrieved "per-
son."
'" 172 Colo. at 126, 470 P.2d at 863.
" "[TIhe court should not adopt an interpretation, which produces absurd, unrea-
sonable, unjust, or oppressive results, if such interpretation can be avoided." City &
County of Denver v. Holmes, 156 Colo. 586, 590, 400 P.2d 901, 903 (1965), citing Western
Lumber & Pole Co. v. City of Golden, 22 Colo. App. 209, 213, 124 P. 584, 586 (1912). This
philosophy has been codified in CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-203(1)(e) (1973), which states
that:
(1) If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the
general assembly, may consider among other matters:
(e) The consequences of a particular construction.
'7 COLO. R. Civ. P. 106.
VOL. 53
STANDING UNDER COLORADO'S APA
A. Rule 106
It was argued by the commissioners that counties are granted
the "capacity to sue and be sued"" and that, therefore, they have
standing to challenge the board of equalization and the tax com-
mission. However, the court reasoned that, since a county is an
arm of the state" and possesses only those powers expressly con-
ferred upon it,2" the power to sue and be sued is limited only to
disputes involving other powers specifically granted to it.
This conclusion presumes that a general power to seek judi-
cial review must be specifically granted by the state to its subdi-
visions. However, in Board of County Commissioners v. Donoho2'
the Arapahoe County commissioners sought a declaratory judg-
ment after the state board of welfare ordered the county to place
Mrs. Donoho on public assistance. The order was challenged by
Donoho and the state board on the grounds that the proper proce-
dure had not been followed-that the county should have filed a
complaint in the nature of certiorari (prohibition) under rule 106.
The court agreed that certiorari would have been more appropri-
ate, but continued to entertain the action. The court assumed
that the county was acting within its authority in seeking judicial
review, without discussing whether it was necessary for the
county to have been expressly granted that power.
It appears that the court in Dolores County was either una-
ware of the Donoho decision or chose not to follow it. In either
case, it may have erred by assuming that the county must be
explicitly granted the power to seek judicial review.
B. Judicial Review Under the APA
More significantly, in Dolores County it was argued that the
county was an aggrieved "person" and, therefore, had the right
to seek judicial review of the reappraisals ordered by the agencies.
After noting that a "person" is anything except an "agency," the
court summarily dismissed the issue, concluding:
Coi.o. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-101()(a) (1973).
Board of County Comm'rs v. City & County of Denver, 150 Colo. 198, 372 P.2d
152 (1962); Colorado Inv. & Realty Co. v. Riverview Drainage Dist., 83 Colo. 468, 266 P.
501 (1928) (dictum).
" Farnik v. Board of County Comm'rs, 139 Colo. 481, 341 P.2d 467 (1959); Robbins
v. Hoover, 50 Colo. 610, 115 P. 526 (1911).
21 144 Colo. 321, 356 P.2d 267 (1960).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
It is clear that a board of county commissioners is an "agency"
within the meaning of the Administrative Code and as such is not a
person who may seek review of "final agency action.
' 2
However, it is not as clear as the court would have us believe that
a board of county commissioners is an "agency." Although a
county is a mere political subdivision of the state, existing only
for convenient administration," it is not necessarily an "agency"
as defined in the APA. Nor is it precluded from being a "person"
in the legal sense. 4
One scholar has stated that "it is generally held that county
and municipal boards are not 'agencies' within the strict meaning
of the [APA] .. ."I It may be noted that the court was
following a very general trend which denies an administrative
officer standing to challenge the decision of a superior board or
tribunal.2 1 However, in other states, courts have developed an
important exception to that rule, and have granted standing in
cases where the challenging party is a political entity which repre-
sents a distinct geographical unit.27 The basis of the exception is
that political subdivisions represent significantly different inter-
ests from the state's when matters of local taxation and adminis-
tration are affected by an agency's decision. Therefore, it was
held to be error for the Michigan State Tax Commission to deny
review to a township that wished to challenge the county board
of commissioners' order increasing the township's assessment.2
Both the township and the county were included in the definition
2 172 Colo. at 126, 470 P.2d at 863.
21 Cases cited note 19 supra.
" Thus, where a statute granted the power of foreclosure to any person holding a lien
on the property, it was held that "[tihe county is a 'person', in the legal sense of the term
.... "County of Lancaster v. Trimble, 34 Neb. 752, 756, 52 N.W. 711, 712 (1892). See
also Calhoun County v. Brandon, 237 Ala. 537, 540, 187 So. 868, 870 (1939); Longview Co.
v. Cowlitz County, 1 Wash. 2d 64, 73-74, 95 P.2d 376, 380 (1939).
23 F. COOPER. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 106 (1965), citing Board of Health v. Sousa,
338 Mass. 547, 156 N.E.2d 52 (1959), Kessler v. Board of Educ., 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D.
1958), Hansen v. Civil Serv. Bd., 147 Cal. App. 2d 732, 305 P.2d 1012 (1957), Stark v.
Heart River Irrigation Dist., 78 N.D. 302, 49 N.W.2d 216 (1951), State ex rel. Wasilewski
v. Board of School Directors, 14 Wis. 2d 243, 111 N.W.2d 198 (1961), and Sloven v. Olsen,
98 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 1959).
' See Davis, Standing of a Public Official to Challenge Agency Decisions: A Unique
Problem of State Administrative Law, 16 An. LAW REV. 163 (1964).
" Id. at 173.
21 Cooper Township v. State Tax Comm'n, 393 Mich. 58, 222 N.W.2d 900 (1974).
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of "person" under the Michigan APA.29 With respect to the inter-
ests that each represented, the court noted:
The Township, as the representative for equalization purposes of all
the taxpayers within its boundaries, has a valid and recognizable
interest in assuring that its residents are not taxed at an unfair rate.
Likewise, the County Board of Commissioners, as representatives of
the entire county, have a duty to equalize the assessments through-
out the county so that all taxpayers pay a proportionately fair share
of the cost of government."'
Although the case may be distinguished by noting that the
township sought review from an administrative agency and not
from a court and that the Michigan statute specifically recognizes
that governmental subdivisions are "persons," the court's dis-
cussion of the separate interests which the state and a political
subdivision may represent is nevertheless enlightening. This
theory was also advanced in a Missouri case, In re St. Joseph
Lead Co. ,31 which is factually similar to Dolores County. There
the county sought judicial review of an order requiring reassess-
ment of property within the county. It was granted standing after
the court reasoned that counties levied taxes in accordance with
express constitutional powers and, therefore, had a vital interest
in all questions relating to the levy and assessment of taxes.
Hence, a county was an aggrieved "person" or "party" within the
meaning of the relevant statutes.2
It is apparent from these cases that there is a rationale, albeit
developed in foreign jurisdictions, for granting standing to a
county as an aggrieved "person." However, the Colorado court,
in choosing not to accept the rationale, failed to recognize the
unique interests a county represents. This decision may be due,
in part, to the fact that the court was not presented with the most
recent amendments to the APA, which subject an "agency" to the
" MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.205(4) (Supp. 1975-76): "'Person' means an individ-
ual, partnership, association, corporation, governmental subdivision or public or private
organization of any kind other than the agency engaged in the particular processing of a
rule, declaratory ruling or contested case."
I" Cooper Township v. State Tax Comm'n, 393 Mich.-58, 65, 222 N.W.2d 900, 905-06
(1974).
3' 352 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1962).
1' Id. at 661. It should be noted that Missouri's provisions for administrative proce-
dure and review, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 536.010-.140 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1975), do not
contain a definition of either "person" or "party."
1976
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
act's provisions only if it is of "state-wide territorial jurisdiction"
and which grant standing to an aggrieved "party." The court may
also have been concerned with previous decisions which disal-
lowed county interference with decisions by the state board of
equalization,"3 or which stated that the powers of the state in
matters of taxation are not subject to judicial control. 4 However,
those decisions were not brought under the APA provisions for
judicial review, and, therefore, should not have been controlling.
Moreover, such an argument was dismissed by the Missouri Su-
preme Court in In re St. Joseph Lead Co. 5 and could have been
similarly dealt with in Dolores County. It appears that the Colo-
rado court was more concerned with finding a rationale which
would harmonize with related, though non-controlling, precedent
than with carefully analyzing the APA.
The implications of Dolores County are far-reaching for
counties and other units of local government, such as school and
water districts. If applied literally, its effect is that, no matter
how particularized or severe the harm caused by an agency's
action, local governmental units will not be offered the opportu-
nity to seek judicial review of the action. Denying access to the
courts in this regard is tantamount to denying access to all those
persons within the governmental unit who, although not person-
ally aggrieved by the agency decision, are citizens of the political
subdivision and may be harmed indirectly.
One might also speculate as to the nature of decisions made
by state agencies confident that their decisions are beyond chal-
lenge from political subdivisions. A decision such as Dolores
County potentially increases the indirect power of state agencies.
Relief through court action has historically been the most signifi-
cant "check" on the irresponsible exercise of governmental pow-
ers. Absent that "check," state agencies become less accountable
to local governments and their citizens.
III. Otero County
Although the issue presented by Dolores County will proba-
E.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. McIntire, 23 Colo. 137, 46 P. 638 (1896).
E.g., Skidmore v. O'Rourke, 152 Colo. 470, 383 P.2d 473 (1963).
"rTIhe fact that the commission may in certain circumstances be the final arbiter
of valuation [doesi not necessarily mean that .. .a political subdivision, a county, may
or should be denied the right of judicial review."
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bly arise infrequently, the Colorado Supreme Court soon had an
opportunity to reconsider the issue in Otero County.3" The
amendments limiting the application of the APA to agencies of
"state-wide territorial jurisdiction" and granting standing to ag-
grieved "parties" as well as "persons" are discussed in the Otero
County opinion, which indicates that the court had all the rele-
vant statutory provisions before it. Had the court chosen to re-
evaluate its policy of denying standing to political subdivisions,
an excellent opportunity to do so was presented. However, Do-
lores County was held to be controlling in all respects. In order
to reach that result, the court summarily dismissed the amend-
ment giving "parties" the right to seek judicial review, stating
that it added nothing to the statute.
Otero County involved a dispute over a rule promulgated by
the Colorado State Board of Social Services. The rule, "Revised
County Compensation for 1974," provided salary increases for
county public assistance and welfare department employees. The
Board of County Commissioners of Otero County and the Colo-
rado State Association of County Commissioners sued, alleging
that the rule exceeded the state board's jurisdiction and consti-
tuted an abuse of its discretion. The suit was dismissed for want
of standing, and the Otero County commissioners appealed, con-
tending that the APA granted a judicial remedy to "persons" or
"parties" adversely affected or aggrieved.
The court succinctly stated the issue to be "whether a Colo-
rado county, acting through its Board of County Commissioners,
has standing to challenge the rules and regulations promulgated
by the State Board of Social Services."37 After reciting the
provisions authorizing judicial review for either an aggrieved
"person" or "party," the court then endeavored to determine
whether Otero County was an aggrieved "person." Reiterating
the notion that a county is a mere subdivision of the state, the
court held that Dolores County was controlling, and, therefore,
Otero County was an "agency," not a "person."
In response to the argument that the court in Dolores County
had failed to consider the 1969 amendment limiting the applica-
1 528 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1974).
17 Id. at 245.
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bility of the APA to agencies of statewide jurisdiction, the court
concluded that the amendment was not applicable to the
problem. This conclusion seems to imply that the amendment to
section 107 does not qualify the definition of "agency," but in-
stead only specifies which "agencies" are required to comply with
APA procedures. Thus, there are some agencies (those of state-
wide jurisdiction) which will apply APA procedures and other
agencies which do not have to apply APA procedures but are
nevertheless "agencies" within the statutory definition." It is of
little consequence to the court which type of "agency" a county
is. Once held to be an "agency," the county is denied standing
as an aggrieved "person."
Although the court may be correct in its interpretation of
section 107, the difficulty with its analysis is that it avoids the
more basic question first presented in Dolores County: Admitting
that a county is a political subdivision of the state, does that
necessarily mean that it is an "agency"? One can only speculate
as to the reason for the court's avoidance of this issue. Its effect
was to eliminate the county's first argument, leaving only the
alternative ground for standing as an aggrieved "party" in issue.
The definition of "party" includes "persons" and "agencies" who
have been admitted or are entitled to be admitted to the proceed-
ings. " In light of the court's reiteration of its determination that
counties are "agencies," it seems clear that the county should
have had standing as an aggrieved "party" if it had some interest
in the rule which was promulgated. However, the court again
denied standing to the county, this time by dismissing an entire
legislative amendment.
After setting out the definition of "party," the court con-
cludes:
The addition of the term "party" in 1969 does not enhance the
appellant's position or diminish the efficacy of the Court's reasoning
" In a more recent case, Chroma Corp. v. County of Adams, 543 P.2d 83 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1975), it was held that the county was not required to conduct liquor license sus-
pension proceedings pursuant to the APA. Citing both Dolores County and Otero County,
the court reasoned that, although the county was a state agency, it was not one of state-
wide territorial jurisdiction, nor had the general assembly directed counties to apply APA
procedures. Thus, it appears that the courts will follow the rationale that there are two
types of agencies.
31 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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in [Dolores County]. Viewing the term "party" in the context of the
act makes it clear that its addition does not confer rights upon the
Commissioners which did not exist under the original act.4"
Contrary to that conclusion, an amendment which grants stand-
ing to "persons" and "agencies," where the original statute
granted standing only to "persons," must confer additional
rights. There would be little, if any, reason for such an
amendment if the legislature had not intended to allow judicial
review for agencies which were or could have been parties to the
administrative proceedings.4' In addition, the county had in fact
been admitted as a party to the rulemaking proceedings of the
board of social services. The state board had, therefore, implicitly
recognized the unique interests which the county represented,
i.e., that the county would be the administrator of the welfare
program and that county funds would be expended for the salary
increases authorized by the state.
Because the county had participated at the rulemaking hear-
ing, it would seem illogical to deny it standing as an aggrieved
"party" for the purpose of challenging the rule created thereby.
However, the court noted that the statutory provisions only re-
quire that notice of hearings be given to "persons" affected and
that interested "persons" be given the opportunity to submit
views.42 Since counties are not "persons" in the court's analysis,
it concludes that the county had been extended the mere courtesy
of presenting evidence at the rulemaking hearing" but was not,
in fact, a "party." Thus, the anomaly is created that, because the
county was not a "person," it was not a "party" either-even
though it had been an active participant in the rulemaking pro-
528 P.2d at 246.
"In making material changes in the language of a statute, the legislature cannot
be presumed to have regarded such changes as without significance, but must be pre-
sumed to have had a reasonable motive." General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp.
381, 393 (D. Colo. 1956), citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107
(1941). "[An amendment generally instead of implying an intent to reiterate implies an
intent to change the amended law . People v. City & County of Denver, 84 Colo.
576, 579, 272 P. 629, 630 (1928).
2 APA §§ 24-4-103(2), (4), (11) (j).
1' 528 P.2d at 248. In a similar case, Will County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax
Appeal Bd., 48 I1. 513, 272 N.E.2d 32 (1971), it was argued that the county board of review
was not a "party" within the meaning of the APA. The court held that, from the provisions
of the statute which required that the county board be notified of the filing of a petition
for review with the appeal board, it could be implied that the county was a "party."
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cess. In effect, the court allows the county to function as a
"party" for the purpose of rulemaking, but not for the equally
important purpose of seeking judicial review. This determination
was justified by an extended discussion of the "legislative
scheme" of the Colorado Social Services Code" and the subordi-
nate role played by the county therein. Ultimately, the court
held:
We conclude that the right to judicial review of the final administra-
tive actions of the State Board of Social Services, under the law of
this state, is limited to those parties to the proceeding before the
administrative agency whose rights, privileges, or duties, as distinct
from those of the State, are adversely affected by the decision."
No such language can be found in any of the pertinent stat-
utes. This was, in effect, a major redrafting of the APA provisions
for judicial review. Perhaps the court feared that a different deci-
sion would open the door to additional litigation, or that political
subdivisions should not be able to challenge decisions of the state
government which created them. That theory has been supported
by the argument that, if state administrative decisions are sub-
ject to review brought by affected governmental subdivisions as
well as affected persons, those decisions tend to become mere
recommendations. But, if there are valid reasons for denying
standing to counties, they were not enunciated by the court, and
it remains unclear why careful analysis of the APA was sacrificed.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
The modifications of the terms "person" and "party" result-
ing from the court's analysis in Otero County were unnecessary
in light of the several alternative solutions available. Some would
have had the same effect of denying standing to the county, while
causing less damage to the APA.
If the errors made in Dolores County are attributable to a
failure to argue all of the relevant statutory provisions, it is more
difficult to understand the court's failure to recognize those provi-
sions in Otero County. Had the court overruled Dolores County,
granted standing to Otero County as an aggrieved "person" and
528 P.2d at 247. See Cor.o. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-1-101 to -126 (1973).
528 P.2d at 248.
" Davis, supra note 26, at 182-83.
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"party," and justified this through acknowledgment of the
amendments, such a decision would have restored the APA to its
fullest meaning and would have relieved the confusion as to the
status of political subdivisions under the APA.
Even assuming that the court was determined to reach the
result it did, it could have done so by using one of two alternative
arguments. The court could have distinguished Dolores County
and held that a county is a "person" and a "party," but denied
standing to Otero County on the basis that it was not sufficiently
"affected or aggrieved." Since those terms, unlike "person" and
"party," are not defined by the statute, judicial interpretation of
them would be more appropriate. This solution has been used by
courts in other jurisdictions to deny judicial review,47 and would
have been less damaging to the integrity of the APA.
Additionally, one section of the statute, evidently over-
looked, could have resolved the issue. According to the amended
section dealing with applicability of the APA, the act applies to
agencies of statewide territorial jurisdiction and to
every other agency to which it is made to apply by specific statutory
reference; but, where there is a conflict between this article and a
specific statutory provision relating to a specific agency, such spe-
cific statutory provision shall control as to such agency.4"
Since the court in Otero County thoroughly analyzed the subordi-
nate role of the county in the state's comprehensive scheme for
providing social services, the court could have concluded that
there was a "conflict" between the APA and the Colorado Social
Services Code, and, therefore, that the latter should prevail. Al-
though this is an imprecise interpretation of the "conflicts
clause," it is one which has been followed in previous Colorado
decisions, 9 and thus would have done no further harm to the
APA.
17 Board of Educ. v. Town of Islip, 15 App. Div. 2d 789, 224 N.Y.S.2d 699 (2d Dept.
1962); King v. Stark County, 72 N.D. 717, 10 N.W.2d 877 (1943).
" APA § 24-4-107 (emphasis added).
" Comment, The Colorado Administrative Procedure Act-Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
3-16-6; Application-A Matter of Construction, 51 DENVER L.J. 275, 276 (1974). Neither
North Kiowa-Bijou Management Dist. v. Ground Water Comm'n, 180 Coo. 313, 505 P.2d
377 (1973), nor Public Util. Comm'n v. District Ct., 180 Colo. 388, 505 P.2d 1300 (1973),
lays out a direct "conflict" between the provisions of the organic statutes and the APA.
From the language of North Kiowa that "the Code has no applicability where a specific
statutory provision relating to a specific agency provides a scheme for the administrative
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Because neither of the suggested alternatives was chosen,
and, therefore, counties and other political subdivisions have
been denied the opportunity to challenge agency decisions, the
remaining remedy is to amend the definition of "person" to in-
clude "political subdivisions." Local governments would thus
automatically have standing if they were sufficiently aggrieved.
Several states explicitly include "political subdivisions" within
their definitions of "person," 50 as does the Revised Model State
Act." Colorado's definition parallels the Model Act except for this
inclusion. The legislators may have assumed this would be super-
fluous, because other sections of the statute would preclude any
finding that political subdivisions are "agencies." Nonetheless,
only an amendment would make that determination unequivocal,
allowing no room for further judicial interpretation.
CONCLUSION
Both Dolores County and Otero County leave much to be
desired in terms of a clear, rational interpretation of the APA.
Even if Dolores County can be attributed to inadvertent error on
the part of counsel, Otero County, in which the amendments were
presented, can not be similarly dismissed. The decision is thus
more suggestive of avoidance of the statutory mandate than of
any serious effort to interpret it.
Whatever reasons the court may have had for these decisions,
they cannot outweigh the gravity of denying standing to counties
which are adversely affected by agency actions. Since it is proba-
ble that no citizen will be sufficiently aggrieved in a personal
capacity, agency decisions will go virtually unchallenged. In addi-
tion, the court's interpretations of "person" and "party" will af-
fect any action brought in the future under the judicial review
provision of the APA. The court's failure to choose any of the
control of the agency," it appears that the court has determined that there is a "conflict"
whenever another statute provides a "comprehensive scheme" of administration. See 180
Colo. at 317, 505 P.2d at 379.
'a IND. CODE § 4-22-1-2 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, § (4) (1966); MICH.
COMP. LAWs ANN. § 24.205(4) (Supp. 1974-75); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.1(d) (1962).
: MODEL. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1946): "'[Pierson' means any indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision, or public or pri-
vate organization of any character other than an agency." Id. § 1(6).
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available alternatives is a clear indication that relief from the
effects of these decisions must come from the legislature.
Susan E. Ertle
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
CORRECTION AND UPDATE TO SECOND ANNUAL Tenth Circuit Survey
In the last issue of the Denver Law Journal, the second an-
nual Tenth Circuit Survey, there appeared an article entitled
Rule 23 and the Truth in Lending Act.' The case discussed in that
comment, Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc.,' had been re-
heard en banc by the Tenth Circuit; the earlier opinion had been
withdrawn and a new opinion issued.3 The Board of Editors failed
to take note of the rehearing and apologizes to the author, the
court, and our readers. Following is an analysis of the court's
action on rehearing in relation to the court's original opinion and
the criticisms in the Survey article.
In Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc.' two truck buyers
brought a class action against their seller for violations of the
Truth in Lending Act 5 and the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit
Code.' In its original opinion the Tenth Circuit stated that certifi-
cation of the plaintiffs' cause as a class action under Rule 231 was
improper because there was no evidence that a class action would
be " 'superior' to other available methods"8 and stated that "class
actions are not proper . . . where the action is predominately for
monetary damages." 9 These grounds were criticized in the Survey
article."' In addition the author of the article suggested that,
under Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin," final adjudication of the
class action status should precede any findings on the merits. A
judgment entered prior to a determination of class action status
could bind only named plaintiffs, and further litigation might be
necessary.'2 On rehearing the court did remand for findings and
1 53 DENVER L.J. 62 (1976).
2 511 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1975).
Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc., 523 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1975).
511 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1975), modified on rehearing en banc, 523 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.
1975).
1 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-66 (1970), as amended (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as the
federal Acti.
' Utah Code Ann. §§ 70B-1-101 to -11-105 (Supp. 1975) [hereinafter cited as the
UUCCCI.
7 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
511 F.2d at 235-36.
Id. at 236.
53 DENVER L.J. at 67-68.
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
2 53 DENVER L.J. at 67.
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determinations as to the elements of a class action. 3 This action
seems consistent with the author's suggested approach.
In the earlier opinion the court further held that actual dam-
ages must be shown before the liquidated damage provisions of
the federal Act or the UUCCC become applicable. 4 The Survey
article criticized this holding as contrary to the plain meaning of
the statutes' and as contrary to recent amendments to the federal
Act."' On rehearing, citing those amendments, the court held that
a showing of actual damages is not a prerequisite to an award of
liquidated damages."
In both opinions the Tenth Circuit reversed the entry of sum-
mary judgment' and remanded for findings of fact which control
the applicability of the federal Act and the UUCCC. Finally, the
court remanded for findings on the applicability of recent changes
in Utah law to the question of recovery under both the federal and
State statutes and for findings of fact relative to attorneys' fees. 9
The court expressly withheld any opinion as to whether de-
fendant's acts conformed to the federal Act.20 Conversely, in its
first opinion the court had held that deferred downpayments are
exempt from compliance with the reporting requirements of the
federal Act and the UUCCC when evidenced by short-term, non-
interest notes.2'
" 523 F.2d at 2.
I 511 F.2d at 236-37.
53 DENVER L.J. at 69-70.
" 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a) (Supp. 1976). These amendments became effective October
28, 1974, subsequent to the trial of Redhouse but prior to the first hearing by the Tenth
Circuit.
523 F.2d at 2.
511 F.2d at 234-35; 523 F.2d at 2.
523 F.2d at 2.
I" ld.
21 511 F.2d at 238. See 53 DENVER L.J. at 71-73.
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